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ABSTRACT 
The Christian understanding of redemption includes the idea that the 
individual needs forgiveness of God for sins committed. But 
forgiveness is understood not only as a divine action; it is also as an 
ethical obligation. Christians need to be forgiven but equally they 
need to forgive; they are necessarily both the object and subject of 
forgiveness. The question which lies behind this thesis regards the 
sense which this objective and subjective forgiveness makes: is the 
Christian concept of forgiveness coherent? 
One feature of this work is that it considers and connects the 
discussion of forgiveness in several different kinds of writing. -The 
first part of the thesis is a review of the way in which forgiveness 
is understood in the synoptic gospels and in British atonement 
theology of the twentieth century. 
Secular writing on forgiveness is considered in the following 
section. This is done in such a way as to allow a comparison of the 
insights afforded by various approaches. Thus in chapter three 
recent discussions of forgiveness in philosophical ethics are 
considered against the background of a real case of forgiveness. In 
chapter four, on the other hand, recent theological writing on 
forgiveness and atonement is considered in relation to discussions 
of forgiveness in contemporary literature. 
In the third part of the thesis Anglican and Roman Catholic 
approaches to liturgical forgiveness are discussed. This leads to a 
consideration of the nature of guilt and shame and a reappraisal of 
their theological and ethical significance. 
The work concludes with an argument about the nature and coherence 
of forgiveness based on the foregoing studies and analysing the 
relationship between forgiveness and others, time, God and the self. 
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PROLOGUE 
In this thesis I examine the nature and meaning of forgiveness in 
a variety of intellectual contexts and make an exploration of the 
distinction between the moral emotions of shame and guilt. The 
thesis is not, nor could it be, an exhaustive study of forgiveness 
in all kinds of theological literature. It is a study in some depth 
of certain areas which have been chosen partly because of what 
they reveal about the nature of forgiveness in their own right, 
partly because of their theological importance and partly because 
of the way in which placing them together reveals important 
aspects of what I am calling here the coherence of forgiveness: 
that is the way in which interpersonal and divine forgiveness 
mutually make sense of each other. 
The predispositions of the author are important factors in the 
editorial process of deciding what areas to include in the study, 
as are the time and place of writing and the fact that the work 
will be submitted for degree examination. Another author may 
have given less space to the sacrament of penance and liturgical 
forgiveness, but it is only by studying such phenomena in 
historical and ecclesial context that the underlying dynamics in 
the development of the Anglican and Roman traditions can be seen 
and the theological and indeed psychological questions predicated 
by such developments revealed. It is the in-depth study of this 
area of confession and absolution which clarifies the need for a 
theological and then pastoral and liturgical response to the 
philosophical and psychological nuancing of the language of guilt 
and shame which have recently become possible. 
Time of writing is not the only factor behind the decision to 
integrate narrative and more propositional and analytical 
philosophy and theology. Part of the power of the question of the 
thesis: `what is the relationship between forgiveness between 
people and that of people by God? ' lies in making the human 
Prologue 
subject, and therefore subjectivity, relevant at every level. 
Another author, or one with more space, may well have had a 
chapter on the psychology of response to injury, offence or 
violation, but this particular work makes use of fictional 
narratives which present plausible scenarios in which the 
possibility of forgiveness is raised, or in which pertinent 
questions about forgiveness are asked. 
Similar reasons lie behind the detailed study of the synoptic 
accounts of forgiveness narratives and the conceptual integrity of 
the evangelists' approaches rather than an examination of the 
Pauline account of justification or the Johannine poetry of love. 
The point is to allow the human subject, with its irrationalities 
and emotions, into the theology of forgiveness. This is no idle 
humanism. Forgiveness, for all its importance in Christian, and 
other, theology is a way of coping with the conflicting demands of 
human emotions and the theology of forgiveness is a second order 
reflection involving analysis of the logic of such responses but 
also a deeper study of their nature and dynamics. 
However, this work does not extensively draw on the area known 
as the psychology' of religion nor on any schools of pastoral 
theology. The reason for this not unrelated to another reason why 
narratives are used. What is at issue here is the fluency with 
which connections can be made between one area or one study and 
another. It was a. matter of authorial judgement that the more 
technical psychological material was not malleable to the needs 
of the developing argument. Moreover, while some have looked at 
forgiveness from the point of view of counselling, their 
conclusions and methods leave one with little to say about 
forgiveness itself. In this way the psychological material was 
surprisingly infertile compared with the liturgical material 
which, in consequence, has been given more space. 
It does not seem necessary to argue for the inclusion of a chapter 
on the way in which forgiveness has been discussed in 
philosophical ethics. The rigor of the discipline is sufficient 
reason, especially when considered alongside the recency of many 
of the studies. While some important works are criticised for 
Prologue 
their lack of breadth and sense of context, the apparatus which 
has been formed through the disciplined examination of some of 
the concepts implicit in the exercise or talk of forgiveness is 
helpful, both directly and indirectly, in exploring the theology of 
forgiveness. 
In the pages that follow, then, is to be found an exploration of the 
nature and theology of forgiveness which has at its heart a 
question about the relationship between human and divine 
forgiveness. Some material has been chosen to assist this 
exploration on the grounds that it gives an insight into the 
established theology of the area and also has something important 
to add to the understanding or answering of the basic question of 
coherence. This is the rationale for both chapter one on 
forgiveness in the synoptic gospels and chapter two on the way in 
which the concept of forgiveness and the model of human 
forgiveness is used and developed in British atonement theology. 
Other material is included because it represents a lively and 
rigorous area of contemporary enquiry or exploration: 
specifically the holocaust narrative and philosophical writing in 
chapter three and the contemporary atonement theology alongside 
the current literature in chapter four. 
The detailed study of the dynamics of the sacrament of 
confession in chapters five and six give opportunity for a 
historical approach to a situation where Christian forgiveness is 
very much at stake and possibly even defined: in the ministration 
of priests to whom auricular confession is made. The question of 
absolution is helpfully clarified by the ethical distinction 
between forgiveness and pardon and the pastoral, liturgical and 
theological developments which have occurred in both Roman and 
Anglican churches in this area attest a process of considerable 
seriousness and importance. 
The final chapter, like the previous two, is somewhat elliptical in 
its approach to forgiveness. For while they attended to the 
theologisation of a liturgical context and occurrence, this focuses 
on those emotions which forgiveness itself might be expected to 
remove, or indeed, the presence of which would or should lead the 
Prologue 
subject in the pursuit of forgiveness. Just as it was felt that a 
consideration of the historical and liturgical context of priestly 
forgiveness would clarify the nature of forgiveness so the 
question of what it is that forgiveness deals with, in the 
emotionality of the one who needs forgiveness, should throw light 
on what it is that forgiveness does for a human being. 
The advantage of the method employed here, with its use of 
narratives, non-theological disciplines and its interest in liturgy 
and the philosophy of psychology is first that it attempts to do 
justice to contributions that have been made in all the areas 
investigated and second that it throws unique light on the concept 
and reality of the coherence of forgiveness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
THE DIVERSITY OF FORGIVENESS 
Theologians who write about forgiveness refer to the centrality and 
prominence of the concept within the Christian religion. For R. C. 
Moberly, for instance, it was of 'exceeding prominence' and for H. R. 
Mackintosh it is "one of the foci from which it is possible and 
natural to survey the whole circumference of Christian truth". 2 It 
was Charles Williams, however, who put it most bluntly: "If there 
is one thing which is obviously either a part of the universe or not - 
and on knowing whether it is or not our life depends - it is the 
forgiveness of sins. "3 
However, several authors have suggested that there is relatively 
little writing in Christian theology and ethics which directly 
addresses the questions of forgiveness. In a bibliographical note 
attached to a dictionary article on forgiveness Paul Lehmann notes 
that, "the discussion of forgiveness in the literature of Christian 
theology and ethics is conspicuously slight. "4 It has also been 
remarked that forgiveness has been a relatively unexplored topic in 
philosophical ethics. 
One reason that forgiveness is a neglected topic is that the word 
itself became unpopular. The origins of this lie in the suspicion 
generated by psychoanalytic criticism of the language and systems 
of guilt. It is clearly articulated by Paul Tillich. In conversation 
with Carl Rogers, for instance, Tillich remarks: 
I Moberly, R. C. Atonement and Personality (London: Murray) 1901 p48 
2Mackintosh, H. R. The Christian Experience of Forgiveness (London: Nisbet) 1927 pi 
3Williams, C. The Forgiveness of Sins (London: Faber) 1950 p107 
4Lehmann, P. 'Forgiveness' in A New Dictionary of Christian Ethics (London: SCM) 
1986 p233 
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"I do not use the word `forgiveness' anymore because this 
often produces a bad superiority in him who forgives and 
humiliation in him who is forgiven. Therefore I prefer to speak 
of the concept of acceptance. If you accept this acceptance, 
then I think I can confess that I have learned it from 
psychoanalysis. I have learned to translate an ideological 
concept which doesn't communicate any longer and replaced it 
by the way in which a psychoanalyst accepts his patients: not 
judging him but accepting him just because he is not good, but 
he has something within himself that wants to be good. "5 
In The Courage to Be he underlines the importance of this language 
of acceptance, seeing it as part of a new reformation. 
"One must remind theologians and ministers that in the fight 
against the anxiety of guilt by psychotherapy the idea of 
acceptance has received the attention and gained the 
significance which in the Reformation period was seen in 
phrases like `forgiveness of sins' or `justification by faith'. 
Accepting acceptance though being unacceptable is the basis 
for the courage of confidence. "6 
Tillich's inspiration for interpreting the condition of the sinful 
individual before God is the image of the guilty person with the non- 
judging counsellor. As he puts it in a famous sermon: "You are 
accepted. You are accepted, accepted by that which is greater than 
you, and the name of which you do not know. Simply accept the fact 
that you are accepted. "7 
The language of acceptance is also taken up in J. V. Taylor's The Go- 
Between God. "Men did not have to be good for God to accept them, " 
he urges, "God dealt only in gifts not in wages... No rules - only God! 
No conditional merit - only forgiving acceptance". 8 
5Kirschenbaum, H. and Henderson, V. L. Carl Rogers Dialogues (London: Constable) 
1990 p72 
6Tillich, P. The Courage to Be (London: Fontana/Collins) 1952 p160 It is worth 
noting that while Tillich sees acceptance as the basis of confidence Kenneth Kirk 
writing earlier in the twentieth century saw forgiveness as the basis of zeal. The 
languages are different but convey a similar idea. See Kirk, K. Some Principles of 
Moral Theology (London: Longmans)1920 
7Tillich, P. The Shaking of the Foundations (London: Penguin) 1962 p163 
8Taylor, J. V. The Go-Between God (London: SCM) 1972 p99 
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This emphasis on the gratuity of forgiveness is of course 
appropriate, but it is simultaneously unsatisfactory. The reason for 
this is that the language of grace and acceptance seems to leave the 
problems of ethics and responsibility untouched. This is not merely 
nascently antinomian but also suggests a simple passivity on the 
part of the one who is being accepted. The language of acceptance is 
therefore sometimes being used at the expense of the idea of 
personal responsibility. 
There are many points in the chapters which follow where this 
tension between acceptance and responsibility is at work behind the 
scenes. On the one hand it is possible so to emphasise the 
responsibility of the offender or injurer or sinner as to deny that 
there is anything in forgiveness other than a self-generated 
repudiation of the badness of their past. This is forgiveness as 
radical repentance which transforms the individual into a new moral 
identity. On the other hand it is equally possible to so emphasise 
the empathy and warmth of the one who accepts or forgives that 
there is nothing for the offender to do other than offend and wait. 
This is forgiveness as radical acceptance. The truth, of course, is 
that forgiveness involves both repentance and acceptance, and both 
in a complex plurality of ways. At different times and in different 
cultures, however, different poles of forgiveness are emphasised, 
sometimes to the apparent distortion and destruction of the concept. 
During the era sometimes (very roughly) known as that of Latin 
theology, which ran in the Roman Catholic Church from the time of 
the Counter-Reformation to the Second Vatican Council forgiveness 
was seen as repentance, and repentance understood in a particularly 
limited and proscribed way. A reaction to this is found in a more 
modern era, which could be described (just as roughly) as American, 
in which repentance is almost entirely eclipsed and is replaced by 
acceptance as the primary or even exclusive aspect of forgiveness. 
The author Don Browning comes close to this in his Atonement and 
Psychotherapy when he writes that: "Forgiveness is [God's] 
unconditioned empathic acceptance in spite of man's rejection of it. 
Introduction 10 
Forgiveness is the nature of grace. "9 The reference here is to Carl 
Rogers' 'unconditional positive regard', which is the basis for non- 
directive client-centred therapy. 
To focus on 'forgiveness', however, is to consider both the 
'repentance' and the 'acceptance' sides of the coin. As the brief 
analysis suggested in the previous paragraph was intended to 
clarify, this is not merely a matter of the use of words. For 
instance, sometimes people will use either the word 'repentance' or 
'acceptance' with a richer meaning than that which was suggested 
above and thereby get closer to the heart of forgiveness. This is the 
case in some occurrences of Tillich's use of `acceptance' language 
where it is clear that his uneasiness about forgiveness is in part 
merely semantic. What he means by 'acceptance' is recognisable as 
a form of forgiveness; as, for instance, when he writes in The 
Courage to Be that the acceptance of God is, "the only and ultimate 
source of a courage to be which is able to take the anxiety of guilt 
and condemnation into itself. "10 And the point might be made that 
he is using psychological language not in a merely uncritical way but 
in an attempt to enrich that discourse with a theological dimension. 
The truth of this, however, does not impinge on the undeniable 
reality that there are many instances where acceptance language is 
used at the expense of a full understanding of forgiveness, one which 
does justice to the personal responsibility of the offender. 
This point is one of the concerns which lies behind a pertinent 
contribution to a Liturgical Symposium on Penance and 
Reconciliation by Karl-Heinrich Bieritz. 11 Basing his contribution on 
a short story by the Russian author Tendriakov, Biertiz argues that 
what is at issue in penance is the need not so much to be accepted as 
to take responsibility. He puts it that in our culture excuse and 
explanation replace accountability and responsibility as the 
response to human action. 
9Browning, D. Atonement and Psychotherapy (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press) 
1966 p707 
1OTillich, P. The Courage to Be p162 
11 Bieritz, K. -H. 'Humankind in Need of Reconciliation' in Studia Liturgica 18 1A 
Worshipping Church Penitent and Reconciling 1988 
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"Who can still seriously speak of personal individual guilt, 
when the behavioural sciences so clearly and irrefutably 
discover the biological, psychological, and societal 
mechanisms that ultimately determine this behaviour? All 
that remains are at most feelings of guilt, burdensome and 
even injurious relics of an assumed false consciousness that 
still thinks it has its own responsibility for actions and 
attitudes which are determined in one way or another by 
environment or natural disposition. "12 
He bemoans the secular and vapid nature of our exculpatory culture 
writing that: 
"Where, previously, religious systems were able to proclaim 
the forgiveness of guilt, today we have offered to us 
clarificatory theories which can explain to the wrongdoer and 
his accusers the deeper causes of his behaviour and so acquit 
him of final responsibility for his deeds. "13 
It is for this reason that he finds the short story such a helpful 
vehicle for his thoughts. The simple plot is that a sixteen year old 
schoolboy shoots his drunkard father who had been maltreating his 
mother for years but then suffers both from a guilty response and 
from a barrage of excuses and justifications for his action provided 
by members of his community. The situation is resolved, however 
when the boy stands up to assert his own guilt, responsibility and 
blame. Bieritz applauds the courage of self-blame: 
"I myself am to blame: when I say that, I step outside the 
endless chain of cause and effect. I interrupt the chain, fora 
brief eternal moment. Whatever may have contributed to 
causing my deed, I am guilty. In saying that, I claim for myself 
a little freedom, a bit of humanity, which cannot simply be 
derived from the facts themselves. "14 
Responsibility, culpability and blame are not necessarily liberating. 
The point, however, is that they are proper consequences of adult 
12Bieritz, K. -H. 'Humankind in Need of Reconciliation' p40 
13Bieritz, K. -H. 'Humankind in Need of Reconciliation' p41 
4Bieritz, K. -H. 'Humankind in Need of Reconciliation' p47 
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actions and as such assert the dignity and humanity of the actor. 
But while guilt and responsibility affirm the facticity of the 
consequences of human actions, forgiveness primarily has to do with 
transcending the consequences of responsible actions. 
This point is made in a classic text on forgiveness in twentieth 
century writing, namely the brief passage devoted to it in Hannah 
Arendt's The Human Condition15. Arendt defines forgiveness as 
redemption from what she calls the predicament of irreversibility. 
She sees this as especially important because the consequences of 
an action are often not apparent to the actor at the time of 
commission: 
"Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of 
what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be 
confined to one single deed from which we would never 
recover; we would remain the victims of its consequences for 
ever, not unlike the sorcerer's apprentice who lacked the 
magic formula to break the spell. "16 
But, as she equally asserts, there is a parallel need for people to be 
held to their promises and to the consequences of their actions, for 
without this they lose their identity. These faculties of promise and 
forgiveness are, she maintains, ineluctably social, as is all morality. 
"No one can forgive himself and no one can feel bound by a promise 
made only to himself; forgiving and promising enacted in solitude or 
isolation remain without reality and can signify no more than a role 
played before one's self. "17 
In order to be habitable, however, the social and moral sphere must 
be an arena of forgiveness. She credits. Jesus of Nazareth with this 
discovery, understanding his teaching to be that unwitting offences 
should be overlooked when the offender engages in metanoia and 
reports a change in mind from that mentality which led to the 
offence. 
15Arendt, H. The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 1958 
16Arendt, H. The Human Condition p237 
17Arendt, H. The Human Condition p237 
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The moral and social import of forgiveness resides in the fact that 
it is based on the determination to act freely, to respond rather than 
to re-act to an offence or injury. In this way an act of forgiveness 
frees the victim as well as the offender: 
"Forgiving, in other words, is the only reaction which does not 
merely re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned 
by the act which provoked it and therefore freeing from the 
consequences both the one who forgives and the one who is 
forgiven. The freedom contained in Jesus' teaching of 
forgiveness is the freedom from vengeance, which incloses 
both doer and sufferer in the relentless automatism of the 
action process, which by itself would never come to an end. "18 
Forgiveness is thus a serious and social matter. In it the fault is 
weighed against the value of the person who injured and the decision 
is taken in favour of the person. Consequently forgiveness is not 
always possible. It exists, as she puts it, in a mutual relation with 
punishment: it being possible only to forgive those cases which it is 
possible to punish and possible to punish those cases which it is 
possible to forgive. This means that the language of forgiveness 
does not connect with what Kant called radical evil. She also notes 
that Jesus' teaching on forgiveness is directed against hamartanein 
'trespasses', and not skandala 'offences'. 19 
There was very little extended theological reflection on forgiveness 
at the time when Arendt wrote. In 1968, however, a series of papers 
was published in Theology which taken together sketch out the scope 
and compass of any work which would address the question of the 
coherence of forgiveness. 20 The papers reveal some of the different 
ways in which the word `forgiveness' can be taken within the bounds 
of theology. 
What the papers have in common is a sense of the importance and 
centrality of their subject. John Hapgood's opening sentences make 
18Arendt, H. The Human Condition p241 
19Arendt, H. The Human Condition p240 
20These papers were originally presented to a conference of the clergy of the diocese 
of Leicester. 
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the point: "Christianity is about the forgiveness of sins. The theme 
was anticipated by the prophets, proclaimed by Jesus and the early 
Church, and summarised in the Lord's prayer. The duty to forgive is 
a prime responsibility placed upon all Christians. And the world 
certainly needs forgiveness, both among individuals and groups. "21 
The contributors, John Hapgood, C. F. D. Moule, Jack Dominion and 
Peter Walker attend to facets of theology, psychology or spirituality 
which are implicated in the concept of forgiveness. Hapgood, for 
instance, is concerned about the moral arrogance and condescension 
of the would-be forgiver and suggests that: "True Christian 
forgiveness is only possible on the basis that we ourselves are 
equally involved in the evil we seek to forgive - and are forgiven!... 
True forgiveness lies beyond morality; like sin it is a religious 
rather than a moral concept". 22 
C. F. D. Moule has in mind divine-human reconciliation, atonement, in 
his consideration of 'forgiveness'. He aims to "clarify certain 
considerations that seem to me basic in any approach to a Christian 
understanding of forgiveness"23 His considerations are: that 
analogies (such as ransom, sacrifice, sanctification, the clearing of 
debt, the pronouncing of a verdict) for the process of forgiveness are 
crucial to religious seriousness; as is the remembrance that they 
are analogies. The value of free, responsible personality is an axiom 
and must be a controlling factor in the language, especially the 
analogical language, which attends to forgiveness. This means that 
any attempt to relate to a wrong-doer must be motivated not by the 
thought that they should get what they deserve but by the thought 
that they should be morally raised to the level of repenting of what 
they have done. The third point is that forgiveness is a costly 
process precisely because persons are precious. "The lesions in the 
tissues of personal relationships (personhood being what God made 
it) cannot be repaired and healed without expenditure - the 
21 Hapgood, J. `Guilt and Forgiveness' in Theology 1968 p387 
22 Hapgood, J. 'Guilt and Forgiveness' p392 
23Moule, C. F. D. 'The Christian Understanding of Forgiveness' in Theology 72 1968 
p435 
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expenditure of healing, creative, life-energy such as is mobilised in 
a living organism when it suffers disease. "24 
The Roman Catholic psychiatrist, Jack Dominion suggests that 
dynamic psychology is the key to the understanding of forgiveness, 
and that parental responses to children's moral transgressions are 
the key to developing personhood. 25 He argues that people learn how 
to relate and forgive long before they know anything about reason, 
and so reason, and therefore most of what theologians have to say, 
has very little to do either with the way in which people receive or 
offer forgiveness. People grow up with a variety of pathologies, one 
of which is a `guilt for wanting', but there are other guilts too, and 
the Church must be careful in the way in which it deals with such 
innocents as experience them. 
Dominion considers that only two faults require forgiveness: failure 
to love self and failure to love neighbour. He is relatively silent on 
the first and by way of considering the second he deals with the 
psychological issues which arise when coping with an aggressor, 
especially if that aggressor is a child. Forgiveness must be that 
response which builds up rather than breaks down the aggressor; the 
merciful God or the forgiving parent will not diminish the worth of a 
child. Thus a response which is accurate, neither authoritarian nor 
permissive, is necessary for the maturing person. "Appropriate 
recognition and the opportunity for reparation allow a central core 
of goodness to be maintained in the identity". 26 The reparation, 
moreover, should be an act of personal growth which reduces the 
likelihood of repetition. 
As Principal of Westcott House Peter Walker has ordinands and 
young clergy on his mind as he reflects on 'The Ministry of 
Forgiveness' in the context of a reading of 2 Corinthians 1-6. He 
commends open-ness, realism and prayer as basic to this ministry. 
24 Moule, C. F. D. The Christian Understanding of Forgiveness' p440 
25 Dominion, J. 'Forgiveness and Personality' in Theology Z3 1968 
26 Dominion, J. 'Forgiveness and Personality' p500 
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"[Is] not an essential part of knowing ourselves forgiven that 
we should be open to receiving from others the truth about 
ourselves, vulnerable to the realisation, it may be for the first 
time, of the full truth of what we have been to them? And 
reciprocally, is not the candour of our own acknowledgement 
of what the other has been to us a measure of the reality of 
our own forgiveness of him? "27 
"The ministry of forgiveness" he contests, "is about our receiving 
the reality about ourselves: our helping others to receive the reality 
about themselves. "28 
For Walker the sacrament of confession is a specific incidence of 
the larger ministry of intercession. The ministry of forgiveness is 
focused before Christ on the cross: imaginatively to be "taken into 
that dying, but finally triumphant, outreach to the world. " Here: 
"the prayer of reparatory intercession spills over into the life 
of reparatory intercession which is precisely Christ's life in 
me: his outreach in me, his would-be drawing of the world, my 
world, despite all the disintegrative pulls of its disorder, into 
its union with God". 29 
This series of papers demonstrates that forgiveness is a complex 
process which involves different kinds of intellectual, moral and 
emotional factors. The idea of forgiveness contains the complex and 
contradictory agendas of depth psychology and atonement theology 
as well as the spiritual dynamics of confession and inter-personal 
forgiveness. What the series of papers fails to achieve is an 
integration of their concerns. This is inevitably the case partly 
because the scale of that task is much greater than the scope of 
these brief papers, but also because theology and ethics have only 
recently begun to address the complexities of inter-personal 
forgiveness in an energetic way. 
As we have noted the subject of forgiveness was, in the middle 
years of the twentieth century, a neglected one in theology and 
27 Dominion 
, J. 'Forgiveness and Personality' p532 28 Dominion , J. 'Forgiveness and Personality' p533 29 Dominion 
, J. 'Forgiveness and Personality' p536 
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ethics. The nineteen eighties, however, saw a great deal of 
theological writing on the question of forgiveness. Concilium had a 
special number on the subject30, Societas Liturgica had a conference 
on liturgical penance31, the British Council of Churches had a series 
of studies on 'Politics and Forgiveness'32 and the Irish School of 
Ecumenics ran a series of seminars on the 'Reconciliation of 
Memories'33. In addition to this there was a resurgence of interest 
in the theology of the atonement34 and renewed concern with regard 
to the sacrament of penance in both the Roman Catholic35 and the 
Anglican Churches36. In the non-theological academic world 
forgiveness was subject to unprecedented attention during the 
eighties with an important study on philosophy and law entitled 
Forgiveness and Mercy37and the first monograph on the ethics of 
forgiveness being published38. Furthermore, as the eighties moved 
into the nineties interest in forgiveness became a more public 
matter. As the legacies of totalitarianism in Eastern Europe and 
Southern America became the material out of which people had to 
construct their personal and communal lives, questions of the 
possibility, the justice and above all the need for forgiveness came 
to the surface. This was especially reflected in drama. Later in this 
work I refer to Ariel Dorfman's play Death and The Maiden as a 
particularly significant examination of the issues involved in* 
forgiveness and freedom and Peter Shaffer's The Gift of the Gorgon 
30Floristan, C. and Duquoc, C. Forgiveness special number of Concilium 184 1986 
31 Studia Liturgica 181 A Worshipping Church Penitent and Reconciling 1988 
32Frost, B. The Politics of Peace (London: DLT) 1991 
33Falconer, A. Ed. Reconciling Memories (Dublin: Columba)1988 
34See Swinburne, R. Responsibility and Atonement (Oxford: Clarendon) 1989; 
Gunton, C. The Actuality of Atonement (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark) 1988; Grey, M. 
Redeeming the Dream (London: SPCK) 1989; Fiddes, P. S. Past Event and Present 
Salvation (London: DLT) 1989; and White, V. Atonement and Incarnation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press) 1991. 
35See Hellwig, M. Sign of Reconciliation and Conversion (Wilmington DI: Michael 
Glazier)1982; Dallen, J. The Reconciling Community (New York: Pueblo) 1985; and 
Fink, P. Alternative Futures for Worship: Reconciliation (Collegeville: Liturgical 
Press) 1987. 
36See Smith, M. L. Reconciliation (London: Mowbray) 1986; Dudley, M. and Rowell, 
G. Confession and Absolution (London: SPCK) 1990; and Silk, D. In Penitence and 
Faith (London: Mowbray) 1988. 
37Murphy, J. G. and Hampton, J. Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press) 1988 
38Haber, J. G. Forgiveness (Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Little) 1991 
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as an important exploration of the relationship between passion and 
justice in forgiveness and retribution. 
The aim of this particular study is to attempt to address the 
question of forgiveness in a way that draws upon and reflects this 
broad and recent interest in the subject. For this reason it will 
raise and address questions about forgiveness which are generated 
both inside and outside the parameters of atonement theology and 
liturgies of penance - the main areas of theology in which questions 
of forgiveness have been considered. 
It follows that this study will be of an interdisciplinary kind, 
drawing on Biblical studies and ethics, philosophy and psychology, 
as well as liturgy and literature, in an attempt to develop a 
coherent account of the human and theological phenomenon and 
imperative of forgiveness. Forgiveness is above all else a 
reparative way of relating. If ways of relating are fundamental 
to human and divine existence it follows that an enquiry into 
what it takes to forgive will be an enquiry into what it means to 
be God and to be human. This is an insight which has been 
affirmed by the tradition which has refused to separate 
theological understandings of atonement from those of 
incarnation, or the theology of redemption from that of creation. 
It suggests that a consideration of the theological significance of 
human forgiveness is likely to engender a sense of the meaning of 
incarnation and atonement in the language of subjectivity and 
relationships. 
Overview 
In the New Testament the gospels suggest that there is in the 
actions and teaching of Jesus Christ a witness to what we are here 
calling the coherence of forgiveness. That is the view that 
forgiveness is a profoundly integrating concept and action. So that, 
for instance, there are theological connections between being 
forgiven and being a forgiver and between divine and human 
forgiveness. 
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This thesis therefore begins with a reading of the New Testament in 
general and the synoptic gospels in particular. It is widely held that 
one of the distinctive marks of Jesus' teaching was his emphasis on 
forgiveness. This is undoubtedly true. But what is the meaning of 
the idea of forgiveness in the synoptic gospels? By carefully 
reading the accounts of Jesus' teaching and healing in the synoptic 
gospels, as well as considering important moments when the idea of 
forgiveness surfaces, some clarity can be brought to the rather 
vague impression that Jesus was in favour of forgiveness. 
In the second chapter there is a consideration of the way in which 
the idea of forgiveness has been discussed and used in British 
atonement theology in the late nineteenth century and the first half 
of the twentieth century. Several theologians in our period have 
used the concept of forgiveness in their explication of the work of 
Christ. Their methodology tends to work from the experience of 
human forgiveness, often with references to the cost of this 
forgiveness to the one who forgives, to an understanding of the 
meaning of the death and resurrection of Christ. 
Few theologians consider that human forgiveness is a 
straightforward matter. Indeed Arthur Lyttleton describes it as 
mysterious. Nor do theologians necessarily see human forgiveness 
and divine forgiveness as distinct realities. William Temple and 
Charles Williams, for instance, repeatedly emphasise the 
connectedness of human and divine forgiveness, or to put it another 
way, being forgiven and forgiving others. 39 
In the third chapter I turn to the question of forgiving others. 
Although Bishop Butler preached notable sermons on both resentment 
and forgiveness in the seventeenth century it is only recently that 
philosophical ethics has begun to re-examine some of the 
fundamental issues in this area. Part of the stimulus for this 
interest has been the problem of the issue of justice in the context 
of the emotional burden of memories of the holocaust. Simon 
Wiesenthal's monograph The Sunflower is a biographical account not 
390ne feature of theological writing on forgiveness is that the question of being 
forgiven by another human being is rarely if ever raised. 
Introduction 20 
so much of the physical horror of the concentration camp but of the 
moral and religious horror of the suggestion that the victims should 
forgive the perpetrators. Heeding the strictures of those who have 
argued that forgiveness must be considered in narrative structures, 
the distinctions and arguments of ethicists who have contributed to 
the recent debate about the meaning and morality of forgiving others 
will be considered against the background of Wiesenthal's account. 
In chapter four I attempt an integration between some of the 
questions about forgiveness which have been raised in recent works 
of literature and some of the thoughts about forgiveness which have 
been generated in theological writing. This is a helpful way of 
testing and developing the meaning of theological insights into 
forgiveness. A distinction which emerges is between pro-active and 
reconciliatory forgiveness. Pro-active forgiveness is understood as 
an act of a certain kind of power and reconciliatory forgiveness as a 
process which involves the repentance of the offender and the 
restoration of the sense of dignity and respect of the offended. 
The two chapters which follow focus on one aspect of the Christian 
understanding of forgiveness, namely the means whereby individuals 
are forgiven by God in the course of the liturgy of the Church. It is 
thought by many that liturgical penance is not an Anglican or 
Reformed practice. The writings of Luther, Calvin and Hooker, as 
well as the provision of the prayer books of the Anglican 
Communion, reveal that this is patently not the case. The main 
difference between the Roman and other western approaches to 
penance, however, is that it is only the Roman Catholic Church which 
has maintained regular confession as a necessary discipline for the 
communicant member of the Church. A secondary difference is that 
the Roman Church has only moved into the area of liturgical revision 
since the Second Vatican Council and so has changed its rites both 
more radically and more recently, thereby generating a greater sense 
of confusion. 
Questions concerning the nature, meaning and importance of the 
Sacrament of Penance or Reconciliation have proved to be very 
difficult ones for the Roman Catholic Church since the second 
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Vatican Council, so difficult in fact that the phrase `crisis of 
confession' is often used. Chapter five is an examination of this 
crisis which reveals it to be of far more than merely liturgical 
interest. Penance is in crisis not simply because liturgists have yet 
to find a formula to win people back to confession but because the 
whole question of what it means to need, to seek and to be granted 
forgiveness in a liturgical way has become extremely complicated. 
This chapter reveals both the depth of the crisis and the nature of 
that complexity. 
In chapter six I consider the history of liturgical penance in the 
Anglican Church. This survey reveals that auricular confession has 
an established place in Anglican practice, particularly deriving from 
the place reserved for it in the order for the Visitation of the Sick 
in the Book of Common Prayer. This primary location, together with 
the teaching that confession should be available but not compulsory, 
help to establish a tradition of liturgical forgiveness with 
complimentary strengths and difficulties to that of Roman 
Catholicism 
In chapter seven I explore the emotions of guilt and shame. This is 
an important area to consider in a study of forgiveness because it 
has often been assumed that the Judeo-Christian tradition is based 
on a history of law-giving and consequently on a theology of a 
redemption which is intended to rescue those who have 
transgressed, and that forgiveness therefore has its primary 
meaning in relation to personal guilt. It has further been assumed, 
at least in the post-Freudian western world, that guilt is a 
problematic emotion, which is in fact far more likely to be 
generated by actions and events for which the subject has no 
responsibility than for those which he or she is responsible and 
therefore truly guilty. Yet another assumption has made this 
situation more complex still, namely that guilt, for all the 
psychological complexity of the construct, is a more sophisticated 
moral emotion than the alternative, shame, which is the hall-mark 
of relatively heteronomous and unreflective societies. The purpose 
of this chapter is to examine these assumptions and to replace them 
by understandings of both shame and guilt which allow for the 
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possibility that it might be both realistic and appropriate for 
individuals to experience these moral emotions and therefore both 
realistic and appropriate for them as individuals and as members of 
social and theological communities to deal with them positively. 
In the final and concluding chapter I draw together what has been 
gleaned from the various investigations outlined above. The 
argument here is that human forgiveness is profoundly connected to 
divine forgiveness, and that the Christian vision of each individual 
as both in need of and needing to offer forgiveness makes good 
human and theological sense. The relation between human and divine 
forgiveness is not so much condition, as Charles Williams feared and 
a reading of the exclusively Matthean texts would suggest, as one of 
connectedness. The forgiveness of God is the inspiration of human 
acts of forgiveness, but it can also be the consequence of intentions, 
intimations or completions of human acts of reconciliation. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
FORGIVENESS IN THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS' 
As we have seen, Hannah Arendt was of the view that the role of 
forgiveness in human affairs was discovered by Jesus of Nazareth. 2 
The Greeks, she argued, knew nothing about it and the Romans only 
had the occasional commutation of a death sentence. The Indian 
Jesuit George Soares-Prabhu also makes the point that forgiveness 
has a special place in Christianity, suggesting that the Indian reader 
of the New Testament would be struck by the frequent invitation to 
forgive. 3 Unlike the Greeks and Romans however, the Indians would 
have found the notion of forgiveness familiar, so that it would have 
been the prominence of the teaching to forgive in the dharma of 
Jesus which would be striking: "For if these are not exclusively 
Christian attitudes, the importance given to them in the teaching of 
Jesus, and the concrete forms they assume in the New Testament, 
give them a specifically Christian significance. "4 
Readers of the Hebrew scriptures are also familiar with forgiveness. 
The Old Testament has several prayers which are based on the 
understanding that God might forgive. 5 There are also prophetic 
moments, such as David's encounter with Nathan, when forgiveness 
is pronounced: "the Lord has put away your sin" (2Sam 12: 13). In 
fact it is possible to argue that the whole of the narrative of the Old 
Testament is based on an act of divine forgiveness. When on Sinai 
the Lord perceived that the people made a golden calf he was 
enraged. Moses interceded by asking the Lord to remember the 
1 Biblical quotations are from the Revised Standard Version. 
2Arendt, H The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 1958 p241 
3Soares-Prabhu, G. 'As We Forgive' in Concilium 184 2 1986 
4Soares-Prabhu, G. 'As We Forgive' p57 
5Eg. Daniel 9: 3-19, See also Exodus 34: 5-7, Isaiah 1: 18 and Psalm 32 
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offence in the context of the covenant, and it is on the basis of this 
that the Lord puts away his anger. "Remember Abraham, Isaac and 
Israel, thy servants, to whom thou didst sware by thine own self... 
And the Lord repented of the evil which he thought to do to his 
people. " (Ex 32: 13&14) It is in this way that Hebrew salvation 
history is underwritten by an act of forgiveness just as much as by 
an act of liberation or covenant. 6 
But even if there are ways of overstating the significance of Jesus 
in the history of the idea of forgiveness it remains the case that he 
is a singularly significant figure. Although the Pauline view that 
"Christ died for our sins in accordance with the scriptures" (I Cor 
15: 3) has framed most western atonement theology, this is only half 
the story of forgiveness. The other half is the teaching and practice 
of Jesus with regard to forgiveness. It is recorded in all three 
synoptic gospels that Jesus not only healed a paralytic man but also 
pronounced that his sins were forgiven. Forgiveness also features in 
Jesus' direct and parabolic teaching. And again, there are narratives 
concerning the way in which Jesus related to people which can be 
interpreted as stories of forgiveness. 
1. FORGIVENESS IN THE GOSPELS 
The purpose of this chapter is to discern what the gospels have to 
say about forgiveness. The treatment will be thematic but will not 
be negligent of differences between the different evangelists' 
understandings. Our purpose, however, is not redaction criticism, 
nor is the point of this study to determine the facts about Jesus' 
teaching on forgiveness and his forgiving actions. Rather it is to 
draw to the surface what is said and done with regard to forgiveness 
in the gospels. 
There are, in fact, no passages which could be claimed to be directly 
and overtly concerned with forgiveness which are common to all the 
gospels. In addition there is important material which appears in 
6Notice for instance the tremendous significance which Exodus 34: 5-7 has in Yom 
Kippur liturgy. 'The Lord, the Lord, a God of mercy and compassion, slow to anger, 
generous in love and truth, showing love to thousands, forgiving sin, wrong and 
failure; who pardons. " 
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one gospel only. Mark is the only evangelist to have it that the 
baptism of John is "of repentance for the forgiveness of sins" (Mk 
1: 4). Only Matthew has it that the wine offered at the Last Supper is 
"poured out for many for the forgiveness of sins" (Mt 26: 28). It is 
only Luke who has the words, "Father forgive them, they know not 
what they do" (Lk 23: 34) on the lips of the crucified Jesus. Finally, 
it is only John who has the Easter-cum-Pentecostal inspiration of 
the disciples: "Receive the Holy Spirit. If you forgive the sins of 
any they are forgiven, and if you retain the sins of any they are 
retained" (Jn 20: 22b, 23). 
Of the gospels Mark and John have the least material which is 
directly concerned with forgiveness. Mark has very little teaching 
material in general and John has hardly any reference to the word 
forgiveness at all. The account of the response of Jesus to the 
putative stoning of the woman taken in adultery is troublesome. 
While it is a classical New Testament text on forgiveness, it is not 
a genuinely Johannine passage. John works on a more abstract 
theological level than any of the other evangelists and shows 
himself to be relatively unconcerned with matters of social 
psychology. Consequently he has descriptions of Jesus such as: "the 
lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world" (Jn 1: 29). It is 
wrong therefore to suggest that John is not interested in 
forgiveness, and there are passages which, when read very closely, 
reveal an interest and an understanding of some of the issues which 
the claim that Jesus is a forgiver raise. 
An example of this is the narrative of Bethesda (Jn 5: 1f). In many 
ways this does not seem to be a forgiveness story at all. However, 
it becomes more than a healing story when Jesus encounters the 
healed man in the temple and says; "See you are well! Sin no more, 
that nothing worse befall you. " (Jn 5: 14) Bultmann is not convinced 
that this is important: 
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"The saying reflects the Jewish idea of retribution, according 
to which sickness must be attributed to sin. This is most 
surprising on the lips of the Johannine Jesus since it makes 
men accept the principle he had rejected in 9.2f7. Moreover, 
the saying bears no relation to the question which was raised 
in v10, and the only point of v14 is to prepare the way for the 
next scene. "8 
Barrett, however, takes a different line. He does not read into this 
the implication that the disease was the result of sin, rather the 
implication is the more subtle one that the man was not chosen for 
his merits. But there is a hint that the healing is more than bodily 
repair, that it may also be a matter of forgiveness. "In John nothing 
is said of forgiveness, but the whole chapter implies a treatment of 
evil too radical to be exhausted in the healing of physical disease, 
and the command to sin no more suggests that sins up to that point 
have already been dealt with. "9 
Mark's references to forgiveness are all direct and important. There 
is the healing of the paralytic (Mk 2: 1-12), the question of 
unforgivable sin (Mk 3: 28) and the relation of forgiveness and prayer 
(Mk 11: 25). All of these are taken up by both Matthew and Luke and 
we will consider them as the core of the teaching on forgiveness 
presented in the gospels. 
In addition to this core there are the Matthean and Lucan flanks. 
Both these evangelists integrate their understandings of the 
importance of forgiveness in the life and teaching of Jesus with 
their more general theological stance and thereby give emphasis to a 
particular aspect of forgiveness. Matthew is the evangelist who 
most emphasises what we might call the conditionality of 
forgiveness, or the duty of the disciple to forgive. Luke, on the other 
hand, while he has this idea, gives more attention to forgiveness as 
7Jesus, when asked whether a man was blind because of his own sins or those of his 
parents replies: "It was not that this man sinned, or his parents, but that the works of 
God might be manifested in him. " 
8Bultmann, R. The Gospel of John (Oxford: Basil Blackwell) 1971 p243 
9Barrett, C. K. The Gospel According to St John Second Edition (London: SPCK) 1978 
p255 
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a response to repentance. These emphases are important enough to 
be described in more detail. 
1. i. Forgiveness in Matthew 
For Matthew, entrance to the Kingdom of Heaven is the supreme, but 
not very easily attained, goal of life. The figure of judgement hangs 
over the narrative, and the text which, as well as being permeated 
by references to the fulfilment of Hebrew prophecy, contains lengthy 
sections of ethical teaching. These can be construed as a moral 
development of Jewish law. The prospect of judgement is thus 
balanced by the ethic of the golden rule: "do unto others what you 
wish them to do to you" (Mt 7: 12). Matthew's moral imperative does 
not stop there, however. Towards the end of chapter 5 ultimate and 
potentially treacherous moral heights are scaled: "Love your 
enemies... you must be perfect even as your heavenly Father is 
perfect" (Mt 5: 43-48). 
The spiritual importance of the way in which human beings comport 
themselves with regard to each other is emphasised in the final 
discourse (Mt 23-25). Most of the sins which are castigated in the 
Scribes and Pharisees are social: accusations of treating others 
badly and religious extravagance are woven into the repeated charge 
of hypocrisy in the seven woes (Mt 23: 13-33). In identifying justice, 
mercy and faithfulness as the 'weightier' matters (Mt 23: 23) 
Matthew distinguishes spiritual and relational aspects of the law 
from the personal and religious. In the parable, or apocalyptic 
vision, of the sheep and the goats this emphasis is developed 
further. Judgement is made on the basis of the way in which others 
have been treated. Relations are all significant because God is in, or 
at least identifies with, the other: "whatever you did for the least 
of my brethren, you did to me" (Mt 25: 40). 
Matthew's ethics are driven by an antipathy to hypocrisy. This is 
why he emphasises both subjectivity and relations with others. If 
these are right then religious practice will have its proper place. If 
they are wrong then religion is vain, damning hypocrisy. Forgiveness 
is important in Matthew as a virtue alongside kindness and charity. 
People should be merciful, broad-minded and tolerant in the face of 
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being sinned against by others. This is congruent with his ethics of 
non-exploitation and integrity: the best thing a person who is 
offended against can do for themselves and the other is forgive. 
This judgement is final. Individuals are blessed or condemned 
according to the way in which they have treated others. But while 
people are judged according to the criterion of whether or not they 
have been merciful, the final judgement is not itself a matter of 
mercy. Consequently people are kind, and therefore saved, or callous 
and therefore condemned. 
Matthew's imperative to forgive does not extend to God. Failure to 
forgive is severely punished: "And in his anger his lord delivered 
[the unforgiving slave] to the jailers, till he should pay all his debt. 
So also my heavenly Father will do to every one of you, if you do not 
forgive your brother from your heart. "(Mt 18: 35) Thus rather than 
being the end of judgement, forgiveness is a basis of judgement. 
Matthew's theological message is not that God is merciful but that 
God the righteous judge demands mercy and kindness in human 
beings. As Beare has observed: 
"[In] this whole passage there is no trace of a doctrine of the 
forgiveness of sins, or of the grace of God. The righteous are 
invited to enter into the kingdom because they have shown 
themselves worthy by their kind deeds, not because their sins 
are forgiven. There is no trace of a saving faith - the 
righteous have done their good deeds without any thought that 
they were serving Christ (or God). "l° 
i. ii. Forgiveness in Luke 
Christopher Evans writes that, "Repentance with a view to 
forgiveness is, for Luke, the sole content of the universal 
proclamation made in Jesus' name. "11 Luke considers both inter- 
human and divine-human forgiveness to be important. Like Matthew 
he emphasises the priority of forgiveness among the virtues of the 
disciples, and like both Matthew and Mark he stresses that divine 
forgiveness is of central importance within the area of salvation, 
1 OBeare, F. W. The Gospel According to Matthew (Oxford: Basil Blackwell) 1981 p496 
11 Evans, C. F. Saint Luke (London: SCM) 1990 p95 
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and that Jesus' authority to forgive sins is pivotal in his dispute 
with the religious leaders. 
As we have noted the cry for forgiveness from the cross is only 
found in the gospel according to Luke. The verse, however, is absent 
from many ancient sources and is widely held to be a later addition 
to the gospel text. 12 Nevertheless the sentiment is not alien to 
Luke's understanding. In Acts the words on the lips of the martyred 
Stephen are: "Lord, do not hold this sin against them" (Acts 7: 60). 
The difference is that whereas Jesus exculpates his murderers as he 
prays for them, Stephen affirms that they are responsible while he 
prays that they may not be condemned to the consequences of their 
guilt. Stephen prays that they might be forgiven: Jesus that they 
might be excused. 13 
Luke is also the only evangelist to tell the story of the prodigal son 
(or loving father or grumpy brother). He sees that there is: "more 
joy over one sinner who repents than over ninety nine righteous 
persons who need no repentance" (Lk 15: 11). Whether or not Luke 
knew ninety nine just people who needed no repentance is not clear. 
What is clear, however, is that he was concerned to reinstate those 
who, on contemporary understanding, would be cast out. Luke, the 
transvaluer of people is primarily concerned with forgiveness as a 
way of changing things. He has the story of the healed paralytic (Lk 
5) but also that of the woman who anointed Jesus at the house of 
Simon the Pharisee (Lk 7). This precipitates not only a social 
scandal but also a dialogue sermon on forgiveness. The point is that 
those who have been forgiven a great deal are greatly loved and 
respond with great, even extravagant love. This sort of teaching 
scandalises and leads to the question: "who is this, who even 
forgives sins? "(Lk 7: 49). 
While both Matthew and Luke end their gospels with commissionings 
of the disciples it is only Luke who includes the idea that: 
"repentance and forgiveness should be preached in his [Jesus'] 
12Evans, C. F. Saint Luke p867 
13The relationship between excuse and forgiveness is examined more closely in 
chapter 3. 
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name". This is an interpretation as much of the meaning of the 
whole of the Hebrew scriptures as it is of the life and resurrection 
of Christ. Although the ideas of repentance and forgiveness are 
severally associated with Jesus in this gospel, this conjunction is 
elsewhere associated with the mission of John, who was: 
"preaching a baptism of repentance for the forgiveness of sins" (Lk 
3: 3). But the emphasis in this post-resurrection appearance is more 
closely related to the presentation of the Church's mission in Acts. 
Evans makes the point that in these passages, "repentance and 
forgiveness are not connected with any doctrine of the death of 
Christ as an atonement or sacrifice, but with his resurrection and 
exaltation to be both judge and gracious messiah. "14 This is also the 
case in this passage: "it is written that the Christ should suffer and 
on the third day rise from the dead" (Lk 24: 46). 
The passage can be contrasted with the equivalent in Matthew (Mt 
28: 18-20). For both evangelists the core is the mission to the 
nations. Matthew emphasises baptism and includes the formulaic, 
"in the name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit" 
(v19). Luke has it that the gospel should be preached in the name of 
Jesus, meaning that members of the apostolic community should be 
regarded as his representatives. The most interesting difference 
however focuses the respective references to ethics. While Luke 
demands that repentance and forgiveness be the message, Matthew's 
concern is that the new disciples should be taught, "to observe all 
that I have commanded you" (v20). As we have seen, Matthew is not 
convinced that there is a way to the kingdom of heaven other than 
perfect obedience of the new, spiritual law. Luke, on the other hand, 
has a gospel of salvation for sinners. 
1. iii. The Unforgivable Sin 
The references to the sin which cannot be forgiven in the synoptic 
gospels (Mk 3: 28; Mt 12: 31; Lk 12: 10) have long been a source of 
anxiety not only for those inclined to scruple about their behaviour 
and intentions but also those who reflect on the forgiveness of God. 
14Evans, C. F. Saint Luke p923 
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In a tradition which stems from Augustine and is based in Hebrews 
6: 4 the unforgivable sin is apostacy. It is the lapsing of those who 
had once received enlightenment. Another tradition equates it with 
the notion of mortal sin derived from 1 John 5 which became such an 
important part of Latin penitential theology. A third approach is to 
follow Karl Barth in the view that it is a persisting with a theology 
of works-righteousness. Yet another sees it as blasphemy, although 
the key texts are quite explicit that blasphemy against the son of 
man is forgivable. As Berkouwer argues, however, the unpardonable 
sin cannot be defined simply in terms of deliberateness, 
stubbornness or blasphemy. The situation is a specific one of 
calculated and wilful misattribution. 
"The admonition is not concerned with a general antagonism of 
men against Christ or with Israel's daily rejection, but rather 
with the circumstance in which the Holy Spirit is obviously 
present in this act of the humble Lord, and yet the credit is 
given to Beelzebul. "15 
The phrase was not original or unique to Jesus but was common 
among the scribes, those towards whom it is, in this passage, 
addressed. The point, according to Lane, is that the scribal 
accusations amount to a denial of the power and greatness of the 
Spirit of God. This is a statement of the limit of faith in salvation. 
`By assigning the action of God to a demonic origin the scribes 
betray a perversion of Spirit which, in defiance of the truth, 
chooses to call light darkness... [it] denotes the conscious and 
deliberate rejection of the saving power and grace of God 
released through Jesus' word and act. "16 
To call good evil is to cut oneself off from good. That is why it is, 
so to speak, unforgivable. "Only the man who cuts himself off from 
forgiveness is excluded from it. "» 
15Berkouwer, G. C. Sin (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans) 1971 p340 
16Lane, W. The Gospel According to Mark (London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott) 1974 
p145 
17Rengstorf, K. in Theological Wordbook of the New Testament ET 1964 p304- quoted 
by Lane The Gospel According to Mark p145 
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According to Lane extrapolation from this particular context is not 
appropriate. Jesus is addressing Scribes, legal experts whose 
responsibility was: "to be aware of God's redemptive action". 18 The 
imperfect tense in `because they were saying that he was possessed' 
suggests a repetition and allied hardness of heart: "tokens of 
callousness which brought the scribes to the brink of unforgivable 
blasphemy". 19 The scribes were not lightly attributing the work of 
the Holy Spirit to Beelzebul and it is the gravity of their 
misattribution which renders it unforgivable. 
None the less the teaching is important. The idea of the unforgivable 
sin clarifies the point that there is a limit to forgiveness. This is 
not a contradiction of the faith that God is infinitely merciful, but a 
statement about the human ability to accept that mercy as 
forgiveness. Forgiveness cannot just be handed out. The saying 
contains the germ of the idea that forgiveness is not a thing but an 
aspect of a transaction. The sin against the Holy Spirit is the self- 
alienation from the forgiving power of the Christ-Spirit by a wilful 
want of repentance. In this way the teaching connects with the 
Pauline warnings not to grieve or quench the Holy Spirit (Eph 4: 30, 
1 Th 5: 19). Moreover it connects forgiveness with repentance and 
faith. It is in the faith of Christ that the sinner learns and lives 
repentance and receives the acceptance and forgiveness which is 
itself the animation and inspiration of the Holy Spirit. 
1. iv. The Dialectic of Forgiving and Being Forgiven 
The interest shown in the gospels with regard to forgiveness can be 
divided into two kinds of concern: that with being forgiven by God 
and that with forgiving one's neighbours. When considering the 
question of being forgiven, issues such as the relation between 
forgiveness and healing, the way in which forgiveness involves 
acceptance, and the extent to which it is immediate and personal, 
even to the extent of being a carnal matter, all surface. When 
considering the question of forgiving others, however, issues such 
as the relation between forgiveness and mercy, forgiveness and 
18Lane, W. The Gospel According to Mark p146 
19Lane, W. The Gospel According to Mark p146 
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prayer and forgiveness and judgement assume priority. Both being 
forgiven and forgiving others involve ethical, psychological and 
theological questions. What distinguishes them is that in one case 
forgiveness is conceived in a proximate, subjective and existential 
way. The main concern is placed on describing and effecting 
forgiveness in the immediacy and confusion of the present. In the 
other case forgiveness is conceived more objectively, abstractly and 
from a distance so that the concern is, in a sense, to estimate 
ethical implications of living under a law of forgiveness. 
Ultimately the teaching of the gospels is that the distinction 
between being forgiven and forgiving others is only an analytical 
one. Indeed much of the complexity of the material derives from the 
fact that it is striving to show precisely the extent and the nature 
of the inter-connectedness between forgiving and being forgiven. In 
what follows the two sets of questions will be treated separately 
under the titles of the physicality of being forgiven and the 
spirituality of forgiving. 
2. THE PHYSICALITY OF BEING FORGIVEN 
In this section the focus of our concern will be the way in which the 
gospels suggest that in his actions and teaching Jesus was forgiving 
and offering forgiveness as an aspect of healthy and healing 
relationship. As we shall see, such an approach involved proximity 
and immediacy and tended to scandalise those who were not 
immediately involved or connected. The main texts which need to be 
read in order to come to an understanding of this aspect of 
forgiveness are the healing-cum-forgiving narratives and the 
parables of forgiveness. 
2. i. The Healing of the Paralytic 
2. i. a. Mark 
Commentators on the gospel of Mark agree that the healing of the 
paralytic (Mk 2: 1-12) in which Jesus pronounces the forgiveness of 
sins, is a development of the controversy which focuses on the 
person and actions of Jesus from the beginning of that gospel. 
Critical tradition is right in suggesting that the authority of the Son 
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of Man is at issue here, but there is more to it than this. The 
tradition that sins are against God alone (Ps 51: 4) is also being 
challenged. The point is not so much that forgiveness is the 
prerogative of a special human being but that sin is importantly 
interpersonal. The Son of Man must be able to forgive sins because 
sins impinge on the sons of men. Forgiveness of sins belongs on the 
human level, just as healing does. 
In the Old Testament sickness is understood to be a consequence of 
sin and therefore healing and forgiveness are closely related 
categories. In some cases, however, they are not merely connected 
but are interchangeable (Ps 41: 4, Jer 3: 22 and Hos 14: 4). 
Distinctions are thus important. Forgiveness can deal with the fact 
that someone is a sinner without necessarily removing the objective 
consequence of the sin - the disease. However, to heal someone is to 
free them from such consequences. That this is an important 
meaning of forgiveness is the message of the narrative of the 
healing of the paralytic. But this is problematic because in the Old 
Testament forgiveness of sins is the prerogative of God alone. 
The penitential practice of the church is anticipated (or perhaps 
reflected) in this discussion. As a reading of Matthew chapters 16 
and 18 would lead one to expect the Matthean parallel puts the point 
with greater strength: "The crowd glorified God, who had given such 
authority to men" (Mt 9: 8). This interpretation raised the question 
of whether this text is a reliable account of what Jesus said and 
intended. Rudolf Bultmann suggests that what we have here is a 
healing miracle with a forgiveness section written into it by the 
early church in an attempt to bolster the idea that church leaders 
had authority of absolution. This suggestion that all the forgiveness 
material (Mk2 w5b - 10) is an accretion has some merits. Certainly 
the story reads very well without these verses, which are 
linguistically as well as theologically awkward. But Lane is against 
this. 20 He puts it that there is not enough evidence to support the 
deletion, and that the awkwardness can be singularly appropriate. 
The grammatical difficulties of the link between v10 and v11 are 
explained by the fact that at this point Jesus is addressing three 
20Lane, W. The Gospel According to Mark p94 
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sets of people: the paralytic and his supporters, the scribes and the 
readers. 
F. W. Beare comments on the Matthean version of this story (Mt 9: 2-8) 
noting that it is shorter and rather later in the gospel. His view 
reflects that of Vincent Taylor that the `forgiveness' verses may 
have had a different origin to the healing miracle, but: "it will 
hardly be seen as a Marcan addition, rather as a supplement 
introduced into the miracle story at some earlier stage of the 
tradition"21. The point here is that the supplement is an authentic 
saying which did not belong in any other particular context. C. F. 
Evans follows neither Taylor nor Bultmann in his understanding of 
the place of these verses in the Lucan version. His view is that: 
"The awkwardness may be accounted for by the story's importance, 
which ensured that it be told in lengthy, dramatic and naive form 
compared with the shorter and smoother combination and 
controversy in e. g. Mk 3: 1-6"22. 
If we accept this pronouncement of forgiveness as an authentic part 
of the gospel we must place it in narrative context. The immediate 
context is the healing of the paralytic, but I would suggest that the 
context of the following narrative, which in Mark is the call of Levi, 
is equally important. This passage may not have any reference to 
forgiveness but there is something similar about it. Levi is not 
forgiven but called. This is significant however because Levi is not 
an acceptable person to call. Such acceptance of the unacceptable is 
very close to forgiveness. There are linguistic differences: 'Follow 
me' replaces 'your sins are forgiven'. Moreover the forgiven person 
is given unlimited freedom, they are `let go' (aphiem, ). Those called 
to follow Christ, on the other hand, are constrained, they become 
'disciples'. But the difference is not simply that those whom Jesus 
forgives are set free to live as they choose whereas those whom 
Jesus accepts are the ones who become his disciples. The fact that 
there are many instances where Jesus' acceptance of others is just 
as unconditional as his forgiveness establishes this. Let the case of 
21 Beare, F. W. The Gospel According to Matthew p221 
22Evans, Saint Luke p297 
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the very next passage (Mk 2: 15-17) where Jesus is observed to eat 
with sinners serve as sufficient example. 
The crucial distinction here is not between those whom Jesus 
forgives and those whom he calls. Rather it is between those who 
respond to Jesus' acceptance/healing/forgiveness and those who 
observe and disapprove. Eating and healing are bodily realities. 
Jesus is physically, bodily, involved with those with whom he shares 
food or whom he heals. The critical onlookers, on the other hand, are 
only intellectually involved; they comment, observe and are 
scandalised. Physical involvement is crucial. There is far more to 
this than Schweitzer allows when he suggests that Jesus is 
proclaimed here as: "the one who reconciles outcasts by his actions 
as well as his words"23. Eating with people is not merely action, it 
is significance, nourishment and community. But in addition to the 
social and biological basics of eating together there are the 
theological fundamentals. The associations with the supper on the 
night on which he was betrayed and the other meals not only in the 
gospels but also in the Exodus narratives should not be passed over. 
In the following section (Mk 2: 18-22) the contrast is made between 
the fasting of John's disciples and the celebrating of those who 
follow Jesus. This reveals the obverse of the significance of eating 
together. Abstention from the physical is not praised here, rather 
enjoyment is seen as appropriate. Another level of analysis 
supports this. John's disciples were baptised `into repentance' and 
thus they live the penitence of the day of atonement, which would be 
a cleansing from sin and affliction of the soul. Their life was one of 
repentance in preparation for expiation. But it was also a 
misunderstanding of the power and the significance of what was 
going on close to Jesus. Even the metaphor chosen to describe the 
events occurring around Jesus suggests physicality and immediacy 
"fresh skins for new wine" (Mk 2: 22). This pattern of proximate and 
physical actions which heal and nourish those involved but 
scandalise religious observers can also be seen in the final parts of 
this section of Mark. The priority of the human over the traditional 
is asserted when heads of grain are plucked on the Sabbath (Mk 2: 23- 
23Schweitzer, E. The Good News According to Mark (London: SPCK) 1971 p66 
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27), and a withered hand is restored, again on a Sabbath (Mk 3: 1-6). 
In consequence the controversy is heightened. Jesus is angry with 
the observers, and they seek new allies with whom to plot his 
destruction. 
The healing and forgiving acceptance of Jesus is thus available to 
those who are in some kind of physical, bodily, contact with him. 
Those who benefit from Jesus' pastoral actions are intimates not 
necessarily in the sense of being disciples or friends but those who, 
quite literally, come near. It is Jesus' physical openness and 
vulnerability which heals those who respond in an immediate, 
generous and somatic way but which scandalises those who keep 
their distance and appraise on the basis of received religion. 
2. i. b Matthew and Luke 
Matthew has a shorter version of the Marcan narrative of the healing 
of the paralytic. He shows no interest in the faith of the paralytic 
man and follows the story, as does Mark, with the call of Levi. His 
version stresses less the controversial nature of the event putting 
more emphasis on the authority, power, even danger of the Son of 
Man. Not only are people healed, but: "even the wind and the sea 
obey him" (Mt 8: 27) and demons are cast out of a man into swine 
which are then thrown into the sea where they perish (Mt 8: 33). 
People perceive Jesus as dangerous; moreover, "they begged him to 
leave their neighbourhood" (Mt 8: 34). 
In his account of the call of Levi, Luke (Lk 5: 27-32) adds a 
characteristic nuance and thereby changes the meaning of the 
passage. By including the word metanoia at the end: "I have not 
come to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance" (Lk 5: 32) Luke 
has moved from an account of the incident to addressing his 
readership. This change, however, does not enhance the passage. In 
his zeal to encourage metanoia in his hearers Luke ignores the fact 
that there is no evidence of the man's repentance in the story. 
2. ii. The Anointing By Mary 
This exclusively Lucan narrative (Lk 7: 36-50) begins with Jesus at 
table with the Pharisees. Being at table with people is already 
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established as a way of accepting sinners in this gospel, moreover it 
is a form of acceptance which has received the critical attention of 
the Pharisees and their scribes (Lk 5: 30). The woman is described as 
a sinner by Simon, and in the end Jesus affirms that her sins are 
many (Lk 7: 47). At no point, however, is it made clear what the 
nature of her sins or sinfulness is. Some have interpreted the saying 
that she had many sins to mean that she was a prostitute, and 
tradition sometimes identifies her with Mary Magdalene. 
The main action of the story is again physical. The woman anoints 
Jesus' body. In accepting her devotion Jesus accepts her. Nothing is 
said and, for the meanwhile, nothing needs to be said. But, as in the 
case of the account of healing of the paralytic and the acceptance 
passages which follow, it is the onlookers, those who are slightly at 
a remove, those who are not in bodily contact, who are provoked to 
protest. In this case it is the host, Simon, who mutters to himself 
and to whom Jesus replies with a story. The parable told to Simon 
is based on the debt-release (apoluein) language of forgiveness, 
whereas the actual forgiveness of the woman uses the sin-letting- 
go (aphiemi) language. It is significant that this central narrative 
fuses these two ways of discussing forgiveness found in the gospel. 
But while it is the woman who is forgiven and who displays much 
love, she does not speak. Her actions may be deemed to speak louder 
than words, but given the absence of verbal material it is impossible 
to be precise about what it is that she is communicating. Certainly 
there is nothing which could be called confession nor is there any 
evidence of repentance. Her actions are expressions of love, trust 
and intimacy. She does not approach Jesus in the hope of pardon nor 
yet of forgiveness or healing. Rather she approaches him in a devout 
though quite physical way. When Jesus says to her that her sins are 
forgiven he is responding primarily to Simon. It is only possible for 
him to say it, however, because she is who she is and because she is 
present and with such an attitude. As in the narrative of the healing 
of the paralytic there is an expression of dissension and disquiet 
among the observers. Jesus' absolution is felt to be audacious and 
provocative. The dismissal of the woman with the words that her 
faith has healed her is also parallel. The woman's love and devotion 
have in turn brought her to wholeness and spiritual health. 
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The passage is of central importance in Luke's gospel of repentance 
and forgiveness. Indeed it is more important than that of the 
paralytic as illness and morality are not confounded. The woman 
was a sinner and is now grateful and generous and loving in response 
to her acceptance and forgiveness. Her righteousness exceeds that 
of a perfectly acceptable Pharisee not because of her relation to the 
law but because of her relationship with the Christ. She becomes 
whole in her response to being accepted, a response which evidences 
the quality of her love. 
2. iii. The Parable of the Prodigal Son 
The whole of the fifteenth chapter of Luke is material unique to that 
gospel. It consists of three parables, only one of which can be 
thought of as a parable of forgiveness. The other two, those of the 
lost coin and the lost sheep, can, however, be read as preparations 
for the central parable of the prodigal son. 
The occasion of the teaching is the typically Lucan one of a response 
by Pharisees and Scribes to Jesus' association with tax collectors 
and sinners: "This man receives sinners and eats with them"(15: 1). 
It is in response to this that Jesus tells the parables. The first two 
are parallels. Something is lost. Its value seems trivial in 
comparison with either the effort taken in searching for it, or the 
risk taken by leaving other responsibilities to engage in the search. 
Both stories have the same meaning: that the rejoicing over the 
finding of something lost allegorises the joy of the angels in heaven 
over the repentance of an individual sinner. 
Different commentators find the focus of the parable of the prodigal 
son in different places. For Jeremias it is about the father: "The 
father, not the returning son is the central figure... The parable 
describes with touching simplicity what God is like, his goodness, 
his grace, his boundless mercy, his abounding love. "24 Others 
consider that the son and his experience is the focus. The emphasis 
in these cases is on the teaching about: "disobedience, the necessity 
24Jeremias, J. The Parables of the Jesus (London: SCM) 1972 ppl28-131 
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of repentance and the joy of forgiveness"25. But while the first 
interpretation fails because it relies too much on the 
straightforward allegory of the father as God, which breaks down 
even within the text (Lk 15 v18 & v21), the second is inadequate 
because such attention on the experience of the son does not do 
justice to such a large proportion of the story. A better reading of 
the parable is obtained by attending to what is going on in the 
relationships depicted rather than in the individuals. The focus of 
the story is not the prodigality, repentance or joy of the younger son 
nor the grief and generosity of the father, still less is it the self- 
righteousness and indignation of the elder brother. The focus of the 
story is in the relationships, not in the individuals. Shifting 
attention to them reveals the parable to be about forgiveness. 
Moreover, read in this way the parable comes to be seen as a 
coherent narrative, not a series of episodes. 
In the parable the relationship between the father and the son is 
challenged by the son taking his inheritance and moving away. That 
between the elder son and the father is stable. The younger son's 
behaviour ruins him and he realises that he is without human contact 
or place in the world. It is at this point that he initiates a process 
of thought and action which is aimed at restoring some kind of 
relationship with his father. Interestingly he comes to see himself 
as an offender, and that his offence is not merely against his father 
but before heaven, a periphrasis for God. Thus he places his 
relationship with his father in the context of his relationship with 
God. Moreover his confession does not concern specific actions. He 
is not so much concerned about the details of his behaviour as about 
what he has become: "I am no longer worthy to be called your son" 
(Lk 15 v18 & 21). Thus the son, in returning and confessing his 
shame, is doing two paradoxical things. He is seeking to reinstate a 
relationship with his father at the same time as owning that he is 
not worthy of the relationship'to which he is naturally entitled. But 
the father, rather than accepting the son's self-estimation, accepts 
the son. The best robe, ring, shoes and fatted calf are all prepared in 
his honour and the father restores the son to a position of honour 
within the household. Luke makes the point that the story is about 
25Evans, C. F. Saint Luke p590 
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finding one who is lost, but the significance here is in the 
restoration of honour, which is the removal of shame. It is a story 
of the restoration of a relationship, a story of forgiveness. 
The elder brother is like all the other onlookers we have encountered 
in these stories of forgiveness. He is present but not very involved. 
He has never tested nor even strained the relationship with his 
father. He is provoked and indignant at the party which is both the 
sign and the means of forgiveness. The elder brother fails to 
perceive that the celebration around the younger is a celebration of 
the restoration of a broken relationship. The elder brother's loyalty 
has been responded to loyally, but without a crisis there can be no 
forgiveness and no celebration. 
2. iv. The Acceptance of Zacchaeus 
The story of Zacchaeus (Lk 19: 1-10) is unique to Luke. Evans 
characterises it as a lively story which is marked, like other Lucan 
narratives, by "a certain lack of logical unity"26. When the word 
soteria appears in verse 9 it is making a very rare appearance in this 
or any gospel. This is certainly the only place where it appears on 
the lips of Jesus. It emphasises that this is a story of salvation. 
The story begins as one of acceptance. Jesus, on seeing the rich but 
small of stature Zacchaeus, invites himself to dinner. 'They' are 
scandalised, and say: "He has gone in to be the guest of a man who is 
a sinner. " (Lk 19: 7) But Jesus does not respond to this, rather it is 
Zacchaeus who speaks. He declares his response to the events of the 
day; that he will give half his goods to the poor and return fourfold 
any fruits of fraud. Jesus then announces that: "Today, salvation has 
come to this house" (Lk 19: 9). 
Is this a story of forgiveness? Zacchaeus makes no confession or 
apology prior to Jesus' acceptance of him. Moreover he does not 
engage with Jesus after the fact of his acceptance. Evans is right 
that the story is not precisely focused, but that is not a reflection 
of its quality so much as of the subject matter. Jesus' response to 
26Evans, C. F. Saint Luke p660 
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Zacchaeus is a key factor in transforming Zacchaeus' ways of being 
with and for others. It is because he has been accepted that 
Zacchaeus decides to deal differently with others. This theme of 
transformation through visitation is strong in Luke, ("Blessed be the 
Lord God of Israel, for he has visited and redeemed his people" Lk 
1: 68) and is given a new significance in this text. The story of 
Zacchaeus is a story of salvation through forgiveness. But there is a 
difference here to the usual pattern of `repentance then forgiveness' 
in Luke's ethical teaching. The pattern here is acceptance/visitation 
then transformation of relationships, all of which adds up to 
forgiveness and salvation. 
3. THE SPIRITUALITY OF FORGIVING 
Just as the gospels show a connection between physicality and being 
forgiven so also they show an equally strong connection between 
spirituality and forgiving others. The idea that forgiveness is a 
necessary aspect of the ethical behaviour of the disciple is thus 
another focus of their concern. The evangelical material with regard 
to these questions is not only to be found within the ethical teaching 
in the sermons on the mount and on the plain. A significant 
proportion is found where the wider context is teaching on prayer 
(Mk 11: 25; Mt 6: 12; Lk 11: 4; Lk 18: 9-14) and the last judgement (Mt 
18). The content as well as the context of such teaching also 
suggests that the matter of forgiving others is of more than ethical 
significance and that it is directly caught up with the divine-human 
relationship. 
3. i. Forgiveness and Prayer 
3. i. a. Being Merciful 
Matthew's sermon on the mount (Mt 5-7) and Luke's sermon on the 
plain (Lk 6: 20-49) contain the most direct and extended ethical 
teaching in the gospels. Into this teaching they integrate the 
understanding that the disciple must be a merciful person who 
exercises forgiveness. Matthew's sermon is longer and fuller than 
Luke's and provides our starting point. 
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The beatitudes are not particularly Christian, but rather are 
described by Beare as: "expressions of simple Jewish piety"27. 
Certainly the one which is closest to our theme, "Blessed are the 
merciful... "(Mt 5: 7) is found in the sayings of Rabbi Gamaliel II: "So 
long as you are merciful, the merciful one is merciful to you"28. It 
is also anticipated in Ben Sirach: "Forgive your neighbour the wrong 
he has done, and then your sins will be pardoned when you pray"29. 
Luke also encourages mercy: "Be merciful, even as your father is 
merciful" (Lk 6: 36). But the teaching goes on from this. Rather than 
responding as the merciful father might, the emphasis becomes one 
of being merciful in order to obtain mercy. "Judge not and you will 
not be judged; condemn not, and you will not be condemned; 
forgive, 30 and you will be forgiven31 .. for the measure you give 
will be the measure you get back. " (Lk 6: 37-38) 
This, like the other evangelical material, stresses not only the 
importance but also the inter-connectedness of forgiveness. The 
emphasis found in Ephesians: "be kind to one another, tender hearted, 
forgiving one another, as God in Christ forgave you" (Eph 4: 42) and 
Colossians: "forgiving each other; as the Lord has forgiven you, so 
you also must forgive" (Col 3: 13) is consistent with this. 
3. i. b. Prayer and Forgiveness 
Developing from this spiritualisation of ethics there is in the 
sermon on the mount an internalisation of piety. The Matthean 
teaching to "be perfect" is followed immediately by warnings 
against seeking the social reward of practising public piety in the 
form of almsgiving, praying and fasting. But as well as privacy, 
economy in prayer is advocated and the Matthean Lord's Prayer 
enunciated. The understanding of forgiveness outlined in the 
beatitudes is reinforced here: "And forgive us our debts as we have 
forgiven our debtors"32 (Mt 6: 12). But in Matthew special attention 
27Beare, F. W. The Gospel According to Matthew p134 
28Beare, F. W. The Gospel According to Matthew p131 
29 Ecclesiasticus 28: 2 
30 apoluein - literally to release. Evans suggests that this is a reference to release 
from debt which he equates with the idea of pardon. Evans, C. F. Saint Luke p337 
31 apoluein. 
32Matthew uses the word hopheiletes for 'that from which we need to be forgiven'. It is 
not found elsewhere in classical or New Testament Greek with this meaning of sins as 
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is given to this petition to be forgiven and the eschatological 
dimensions of the ethics are drawn out. "For if you forgive men 
their trespasses, your heavenly Father also will forgive you; but if 
you do not forgive men their trespasses, neither will your Father 
forgive your trespasses. " (Mt 6: 14) 
Luke also has Jesus teach the disciples a prayer but not in the 
context of the sermon on the plain. The prayer, like the sermon, is 
more concise than Matthew's version and does not contain any 
additional inducement to act in accord with its implications. Rather 
the ancillary teaching is about the graciousness and generosity of 
the heavenly Father who will hear and respond to prayer. The 
specific prayer is limited to five clauses but it does contain a 
petition for forgiveness: "and forgive us our sins, as we forgive 
every one who is indebted to us" (Lk 11: 4). 
Mark also suggests that forgiveness is a point of connection between 
ethics and eschatology, between inter-personal and divine-human 
relationship: "And whenever you stand praying, forgive, if you have 
anything against any one; so that your Father also who is in heaven 
may forgive you your trespasses" (Mk 11: 25). The context of this 
remark is the cursing of the fruitless fig tree (Mk 11: 12-14 and 20- 
25) but this text is caught up with that of the cleansing of the 
temple (Mk 11: 15-19) and cannot be distanced either from the 
triumphal entry which has just been narrated or from the dispute 
over the authority of Jesus which ensues (Mk 11: 27-33) and which 
leads into the parable of the vineyard (Mk 12: 1-12). 
Schweitzer notices the parallel to the petition in the Matthean 
Lord's Prayer (Mt 6: 14) and comments that, "a right relation to God 
always involves a right relation to one's fellow men"33. Lane's view 
debts. Luke uses the more common aphiemi in the Lord's Prayer but uses this word in 
13: 4 in a passage about the general need for repentance in which there is no possibility 
of a financial connotation. The septuagint knows nothing of the coincidence of sin and debt 
which hopheiletes implies, though it does occur as a figure of speech in Targums and 
rabbinic literature (See Beare p177) This is, in fact, an Aramaic usage. The Aramaic 
word hoba can carry the meaning of either debt or sin. Certain contemporary synagogue 
prayers include similar sentiments in a similar language., for instance there is a new 
year prayer: "Our Father, our king, forgive and remit all our debts" 
33Schweitzer, E. The Good News According to Mark p235 
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that this is a free floating logion does not, however, inhibit him 
from commenting on the implication of having this text in this 
context. 
"The effect of the juxtaposition of v23-4 and 25 is to suggest 
that not only faith but also the willingness of the Christian to 
forgive conditions the efficacy of prayer. The conjunction of 
these two thoughts in Mark affirm that the right to pray the 
prayer envisioned in v23-4 belongs only to brothers who are 
mutually reconciled and united in a community of faith". 34 
Does it make sense to insert this teaching about the importance of 
human forgiveness into this context? The triumphal entry and the 
cleansing of the Temple are powerful signs of the significance of 
the mission and message of Jesus. Jerusalem is stormed by the 
Messiah of the merciful God who is concerned with righteousness 
and justice but who, far from being convinced that the current 
religiosity is a means to this end, challenges it both directly, by 
casting people out of the Temple, and indirectly, through the parable 
of the vineyard. The cursing of the fig-tree and attendant 
commentary are a worked and concrete example of the point, and it 
is at the heart of this, the focus of the section, that the verse about 
the necessity of forgiveness is inserted. At the very least this 
points to the centrality of the forgiveness teaching in the religious 
ethics of Jesus. Certainly divine-human relations are set on a 
different footing, but the divine partner cannot sustain forgiveness 
against the spirit of unforgiveness. 
3. ii. Forgiveness and Judgement 
The eighteenth chapter of the gospel according to Matthew is part of 
the larger section which stretches from chapter 14 to the end of 
chapter 25. It is the fourth major discourse in that gospel and in it 
several themes closely related to forgiveness are combined with the 
parable of the unforgiving slave. 
Two kinds of vulnerable and weak people, children and those who 
have sinned, are the concerns of the early part of this chapter. 
34Lane, W. The Gospel According to Mark p411 
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Humility is pronounced as a necessary virtue for those who would 
enter the kingdom, and in this way it is similar to, if not identical 
with, forgiveness: the disciple is to be humble `like a small child' 
(Mt 18: 4) and ready to forgive `seventy times seven' (Mt 18: 22). The 
language is of conditionality and Matthew's emphasis is thus on the 
virtue that is required of the disciple. The second half of the 
chapter is concerned with the forgiveness that disciples have for 
each other. It is assumed that certain faults can be legitimately 
described as interpersonal sins and that it is appropriate to bring 
such a fault to the light of day (Mt 18: 15). Matthew then sets out a 
process by which such sins may be dealt with within the 
fellowship. 35 This culminates, should the sinner refuse to attend to 
his admonishers, in the casting out of the sinner. 36 This is then 
bolstered by: "whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven... " 
(Mt 18: 18). Then, by way of immediate contrast, Peter's question 
about forgiving his brother is asked. This is surprising because the 
language had steadily devolved towards the prospect of damnation of 
those who do not, will not or cannot acknowledge their sins against 
others; and yet Peter's question is about the human expression of 
forgiveness. Peter, at least, articulates the contrast between the 
emphasis on forgiving in the earlier teaching and this sudden stress 
on the product of sin against others. His suggestion of forgiving 
someone seven times can be read either as the words of a generous 
and compassionate spirit or of a confused man trying to reconcile 
the irreconcilable. In any case the answer of seventy times seven is 
as much a contrast with Jesus' previous line of thought as it is of 
this suggestion of Peter's. 37 This unresolved tension is the 
occasion of Matthew's parable of the unmerciful servant which is 
35Luke has this teaching but in a greatly condensed form with a different emphasis. 
Lk17: 3 'Take heed to yourselves; if your brother sins, rebuke him, and if he repents, 
forgive him; " 
361t should be noted that this excommunication process, in which the local church acts 
as a kind of assize is based on a non-hierarchical and egalitarian community - see Mt 
20: 25-27 and Mt 23: 8,10. The emphasis is thus very different here to that read in Jn 
20: 23 in which the authority to forgive or retain is donated to the small group of 
disciples. 
37Luke has this teaching but without the drama of the Matthean excommunication 
process, he simply continues the logic of 17: 3 (see note above) "and if he sins against 
you seven times in the day, and turns to you seven times, and says, 'I repent', you must 
forgive him. " 
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not, like so many, a parable of the kingdom. 38 It is a parable about 
the Last Judgement. 39 
The initial debt of the servant was enormous, so large that Beare 
suggests that it is `incredible': ten thousand talents was the largest 
unit of account; it would be the total revenue of a wealthy 
province. 40 Selling the servant and his family would not cancel the 
debt and might, therefore, best be thought of as an expression of 
wrath. The point is that this is a debt which could not possibly be 
repaid. The plea of the servant for more time in which to pay is 
quite fatuous. In the parable forgiveness of the debt becomes the 
criterion and judgement under which the servant lives. He is 
therefore judged on his failure to forgive even trifling debts. But 
this is not a failure to be just. The servant's problem was that he 
did not let his relationship with his master inform his relations 
with those under him. It was the small-minded pursuit of 'justice' 
which was his down-fall. According to Jeremias this is a teaching 
which develops the imagery of the two measures in Jewish 
apocalyptic thought, but which is without parallel in Jewish 
literature. "Jewish apocalyptic thought that God rules the world by 
the two measures of Mercy and Judgement; but at the last judgement 
he only makes use of Judgement... On the other hand, Jesus taught 
that the measure of Mercy is in force at the Last Judgement also". 41 
Jeremias suggests that the relevant question is: when does God 
measure by Judgement and when by Mercy? "Where God's 
forgiveness produces a readiness to forgive, there God's Mercy 
grants forgiveness of debts again at the last Judgement; but he who 
abuses God's gift, faces the full severity of judgement, as if they 
had never received forgiveness. "42 The point of the parable can be 
described as indicating that Mercy is Justice in as much as it 
replaces justice as the eschatological criterion. Judgement 
concerns, in other words, whether the character is merciful and 
forgiving. 
38C. H. Dodd The Parables of the Kingdom (London: Nisbet 1936) p33 "I have failed to 
find any specific link between this parable and the idea of the kingdom" 
39Jeremias, J. The Parables of Jesus p213 
40Beare, F. W. The Gospel According to Matthew p382 
41Jeremias, J. The Parables of Jesus p213 
42Jeremias, J. The Parables of Jesus p214 
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Luke has a briefer passage which deals with some of these issues. 
(Lk 17: 1-4) There are important differences between the Lucan and 
the Matthean treatment, however. Matthew emphasises keeping 
disputes in proportion: "If your brother sins against you, go and tell 
him his fault, between you and him alone. If he listens to you, you 
have gained your brother. " (Mt 18: 15) But Luke has: "Take heed to 
yourselves; if your brother sins, rebuke him, and if he repents, 
forgive him. " (Lk 17: 3) Luke, that is, does not insist upon 
forgiveness unless there is repentance, metanoia. However, if a 
sinful brother does repent there is no effective limit on the extent 
to which he can be forgiven: "and if he sins against you seven times 
in the day, and turns to you seven times, and says, `I repent', you 
must forgive him"(Lk 17: 4). It is noteworthy that for Luke 
repentance is a necessary precondition for forgiveness, whereas for 
Matthew it is not (Mt 18: 21-22). Both Matthew and Luke value 
forgiveness but for Luke is it a response, whereas for Matthew it is 
an initiative. 
3. iii. Forgiving and Being Forgiven 
Although this chapter has been structured around the distinction 
between being forgiven and forgiving, a central aspect of the way in 
which the forgiveness is discussed in the gospels draws attention to 
the interconnectedness between the two. This interconnectedness is 
most evident in the Lord's Prayer: "forgive us our sins as we forgive 
those who sin against us". An equal but different connectedness is 
evident in Colossians and Ephesians where encouragement to 
forgiveness of others is based on the teaching that this is a 
consequence of the fact of having being forgiven (Colossians 3: 13 
and Ephesians 4: 32). 43 
In the epistles then, the connection between being forgiven and 
forgiving is one of enablement. In the gospels, however, the 
connection seems to be one of condition. In Paul the origin of 
43"... if anyone has a complaint against another, forgiving each other; as the Lord has 
forgiven you so you also must forgive. " Colossians 3: 13 
"Be kind to one another, tender hearted, forgiving one another as God in Christ 
forgave you. " Ephesians 4: 32 
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forgiving is to be found in our having been forgiven, whereas, or so it 
seems, in Matthew and Luke the origin of our being forgiven lies in 
our action of forgiving others. 
C. F. D. Moule discusses the relationship between forgiving and being 
forgiven in the synoptic gospels. While affirming that these texts 
are to be interpreted as suggesting that forgiveness is conditional, 
he argues that it is quite wrong to think of forgiveness as something 
which can be merited. "The key to an answer to this question lies in 
distinguishing between, on the one hand, earning or meriting 
forgiveness, and on the other hand, adopting an attitude which makes 
forgiveness possible - the distinction that is between deserts and 
capacity. "44 His view is that forgiveness is conditional on 
repentance not because it will be withheld unless the sinner repents 
but because unless a sinner repents that sinner will not be able to 
receive forgiveness. Consequently real repentance, metanoia, is 
truly a sine qua non of forgiveness. 
"That forgiveness is conditioned by repentance is true, 
because reconciliation is a personal relationship, and cannot 
be achieved without responsiveness on both sides of the 
relationship. But that forgiveness is earned by repentance or 
deeds of reparation is not true. "45 
Moule makes his case with reference to Matthew 18. The point here 
is that the forgiveness of the servant is conditional not on merit but 
on the ability to receive the forgiveness which is freely offered. 
This narrative, he argues, "says no more than that the free 
forgiveness could not be had without the debtor's capacity to 
receive it. "46 
But Matthew 18 is quite clear that unless the disciple forgives 
others that disciple will not be forgiven, rather condemned as a non- 
forgiver. And, as the parable of the publican and tax collector 
demonstrates, inter-personal attitudes are fundamental to the 
44Moule, C. F. D. 'As We Forgive' in Essays in New Testament Interpretation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1982 p281 
45Moule, C. F. D. 'As We Forgive' p282 
46Moule, C. F. D. 'As We Forgive' p285 
/", V-l 
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relationship with God, which, for Matthew, has as its ultimate 
reference last judgement. Moule attributes this aspect of the 
chapter 18 narrative, what he calls its `vindictive tone', to its 
origin as a piece of popular preaching. But in doing so he fails to 
account for the repetition of the idea in 6: 14 and to locate the 
teaching within the framework of eschatological judgement. For 
Matthew the forgiving of others is necessary to avoid condemnation: 
to fail to forgive is the unforgivable sin. 
Moule's argument is much stronger in the case of the gospel of Luke. 
For one thing there is less material which suggests that God 
forgives those who forgive, and for another there is more evidence, 
as we have seen, that Jesus is quick not only to accept those who 
intimate metanoia but also to accept and to forgive in advance of 
any repentance. Indeed, Moule's argument is based on his 
interpretation of the text in Luke 6 of the woman who anoints Jesus. 
As he rightly points out, the key issue here is the suggestion that 
the words of Jesus to Simon imply that the woman is forgiven 
because of her love. This is a view which the Revised Standard 
Version of v47 supports: "Therefore I tell you, her sins, which are 
many, are forgiven, for she loved much; but he who is forgiven little, 
loves little. " Moule argues, however, that this is a mistranslation 
which focuses not on the translation of the verb to forgive but on 
the word oti, `because'. This, he contends, applies not to the reason 
that she was forgiven but to the reason that it is possible to say 
that she has been forgiven. The reason that Jesus is able to say that 
she has been forgiven is because she is so loving. This point is taken 
in the New English Bible which translates: "her great love proves 
that her many sins have been forgiven" and the Jerusalem Bible 
which has: "For this reason I tell you that her sins, her many sins, 
must have been forgiven her, or she would not have shown great 
love. " 
Thus while Matthew and Luke, like Paul, stress the 
interconnectedness of forgiving and being forgiven they do so in 
different ways. For Matthew, forgiving others is the sine qua non of 
being forgiven whereas for Luke being forgiven by God or accepted by 
Jesus necessarily issues in consequences which are characterised by 
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generous love; whether it is the personal and extravagant kind such 
as that of the woman who anoints, or the socially responsible and 
reparative kind shown by Zacchaeus. Paul understands forgiveness 
as a moral duty on those who have been forgiven. This approach 
overlaps with Matthew's idea that human forgiveness is an 
imperative and with the Lucan one that a generous and healing spirit 
is the product of divine forgiveness. 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter the understandings of forgiveness expressed in the 
synoptic gospels have been surveyed with special attention to the 
question of the nature of the relation between divine and human 
forgiveness. The study has confirmed that forgiveness is a complex 
reality which is characteristically embedded within narrative 
structures. 
All the evangelists record that Jesus not only encouraged 
forgiveness but also forgave individuals. The forgiveness of Jesus 
was experienced by those who came sufficiently close to engage 
with his openness and vulnerability in a physical and healing way. In 
the teaching of Jesus such forgiveness was associated with the 
acceptance both of those who were outside, or condemned by, the 
law and with the acceptance of intimations of repentance. In each 
case the act of forgiveness was described as immediate and open- 
ended. 
Jesus also taught his disciples that they should be merciful and 
forgiving towards others. While his actions of forgiveness were 
characterised by their physical quality the teaching on the need to 
forgive was contextualised by the theological matters of prayer and 
judgement. Moreover the teaching on forgiveness pointed to the 
connection between the way in which people related with others and 
with God. The argument here is that Matthew and Luke understand 
this interconnection in different ways. For Matthew it is necessary 
to forgive others in order that one receive divine forgiveness. For 
Luke, however, human forgiveness is one of the many gracious and 
generous responses which there can be to the experience of having 
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been accepted and forgiven. This seems, at first sight, to be the 
opposite of an earlier conclusion that for Luke forgiveness was a 
response whereas for Matthew it was an initiative. The two 
conclusions are reconciled, however, when it is clear that for 
Matthew it is human forgiveness which is the initiative. It has no 
origin other than the volition or decision to forgive. For Luke, on the 
other hand, forgiveness is a particular dimension of the idea that 
human relating should be characterised by love and acceptance. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
FORGIVENESS IN BRITISH ATONEMENT THEOLOGY 
1890 -1940 
One of the central paradoxes with which this work has to come to 
terms is the fact that forgiveness is on the one hand such a self- 
evidently central aspect of Christian doctrine and ethics and yet on 
the other hand is not a subject to have been approached directly in 
book length studies. One of the reasons for this is that much work 
on forgiveness has gone on under the heading of atonement. Such 
work as this has characteristically taken human forgiveness as a 
primary analogy for the divine-human reconciliation effected by the 
work of Christ. In this chapter I offer a review of such British 
writing on forgiveness as comes into this category in the years 
1890 to 1940. Most of the work in this chapter is written by 
Anglican theologians, the exception being that by the Scottish 
Presbyterian H. R. Mackintosh. All the writing is characterised by 
what one might call `human interest'. None of the theologians makes 
any positive use of the developing science of psychology but all of 
them refer at several points to human and relational experience. 
This is done informally and anecdotally as well as, especially by 
Charles Williams, in a literary way. This is helpful to us as it 
allows for the development of a fuller picture of the nature and 
meaning of forgiveness than would be allowed by a merely 
propositional or rational analysis of the concept. All the writers 
have something to say about forgiveness both as an aspect of 
interpersonal life and as atonement. None of these authors 
underestimates the complexity of forgiveness between people and 
many important issues are revealed as they attempt to clarify what 
the atonement means by talking about human forgiveness. There is 
an apologetic note to be heard in some of the works but there is also 
genuine theology to be read here. Forgiveness is not straightforward 
in theory, even if it is in practice, and genuine insights into the 
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nature of God and the significance of relationships and relational 
repair are to be gleaned by attending to the work of Arthur 
Lyttleton, R. C. Moberly, William Temple, H. R. Mackintosh, and Charles 
Williams. 
1. ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS ARTHUR LYTTLETON 
Arthur Lyttleton's Lux Mundi essay has atonement as its subject, but 
the tenor of his paper suggests that in order to understand the 
atonement there must be a real effort to place it in the context of 
the rest of theology. In isolation atonement makes no sense. But 
while his case is, in part, that atonement must be considered 
alongside doctrines such as incarnation and those of God and sin he 
also makes the point that divine forgiveness and human forgiveness 
must be considered together if the nature of any forgiveness is to be 
understood. This is because human forgiveness is something not 
only parallel to but also as mysterious as atonement itself. 
"And even if the Atonement could be altogether reduced, so to 
speak, to terms of human experience, it will be shown that 
man's forgiveness, the nearest analogy of which we have any 
knowledge, is an experience of which no logical explanation 
can be given, which seems to share, indeed, something of the 
mystery of the divine anti type. "l 
When Lyttleton speaks of forgiveness he means both the human 
experience of being forgiven, and the human knowledge or faith that 
one is forgiven of God; something which he believes to come from a 
meditation on or observation of the death of Christ. His most 
substantial thoughts with regard to forgiveness are revealed, 
however, when he moves on from the questions pertaining to the 
divine dealing with the unrighteousness of the sinner and the 
vulnerability of the sinner to the power of sin, to consider the 
possibility that the work of the atonement was not merely for man 
but also in man. 
1 Lyttleton, A. The Atonement in Gore, C. Lux Mundi (London: John Murray)1891 
p285 All references to Lyttleton in this chapter refer to this essay 
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"The Atonement is, after all, God's forgiveness of us in Christ, 
and no forgiveness is conceivable which does not in some 
degree relieve the offender of the consequences of his offence. 
Human forgiveness... must, in the very act of forgiving, put 
away and abolish the anger of the offended person, the 
alienation which the offence has caused, and which is 
certainly part, sometimes the greatest part, of the penal 
consequences of an offence. Human forgiveness therefore 
transgresses the strict law of retribution. "2 
Lyttleton is at pains here to show that some of the criticism of any 
Christian understanding of atonement is based on an inappropriate 
form of reasoning: we might say now that what was required here 
was not so much logic as psycho-logic, not so much rationality as 
human-sense. He continues to describe human forgiveness: 
"Inexplicable though the fact may be, experience tells us that 
forgiveness avails to lift the load of guilt that presses upon an 
offender. A change passes over him that can only be described 
as regenerative, life-giving; and thus the assurance of pardon, 
however conveyed, may be said to obliterate in some degree 
the consequences of the past. It is true that this result of 
forgiveness cannot be explained logically so as to satisfy the 
reason, but the possibility and the power of pardon are 
nevertheless facts of human experience. "3 
It is in this analogous way that human and divine forgiveness relate: 
"The Atonement is undoubtedly a mystery, but all forgiveness 
is a mystery. The Atonement undoubtedly transgresses the 
strict law of retribution, but all forgiveness transgresses it. 
And we may believe that human forgiveness is, in spite of all 
its imperfection, like that of God, for this is surely the lesson 
of the Lord's Prayer, `Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive 
those who trespass against us. "14 
Lyttleton follows these thoughts of analogy with reference to what 
he calls, "the truth, stamped on every page of the New Testament, of 
2Lyttleton, A. p302 
3ibid. 
4ibid. 
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the mystical union between Christ and his people. "5 This means that 
while the work of atonement is Christ's alone there is not only room 
for a human contribution to the process, the process itself will not 
occur without the human contribution of faith. 
"But like the gifts of grace which come after forgiveness, the 
forgiveness itself has to be personally accepted by us; it must 
be brought into contact with each man's will. So regarded, the 
Atonement, though the great gift of reconciliation is 
absolutely free, the product of the spontaneous love of God, 
does lay on us an obligation. On our part faith is demanded 
that we may realise, and appropriate, and associate ourselves 
with the pardon which is ours in Christ. "6 
In this Lyttleton strikes a note which will become a resonant chord 
in the work of Moberly, picking up, as it does a central idea in the 
understanding of the atonement of McLeod Campbell, that is the 
identification of the sinner with Christ: "Faith identifies the 
individual with the sacrifice which has been offered for him, and 
therefore with Christ's attitude towards God and towards sin, and 
though it is but the first step, yet it is emphatically that by reason 
of which we are justified. "7 
There is more to atonement than justification, however. For 
Lyttleton sanctification is: "the imitation of Christ in that task of 
learning of obedience to which His life was devoted, and which his 
death completed"8. Humanity has been saved from some suffering, 
but not all. However that suffering which remains is not "penal, but 
remedial and penitential"9. 
The emphasis which develops in this section of his chapter is on the 
need for human participation in the atoning work of Christ so that it 
can be realised in the individual. 
5Lyttieton, A. p303 
6Lyttleton, A. p304 
7Lyttleton, A. p305 
8Lyttleton, A. p306 
9ibid. 
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"Our personal share in the Atonement is not mere passivity. It 
consists, first in the acceptance of God's forgiveness in 
Christ, our self-identification with Christ's atoning attitude, 
and then in working out, by the power of the life bestowed 
upon us, all the consequences of forgiveness. "'0 
Lyttleton's understanding of atonement is only possible because he 
treats human forgiveness as a serious and important activity. What 
he does not do at any point, however, is suggest that there is in the 
act or activity of human forgiveness a manifestation of divine grace, 
nor does he develop the thought that there might be a theologically 
significant relationship between being forgiven and being a forgiver. 
He does refer to the need for obedience to the law of perfect 
righteousness, but he does not indicate whether this has as much to 
do with having a forgiving response when offended as it does with 
doing the right thing by God and by human neighbours. What he 
ignores is the possibility of developing a human moral sympathy and 
compassion which makes forgiveness the prevailing attitude 
towards others who are, inevitably, within the thrall of sin. 
2. ATONEMENT AND PERSONALITY R. C. MOBERLY 
Reviewing R. C. Moberly's magnum opus almost sixty years after is 
was published Vincent Taylor was very positive. 
"Atonement and Personality is a work of great beauty and 
suggestiveness. Written by an outstanding Anglican scholar, it 
combines subtlety of expression with warmth of religious 
feeling. It is the work of a theologian, a philosopher, and a 
worshipper all in one, and is written on so broad a scale that it 
gives the reader a liberal education in theology in general". 11 
The book is full of difficult and audacious questions for the 
theological mind. What is punishment? What is penitence? What is 
forgiveness? It raises the issues of subjectivity and objectivity 
and pushes on to include within the architecture of the Atonement 
discussion of the Trinity, Pentecost, Church and Sacraments. The 
101b! d. 
11Taylor, V The Cross of Christ (London: Macmillan & Co. )1957 p78 
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focus of concern however is not the cross of Christ but the heart of 
the penitent, its healing, nourishment, growth and its home both in 
God and in the reconciling community. 
Hastings Rashdall's review written at the time of publication is far 
less positive in tone than Taylor's remarks. Yet there is an 
appreciation of the effort and insight of the chapter on penitence 
which is only exceeded by his favour for the understanding of 
forgiveness proposed in the third chapter. As Moberly insists, 
forgiveness is such an exceedingly prominent part of the Christian 
religion that we need to ask the question of what it is. It is related 
to punishment but is not the mere remission of punishment or 
penalty, although it may involve this, especially if this is likely to 
lead to the reformation of the penitent. Moreover he agrees with 
Lyttleton that there is a need for a special, human and sympathetic 
kind of thought necessary to the understanding of forgiveness. 
"Forgiveness is not a transaction which can be taken by itself and 
stated as it were in terms of arithmetic. It is the attitude of a 
person to a person. It can only be understood in terms of 
personality. "12 It is complex, and it involves: "treating, nay even a 
recognising, of the person forgiven as good". 13 But it is also in 
pursuit of justice, which is the reform of the sinner, the 
reformation, or transformation, of the character. It is no 
"indifference to sin which is itself a new sin". 14 
Moberly's understanding is that forgiveness occurs to the extent to 
which a person is 'forgivable'. He appreciates that putting it this 
way courts the danger of evacuating the idea of forgiveness of 
human meaning. If I forgive those who are forgivable, and if I have 
no choice about it because their 'forgiveableness' is irresistible, 
then I do not act in forgiving; it merely happens. This is clearly 
wide of the mark. Forgiveness does not just happen, it is a matter 
of agency. But this is something of a theoretical quibble because 
people are never perfectly forgivable. 
12Moberly, R. C. Atonement and Personality (London: Murray) 1901 p54 all 
references to Moberly in this chapter refer to this book 
13Moberly, R. C. p55 
14Moberly, R. C. p56 
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Moberly sees forgiveness as a generous response to a germ of 
penitence which may be perceived, and when perceived and treated 
gracefully, will begin to grow. 
"Earthly forgiveness - real in the present, but real as inchoate 
and provisional - only reaches its final and perfect 
consummation then, when the forgiven penitent - largely 
though the softening and enabling grace of progressively 
realised forgiveness - has become at last personally and 
completely righteous. It is not consummated perfectly till the 
culprit is righteous: and love does pour itself out to welcome 
and to crown what is already the verdict of righteousness and 
truth. "15 
Moberly is clear that forgiveness is not a kind of action or attitude 
which is distinct from love. Indeed it is love in certain 
circumstances: `There is no difference at all between Divine 
forgiveness and Divine love... Forgiveness is love in its relation to a 
personality which having sinned, is learning, and to learn, what the 
sin-consciousness of penitence means". 16 
Divine and human forgiveness are profoundly connected. "Human 
forgiveness is to find its inspiration in man's experience of the 
forgiveness of God. God's forgiveness must find an expression of 
itself in man's forgiveness of man. "17 Human and divine forgiveness 
are not the same thing but they may sometimes approximate much 
more closely than others. The parent's response to the naughty child 
is seen as a close parallel and is described as the `diplomacy of love' 
in a charming and sympathetic paragraph. 18 The main point is well 
put in this contrast: "Love dare not, can not - being love - forgive in 
the height of passion. Love dare not, can not - being love - fail to 
forgive from the moment when forgiveness is possible. "19 Moberly 
sees forgiveness as integral to moral and personal development. It 
is the `sunshine in which character grows'. 
15Moberly, R. C. p61 
16Moberly, R. C. p62 
17Moberly, R. C. p63 
18Moberly, R. C. p64/5 
19Moberly, R. C. p64 
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Moberly appreciates that there are many other circumstances in 
which the meaning of the duty to forgive, or for that matter to love, 
would be different. The starkest of these are the many 
circumstances in which the subject to offer forgiveness is a victim. 
He asks himself what makes it possible for a victim to forgive and 
concludes that it is the realisation first that the victim has no right 
not to suffer and second that the offender is: `not a thing but a 
man'20. These two attitudes make forgiveness a real possibility. In 
martyrdom there can be acceptance of death and prayer for the 
murderers. In less than terminal victimisation, "our forgiveness 
takes the form of the consecrating of our will, the uplifting of our 
appeal, to God on their behalf. "21 The point is that if we are seeking 
to understand divine forgiveness through an analysis of human 
forgiveness we will do better if we start with the relationship of 
parent to child than with that of victim to oppressor, as the former 
is a better analogy of our relationship with God. Forgiveness is 
always provisional and is primarily a morally educational mode of 
love, one which leads to the perfection of penitence and thus the 
fullness of righteousness and forgiveness itself. Forgiveness is a 
way of God doing battle with sin, for forgiveness, like sin, gets 
inside the self, it informs, reforms, transforms the personality. 
Moberly's vision is of the transformation of the self. Central to 
this, as to all this thinking, is the idea of free will. His argument is 
that human will is at its most free when conforming to the divine 
will, and that there is a process of development operative 
throughout life which may tend in this direction. This is not an 
isolated activity of a section of the psyche but is quite fundamental 
and integrative. 
20Moberly, R. C. p68 
21 Moberly, R. C. p69 
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"The gradual enlargement of the capacities of selfhood, the 
emancipation from disability, the perfecting of power, till, 
under conditions as transfiguring as the visible glory of the 
holy mountain, the self, in its own transcendent 
consummation, finds at last what it meant, in God's truth, to 
be a self"22 
Such romantic subjectivity was not common in the theological 
writing of Moberly's period, but he persists, convinced that, "my 
free will means the capacity in me of a perfect response, of 
personal will and personal character, to God"23. And he is closest to 
his appreciation of Schleiermacher when he writes that: "Free will 
is not the independence of the creature, but rather his self- 
realisation in perfect dependence"24. Such perfection is humanly 
impossible and therefore the Holy Spirit of Christ is the only basis 
of free living. 
"This is what free will means. In its perfectness it is the self 
become another. It is Christ in the man. It is the man become 
One Spirit with Christ. It is the love of God reproduced in the 
man until the man, in God's love, or God's love in man, has 
become a divine response, adequate to, because truly 
mirroring, God. "25 
In this way he argues that to be without sin and to be free are the 
same condition. No human being but Christ attains this state. 
However all people have the possibility, we might now say the 
potential, of tending towards it. Such a tendency is not a feature of 
the isolated individual, however. It is a product of the person in the 
sacred community. Moberly bemoans the individualism of western 
Christianity. For too long the concept of 'I' has been used in 
theology in a naive and unreflective way, as if human identity were 
complete and entirely individual, and this notwithstanding the 
thought so familiar in Christianity that: "the excellent glory of a 
man is only in personal union and communion with the Spirit of 
22Moberly, R. C. p225 
23Moberly, R. C. p226 
24ibid. 
25Moberly, R. C. p227 
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Jesus Christ". 26 But Moberly insists that the gift of the Spirit is 
the kind of gift which effects such a transformation that, as it 
were, after the gift has been received the identity of the recipient 
is more like the gift than the initial self. So that it is fair to say, 
speaking of the presence of the Spirit of Christ: 
"He is not a mere presence in me, overruling, controlling, 
displacing. What he does in me, I do. What He in me wills, I 
will. What he in me loves, I love. Nay, never is my will so 
really free: never is my power so worthy of being called 
power: never is my rational wisdom so rational or so wise; 
never is my love so really love; never moreover is any one of 
these things so royally my own; never am I, as I, so capable, 
so personal, so real; never am I, in a word, as really what the 
real `I' always tried to mean; as when by the true indwelling 
of the Spirit of God, I enter into the realisation of myself; as 
when I at last correspond to, and fulfil, and expand in my 
fulfilling, all the unexplored possibilities of my personal 
being, by a perfect mirroring of the Spirit of Christ; as when 
in Him and by Him I am, at last, a true, willing, personal 
response to the very Being of God. "27 
The rhetoric compares most favourably with many of less helpful 
images of the way in which the Holy Spirit might enter into a 
subject's personhood. There is no pouring down or filling up here, no 
thought that the Spirit of God and that of a person might not mix too 
well, but rather that they tend towards identification. On 
interaction the perfect perfects the imperfect. This is not the 
language of the laundry, so prominent in thinking about baptismal 
and post-baptismal forgiveness, but that of alchemy and magic. 
Uncleanness, dirt, imperfection, stain is simply no more; it has 
vanished without trace. All that is left is clean, perfect, pristine, 
good and pure. This is washing-up not merely without dirty water 
left in the bowl but with the water and the bowl somehow entering 
into the china and making it radiate an infectious cleanliness. 
This Levitical logic is found in his reflections on holy communion 
where he refers to: "The foulness of eating foulness; the strength of 
26Moberly, R. C. p250 
27Moberly, R. C. p252 
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eating strength; the sanctity of eating sacrifice". 28 This then 
becomes his basis for understanding the human nurture provided in 
the sacrament of Holy Communion. 
"The Holy Communion is the perpetually fresh and fresh 
imparting, to the congregation, and to every qualified 
individual member of the congregation, of the humanity of 
Christ; that is to say of that Humanity, divinely spiritual, 
which, perfect in its own inherent holiness, has through the 
consummation unto death, of the sacrifice of contrition, felt 
and crushed the whole accumulated power of sin. "29 
The sacramental system is thus not at all in tension with the 
theology `of consummation of human personality only in and 
thorough personal union with the Spirit of the Incarnate". 30 And this 
emphasises that the atonement cannot be conceived of as a 
transaction by which God is spared the demands of justice. Rather, 
"it is a real transformation of the conditions and possibilities 
of humanity, which, being consummated first in the person of 
Jesus Christ, becomes, through him, a personal reality in all 
those whose personality is ultimately determined and 
constituted by the progressive realisation in them, of His 
Spirit - which is, in its final consummation, their absolute 
identity, in Spirit, with Him. "31 
For Moberly forgiveness is the means by which human and imperfect 
penitence is met and brought to the fruition of union with God in the 
Church. Penitence, like punishment, is of value but it is not the 
right order of response to the problem of human corruption. It does 
not get to the heart of the matter which is the wayward and 
therefore unfree human will. Of particular interest is his use of the 
language of self-hood and the thought that there is within the self 
the possibility of development towards fulfilment. But it is equally 
significant that he sees that this is a process which will forever 
subvert itself. Moberly is certainly no humanist, but believes that 
salvation comes through a forgiveness which is mediated by 
28Moberly, R. C. p268 
29Moberly, R. C. p273 
30Moberly, R. C. p275 
31 Moberly, R. C. p275/6 
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processes of identification and inspiration which in the end 
transform the individual sufficiently that there is no moral problem 
with the cancelling of their fault. 
"The doctrine, then, of the atonement through Jesus Christ, the 
doctrine of the redemption of sinful man, means a real change, 
not a fictitious one, in the man who is redeemed. It means a 
change no less portentous, in himself, than the change from 
being personally identified with sin, to being personally 
identified with the very Divine perfection of holiness. "32 
3. FORGIVENESS AND FELLOWSHIP WILLIAM TEMPLE 
In his early book Mens Creatrix William Temple wrote an essay on 
the problem of evil. In his later work, Christus Veritas, he 
attempted to address some of the questions which this raised in a 
chapter on forgiveness. It is to this that we turn for a more 
developed understanding of forgiveness and atonement. 
Temple's starting point is the need for restoration of unity. "The 
very notion of forgiveness presupposes an alienation, a severed 
unity. "33 But if this is the starting point, what is the nature, the 
`doctrine', of forgiveness? 
To begin with the gospels. "Dr Rashdall is perfectly right... the plain 
teaching of the parable [of the prodigal son] is that God freely 
forgives all who repent, and that the rest of the teaching of our Lord 
accords with this. "34 But there is more to the question of 
forgiveness than this. And here Temple usefully states two 
questions which have often competed for theological attention: how 
can forgiveness be freely given without loss to the majesty of the 
moral law? And, how, if repentance is the condition of forgiveness, 
is that condition fulfilled? 
32Moberly, R. C. p277 
33Temple, W. Christus Veritas (London: Macmillan) 1925 p255 All references to 
Temple in this chapter refer to this work. 
34Temple, W. p256 
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In the course of his discussion Temple makes the following 
important and germane points. The answer to the two questions is 
to be sought in the cross; the motivation of the cross is to be found 
in the love, not the wrath, of God; forgiveness does not consist in 
remission of penalty but in restoration to a relationship of 
affectionate intimacy of sons with their Father; God really is 
antagonistic to the sinner in sin (and sin is a perversion of will); 
Christ came to save people not from punishment for sins but from 
their sins. From all this it follows that: "The atonement is 
accomplished by the drawing of sinful souls into conformity with 
the divine Will. "35 The problem is to do justice both to the 
evangelical witness and to the moral realisation that in order to be 
God, God must forgive through care and effort rather than 
indifference. To this Gethsemane and Golgotha provide ready 
answers. And at this point it becomes clear that Temple's 
theological effort prefigures much which has been written more 
recently about the need to relate atonement and theodicy: "There 
are two ways of expressing antagonism to sin; one is to inflict 
suffering on the sinner, the other is to endure suffering. Either 
repels the charge of moral indifference". 36 
When it comes to questions of substitution and propitiation Temple 
is sagely cautious. There is no doubt that the cross was for us, but 
that does not mean the end of any suffering nor does it mean that 
there has been any propitiation. He prefers rather to think of the 
desire for propitiation as primitive and to say that the cross fulfils 
and supersedes the mentality which construes justice in this way. 
The significance of the cross is to make it possible that repentance 
might follow sin. The cross is a vehicle of repentance. "His love, 
shown pre-eminently in His Death, has transforming power over all 
those who open their hearts to it. "37 Temple is walking up the path 
once cleared by Moberly, but his concern is not so much to explore 
the psychology of penitence as to make it clear how the language of 
sacrifice can persist although the language of substitution, 
vicarious suffering and propitiation all begin to pass away. "We 
35Temple, W. p259 
36Temple, W. p261 
37Temple, W. p263 
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plead His Passion, not as transferred penalty, but as an act of self- 
sacrifice which re-makes us in its own likeness". 38 
This established, Temple is free to begin to look at the relationship 
between divine and human forgiveness. 
"God's forgiveness is restoration to intimate fellowship with 
God; but fellowship with God is fellowship with self-forgetful 
and self-giving Love, of which forgiveness is a necessary 
outcome. If we do not forgive, we are not in fellowship with 
God. The repentance, which is the condition of God's free 
forgiveness, is a turning away from our selfish outlook and the 
adoption of God's outlook, from which forgiveness necessarily 
proceeds. God's forgiveness of us and of our brothers are not 
related as cause and effect but rather as the obverse and 
reverse of one spiritual fact. They are in their own nature 
indissolubly united. It is not by an arbitrary decree that they 
are associated together; they are one thing... He can only 
forgive us, as we forgive our brothers. "39 
This is an extremely significant point not least because it brings the 
question of what true repentance might mean into the arena of 
everyday concerns. It means forgiving those who have offended you, 
be they your sworn enemy or your beloved wife. It is powerful 
because it generates a dialectic, but more than a dialectic, which is 
to be spiritually explored to the extent to which real relationships 
are improved and real relations loved. It moves the focus of the holy 
from the neuroses of the anxious man in mid-life crisis to the busy 
mother extending her tired arms to lift up a naughty little boy; from 
the musty confessional to the stubborn adolescent venturing to talk 
again with her friends who have been spiteful; from the petulant 
striving after perfection in all things, even penitence, to the old man 
struggling to write a note of greeting to his long estranged son. 
"The Forgiveness of Sins is an article of the Creed... when [a man] 
says that he believes in the forgiveness of sins, he ought not to 
mean that he holds the opinion that God forgives sins, but that he 
believes in forgiving sins as a principle of practical life - God's life 
and man's. "40 
38Temple, W. p264 
39Temple, W. p265 
40Temple, W. p266 
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This is a significant example of the integration of theological and 
ethical aspects of forgiveness. But Temple's contribution is not 
spent there. He suggests a distinction between `forgiveness' and 
`forgiving-ness'. 41 The latter being the internal attitude, the former 
the process involving the acceptance of an offer and the restoration 
of intimacy. He also stresses that while the forgiveness of sins is 
the 'practical and human' part of atonement, there is more to the 
doctrine than that. This should be born in mind, though it is 
reasonable to ask how far forgiveness alone, as it were, can go 
towards healing the lost unity between not only God and humanity, 
but also God and creation. But Temple is no simple triumphalist. 
The real victory of the cross is in the revelation that God can truly 
suffer, and that of the resurrection is that the defeat and suffering 
of the cross is itself the victory. "Cross and Resurrection together 
give us Tragedy transmuted into triumph as the key to the 
interpretation of the world". 42 The language of change is central, as 
it was to Moberly, but Temple's change is in a different sort of 
space. It involves, for instance, the change in the value or meaning 
of a sinful action. Thus forgiveness, atonement, does not change the 
facts of the past, and certainly is no mere forgetting, rather it is a 
placing of whatever would alienate the two parties in the context of 
an energy which would heal the rift. 
4. FORGIVENESS AND CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE H. R. MACKINTOSH 
F. W. Dillistone has described H. R. Mackintosh's The Christian 
Experience of Forgiveness as: `The most extensive attempt in 
modern times to interpret the Atonement in terms of the category of 
forgiveness. "43 He also recommended the work's, "deep insight into 
the nature of personal relationships and... profoundly religious 
quality"44. Dillistone draws attention to Mackintosh's understanding 
of the cataclysmic scale and quality of his subject, noticing how he 
41Temple, W. p268 
42Temple, W. p271 
43DiIlistone, F. The Christian Understanding of the Atonement (London: SCM) 1968 
p299 
44/bid. 
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speaks of: 'The `shattering' discovery of personal failure: the 
`shattering' experience of pardoning personal wrong"45. 
For Mackintosh forgiveness is a synonym of justification and he 
contends that the common distinction between the two, that 
forgiveness did not include the restoration to fellowship but was 
focused on the blotting out of offences, is invalid at the level of 
human experience rather than analytical theory. 46 The reason for 
discussing forgiveness rather than justification is the ordinariness 
of the word, and the consequent possibility of relating the 
theological and human interpretations of experience. And 
forgiveness is a reality. Mackintosh dismisses the objections that 
forgiveness is impossible because it is `contrary to the nature of the 
world' and equally that forgiveness is immoral, and that the 
Christian insistence on it, "betrays a serious ethical inferiority to 
other, more sombre, faiths"47. 
Mackintosh argues that forgiveness is not remission of penalty. 
Indeed, "pardon and retribution invariably go together... [because] If 
God did not chastise sin in the very act of forgiveness, and in the 
persons of the forgiven as a sequel to forgiving them, He would not 
be more loving than He is; He would cease to be God. "48 But the 
forgiveness of God does sweep away guilt, `that painful sense of 
accountability and self-contempt'. We are not totally reformed, not 
rendered sinless, by the divine forgiveness and so our sinful and 
rebellious natures will be in tension with the fellowship which we 
prospectively enjoy. It is in this way, he argues, that we suffer 
nothing more or less than divine punishment. Forgiveness is not the 
restoration of innocence but of fellowship. And fellowship with God 
is not for the human being unalloyed bliss, rather it is external 
(objective) challenge and internal (subjective) turmoil. None the 
less, and we know this, he claims, from human life, "forgiveness is 
an active process in the mind and temper of a wronged person, by 
means of which he abolishes a moral hindrance to fellowship with 
45Dillistone, F. The Christian Understanding of the Atonement p300 
46Mackintosh, H. R. The Christian Experience of Forgiveness (London: Nisbet) 1927 
p3 All references to Mackintosh in this chapter refer to this book. 
47Mackintosh, H. R. p13 
48Mackintosh, H. R. p25 
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the wrong-doer, and re-establishes the freedom and happiness of 
friendship. "49 From the forgiver there is no hostility or aggression, 
but this does not mean that the forgiven person does not experience 
any pain. In fact it is the surprising reason for it. Forgiveness: 
"differs by a whole moral universe from the mere abandonment of 
revenge"50 and the language of forgetting is not entirely 
inappropriate to the forgiver's cognisance of the offender's guilt51. 
Equally, "forgiveness is emphatically more than the ignoring of 
trespass". 52 This is because the turning of a blind eye to the sin 
drains life of its passion. 
Divine forgiveness must be at least as ethical as this understanding 
of human forgiveness. This has not always been the case in theology 
or preaching: "The Christian religion has suffered gravely in the 
past because on too many occasions it has been supposed to stand 
for a conception of Divine pardon less noble than that which the best 
moral opinion would look to see exemplified in the life of any 
ethical pioneer". 53 And yet: `The wonder of Christianity lies in 
this, that the Holy God receives sinners... It is all but unbelievable 
that the Righteous one should forgive unrighteousness, yet the 
Church knows it to be the commonest thing in the world"54. 
Mackintosh believes that: 'The reality of pardon, imparted by such a 
God, can never be demonstrated to one who has not known it from 
within". 55 This is an experience which has its origin and initiative 
in God and not man, and which is real not for the good but for the 
bad, nor is it for the few but rather for the many. 
Mackintosh refers with much approval to the theology of Herrmann 
of Marburg for whom: "Forgiveness as an idea is unconvincing; 
forgiveness as happening to us in real life changes everything and is 
its own evidence". 56 Mackintosh adds to this the understanding that 
49Mackintosh, H. R. p28 
50Mackintosh, H. R. p29 
51 ibid. 
52Mackintosh, H. R. p30 
53ibid. 
54Mackintosh, H. R. p33 
55ibid. 
56Mackintosh, H. R. p46 
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the love of God is perceptible only to those who have known true 
human love. The situation with regard to forgiveness, however is 
slightly different because, "No one can forgive his neighbour's sin"57 
and "... man's power to forgive man is undermined by his own 
sinfulness, which leaves him with nothing more than ability to 
condone this or that particular fault or shortcoming. "58 In other 
words, only God can forgive fully. And: "The only way in which we 
can receive the forgiveness of God is this, that He makes us feel the 
penalty of our sin, and yet at the same time brings home to us the 
incomprehensible fact that he is seeking us and not giving us up... It 
is a religious experience. "59 
Mackintosh is fascinated by the relationship between holiness and 
sin and observes that, "historically, every closer approach to true 
knowledge of God has been accompanied by deeper insight into 
sin. "60 And we are right to be surprised by this, it is as if these two 
contrasting realities were actual mirrors rather than mirror images 
of each other. And this is the case. Sin reveals holiness and 
holiness reveals sin. This is a convenient launching pad for a 
discussion of sin which is understood neither as misfortune61 nor as 
error or ignorance62 but as a perversion of will: "the claim, 
explicit or implicit, to live independently of God and to put 
something, whether self or world, in his place. "63 It is, of course, 
our own responsibility and so: `To put sin down to the account of 
external influences is not to lessen but to increase our sin by 
covering it with false excuses and poisoning the springs of truth 
within"64. 
Sin is powerful but forgiveness is primarily directed against the 
guilt rather than the power of sin. For Mackintosh guilt is essential 
for forgiveness, since it is a part of penitence. But more than this, 
57Mackintosh, H. R. p43 
58Mackintosh, H. R. p47 
59Mackintosh, H. R p48 quoting Hermann 
60Mackintosh, H. R. p54 
61 Mackintosh, H. R. p55 
62ibid. 
63Mackintosh, H. R. p60 
64Mackintosh, H. R. p60/l 
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he sees guilt as a part of hope. He is extremely hostile to those 
psychologies which concern themselves with the health of the guilt- 
ridden and emphasise subjectivity and the autonomy of the 
individual in moral reasoning. In Mackintosh's view moral authority 
is located far from the individual conscience. The religious context 
is essential, as it furnishes morality with the crucial concept of sin 
which provides a positive context for the experiences of guilt and 
forgiveness. 
It is when he comes to consider the doctrine of the atonement that 
Mackintosh makes theological use of his understanding of the 
experience of forgiveness. The real issue, of course, is how to fit 
forgiveness into a moral framework forged on the anvil of the lex 
talionis. His starting point is the troubled Pauline perception that 
there is something which transcends the fundamental category of 
law. Like John Oman, whose Grace and Personality65 makes very 
similar arguments on this point, he argues that justification or 
forgiveness is not so much a breaking of the law as an elevation of 
the level of the discussion to the personal rather than the legal 
sphere. Both these reformed theologians seek to make sense not of 
the traditions of penance but more of the nature of faith and grace 
which they estimate to have its most germane and powerful 
manifestation in the experience of forgiveness. Mackintosh's 
forgiveness, like Luther's justification, is nothing much to do with 
law or merit but everything to do with righteousness, a right 
relationship with God. It is a relationship of faith. But faith does 
not imply ethical perfection, rather it means thinking and loving in a 
way which connects with the way in which things ultimately are. It 
means living with the cognisance that human beings are by grace 
forgiven and by the same grace enabled to live with a transformed 
self and self-understanding in which a sense of both being 
responsible and having been forgiven persist. 
This is the background for Mackintosh's exploration of the category 
of atonement. The roots of this understanding are in the Hebrew 
prophets who, "took the personality of God seriously; they took the 
personality of man seriously and as a result they took seriously the 
65Oman, J. Grace and Personality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1925 
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contact between God and man which forgiveness is"66. And this is a 
line which he, like Oman in Grace and Personality, perceives to be 
crucial to an understanding of humanity: "forgiveness, imparted by 
God's love, is indeed the act by which we are constituted as persons 
in the full sense". 67 Mackintosh believes that human forgiveness, 
although much neglected in moral philosophy, is a crucial analogy for 
the theology of the atonement. For a human to forgive another, he 
follows Horace Bushnell in believing, requires sympathy of the 
offended for the offender to the point of suffering or expense: "one 
man can really pardon another only in so far as he takes the other's 
sin upon himself in the cost he personally bears on his behalf". 68 To 
forgive another is, "an experience of sacrificial pain, of vicarious 
suffering. It is the state of the soul under great stress". 69 
Mackintosh argues that Anslem's attempt to argue from first 
principles for the need of a saving God-man is hopeless. 7° There is 
only one way to come to an understanding of atonement, and that is 
through the experience of the effect of `holy love' on our hearts. 
Atonement, like forgiveness, is literally incomprehensible, and 
certainly incredible to intellect and reason. 
"Many people, if they were frank, would confess that so far as 
they have gone in life, they have never yet been able to 
understand what forgiveness means. That is not surprising: 
there is in forgiveness something that baffles common 
thought.. it appears... both impossible and immoral. "71 
The cross, then, is the meaning of the relationship between holiness 
and love which is God for us. It is a magnifying glass held over our 
moral nature, revealing the truth about it and showing its effect. 
But it is more than judgement. The cross makes forgiveness 
possible because it reveals the connection between sin and 
suffering. This is `heart-subduing'72 because it is God suffering for 
66Mackintosh, H. R. p179 
67Mackintosh, H. R. p181 
68Mackintosh, H. R. p186 
69Mackintosh, H. R. p188 
70Mackintosh, H. R. p95 
71 Mackintosh, H. R. p211 
72Mackintosh, H. R. p209 
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us. The death of Christ, "not merely reveals God's antecedent 
forgiving love; it actually conveys forgiveness and renders it 
effective. "73 Forgiveness, then, is always "bought with the 
suffering of the offended spirit". 74 In the cross "the world is shown 
how awful goodness is". 75 
In the final section of his book Mackintosh turns his attention to the 
more subjective questions of human forgiveness. At an important 
point he takes issue with a view which he attributes to R. C. Moberly 
that forgiveness is an incremental or developmental process. 
Forgiveness cannot be, "conditional, subject to revision, in a real 
sense precarious and asymptotic"76 as this is so far from the 
parable of the prodigal son. Christian life can be full of joy, and so 
the pardon must be full and real, not partial or provisional. It is for 
sinners, those who are morally as well as emotionally unworthy. In 
developing this he follows Rashdall's point that Moberly's theology 
would be better had he read Ritschl, and he repeats the claim that 
the forgiveness of God is not analytic but 'synthetic' or creative. 
This means that: "the forgiving love of God does not presuppose our 
worth but calls it into being. "n Because, "God who by His holiness 
shatters our claim to live before Him nevertheless by His love gives 
us new life". 78 Forgiveness is a creation; theologically it is new 
creation. 
Forgiveness, because it is a product of grace and spirit is itself a 
form of inspiration. To be forgiven is to be inspired: "So far then is 
pardon from being a moral sedative, that it is the most powerful 
stimulus to self-forgetful goodness of which we have any 
knowledge". 79 It is not a path to antinomianism, but to gratitude, 
but not only to gratitude, but also to fear, by which he means 
sensitivity of spirit and conscience rather than blind terror. More 
73Mackintosh, H. R. p212 
74Mackintosh, H. R. p216 
75ibid. 
76Mackintosh, H. R. p242 
77Mackintosh, H. R. p245 
78ibid. 
79Mackintosh, H. R. p264 
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important than the emotionality however, is the spirituality, or 
ethics. 
"The content of the new morality inspired by forgiveness is 
social... We cannot have God apart from our neighbour... To be 
blessed in pardoned fellowship with the Father is to be 
conscious of the impulse, which will not be denied, to share 
our lives with all for whom God cares. Thus a vital connection 
exists between forgiveness and the Church, or rather all 
mankind. The pardoned life, when equal to its idea, is a life in 
which each is a debtor to all the rest. "80 
Mackintosh sees the Church as `an ethically indispensable' medium 
of Divine pardon. "Were the Church to disappear, the reality of 
Divine pardon would disappear along with it. "81 Mackintosh suggests 
that: "If the presence of a forgiving spirit is an indispensable 
prerequisite of our receiving pardon... then it is only as non- 
Christians are forgiven by their Christian neighbours that they can 
believe in the forgiveness of God to them personally. "82 Forgiveness 
has to start somewhere, otherwise the vicious circle of sin and 
hypocrisy cannot be broken. He knows that it is broken in the 
Church, and therefore it is the duty of the Church to break its bounds 
and let the spirit of pardon and forgiveness abroad. This is an 
important point: "the experience of receiving God's pardon involves 
the consciousness that we form part of a pardoned company; it 
means that we are content to share and share alike with them, for in 
the kingdom of God none can be saved in isolation. "°3 To be forgiven 
of God is to live and forgive, and for that matter be forgiven, in a 
fellowship which will not, from any perspective other than that of 
the forgiven sinner, seem particularly attractive. 
5. FORGIVENESS IN THE FLESH CHARLES WILLIAMS 
Williams is both the most central and the most eccentric of the 
authors who will be considered this chapter. Writing during the war, 
and not so much from technical theological materials as from the 
80Mackintosh, H. R. p268 
81 Mackintosh, H. R. p271 
82Mackintosh, H. R. p279 
83Mackintosh, H. R. p284 
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insights of poets and saints, he attempts to make sense of what he 
considers to be one of the most important calculations which a 
sentient being must make. "If there is God there is sin, if there is 
sin there is forgiveness, we must know it in order to live to him. "84 
Williams' is a reluctantly written monograph in which the human and 
the divine, the social and the personal dynamics of forgiveness are 
related to the doctrine of the atonement. The poets Shakespeare and 
Blake, Dante and Milton and the visionaries Julian and Paul are his 
main sources. Although it lacks an explicit theological metre his 
work clearly develops from the fertile soil of the teaching of Jesus 
and the thinking of Augustine. Williams does not forget his Anglican 
inheritance and there are references to William Law and O. C. Quick. 
For Williams atonement is of a piece with the redemptive purposes 
of God shown in incarnation and already implicit in creation. 
Williams prefers the language of `chastity' and `courtesy' as well as 
that of `co-inherence' to what he dismisses as fashionable 
theological vocabulary. But as well as such classical and 
intellectual resonances he is determined to ground his understanding 
of sacrifice in the Hebrew spirituality of blood and offering. It is 
for this reason that it is not appropriate to read Williams in the 
same way as other theologians. His idiom is quite different to that 
of a Temple or a Moberly and perhaps his work should be thought of 
as belonging to the category of theological poetry. The point of his 
theological language and style is to reveal the theological 
significance of all things and to establish that the divine interest is 
in the indivisible process of creation and redemption. The context, 
then, is provided by drama: both the drama of the fall and the 
dramatic nature of forgiveness. Shakespeare reveals something of 
the human generosity of spirit which is basic to the process of 
forgiveness. And the fall is interpreted as a revelation of the state 
of human being and relating so that it is regarded as disintegrated 
and at odds with itself and its origins. His central concept is 
'charity' which is precisely that which was lost in the fall. The two 
84Williams, C. The Forgiveness of Sins (London: Faber and Faber) 1950 p108 
Williams wrote the book in 1942. All references to Williams in this chapter refer 
to this work. 
Forgiveness in British Atonement Theology 76 
primary constituent elements of charity are 'chastity' which is love 
of the soul for God, and 'courtesy' which is the love of the soul for 
its created companions: "chastity is courtesy towards God; courtesy 
is chastity towards men"85. 
Another key notion is that of `co-inherence' which describes perfect 
relationship, found originally in the relations of the persons of the 
Trinity. There is a perfect mutuality and intimacy in co-inherence, 
it is the realisation of the purpose of creation. Sin is an aspect of 
the difference between co-inherence and incoherence: "Sin is the 
name of a certain relationship between man and God. When it is 
fixed, if it is, into its final state, he gives it other names; he calls 
it hell and damnation. "86 It is on the basis of this understanding 
that he offers a definition of forgiveness. "But if a man were to be 
restored, what was to happen to the sin? He had a name for that 
relationship too... he called it `forgiveness'. "87 Putting it in terms 
of the language which he is adopting he describes it as: "Something 
at least by which the sin was to be brought into perfect accord with 
the original good, the incoherence into the co-inherence. "88 
Williams considers the sacrifice of Christ on the cross to be the 
paradigm of forgiveness which is continuous with all other attempts 
at, and achievements of, forgiveness. In particular he views it in 
the context of the Hebrew tradition of sacrifice. But he sees that 
the blood sacrifice tradition makes only imperfect sense because 
the alienation between the one who offers and the offering persists. 
Christ is, as he puts it, "Forgiveness in the flesh"89 because he is 
the incarnation of God and therefore "lived the life of 
forgiveness. "90 When Williams makes points such as this he is 
stressing the necessary connection between incarnation and 
forgiveness. It is not a matter of words or law or contract or 
85WiIliams, C. p127 
86WiIliams, C. p132 
87WiIliams, C. p133 
88ibid. 
89WiIliams, C. p146 
90ibid. 
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transaction, rather it is, as he puts it, `an act... something to be 
done'. 91 
Williams' high doctrine of incarnation convinces him that the whole 
of the life and person of Christ was an initiative of forgiveness: "It 
was the Life that was the fact - of forgiveness as of everything holy 
else, and there was no moment in that life which was not towards 
men and women, a fact of Forgiveness, or at least a fact of the offer 
of Forgiveness. "92 But he is equally sure that the offer of 
forgiveness was not withdrawn when it was apparently definitively 
rejected in the passion and death of Christ. 
"The Resurrection was the Resurrection of Forgiveness, but 
the sin which brought it about was no longer to be covered, 
even in and by God himself. He became an energy of 
forgiveness in the Church. He had stated the principle in the 
years of his life - almost, as it were, by accident, as an 
answer to a question or as a clause of a prayer. That principle 
was that the active and passive modes of forgiveness were not 
to be separated; that they were indeed, in some sense 
identical; one could not exist without the other... To forgive 
and to be forgiven were one thing. "93 
Thus forgiveness itself is like the unity and co-inherence which it 
seeks to bring about. It is not possible to disconnect the parts of 
forgiveness, not possible to imagine being forgiven without oneself 
forgiving. Thus there is judgement in Jesus' teaching about 
salvation, or as he puts it, there is threat. 
"The threat implicit in that clause [forgive us our sins as we 
forgive those who trespass against us] is very high; it is the 
only clause which carries a threat, but the threat is clear. No 
word in English carries a greater possibility of terror than 
that little word `as' in that clause; it is the measuring rod of 
the heavenly city, and the knot of the new union. But also it is 
the key of hell and the knife that cuts across the union. "94 
91 Williams, C. p145 
92Williams, C. p147 
93Williams, C. p15617 
94Williams, C. p157 
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Forgiveness is a matter of integrity, but while on the human, 
subjective and emotional side the implications are those of 
judgement and dread and anxiety lest one is not forgiving enough, on 
the theological side there is the gloriously perichoretic spectacle of 
perfect co-inherence. 
"The condition of forgiving, then, is to be forgiven; the 
condition of being forgiven is to forgive. The two conditions 
are co-existent; they are indeed the very point of coexistence, 
the root of the new union, the beginning of the recovery of the 
co-inherence in which all creation had begun. "95 
Forgiveness then is both a commandment and a theological duty. 
There is, from the divine side, no choice but to enter into it, but 
from the human side, as Williams concedes, it is a difficult and 
testing possibility. Nonetheless: "Forgiveness of injuries is 
demanded of the Christian because of the nature of Our Lord, and it 
is demanded entirely. "96 In this way the demand for forgiveness on 
the part of the disciple is related to the demand that the disciple be 
perfect. This is not an unrealistic expectation, it is rather the 
appreciation that redemption is not a process which is external to 
the human will. But there is something peculiarly unbalanced about 
all this as he suggests: "Heroic sanctity is required perhaps to 
forgive, but not to forgive is ordinary sin"97. The failure to forgive, 
like evil itself, is often banal. 
Williams pays some attention to what he calls the techniques of 
pardon and notes, as the novelist he is, some of the quirks of human 
nature which make forgiveness more or less easy or difficult. He 
suggests, for instance that the faculty of memory is important but 
that its influence is not straightforward. "There are two methods 
of reconciliation: that which remembers the injury in love and that 
which forgets the injury in love. "98 He also observes that forgiving 
and pardoning are activities which are themselves couched around by 
temptations. It is easy for pardoners to become proud and superior 
95ibld. 
96WiIliams, C. p165 
97Williams, C. p167 
98WiIliams, C. p168 
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in their action, and this means that acts of forgiveness or pardon 
must, like all exercises of virtue, be entered into with humility and 
seen not as ends in themselves but as part of a larger process, that 
of creation-redemption. 
It is important, because it can be self-flattering to do so, not to 
enter too lightly into forgiveness, not, that is, to attempt to forgive 
those who do not need to be subject to the (implicit) humiliation of 
forgiveness. 
"We had better be very sure indeed that we have been injured 
at the heart before we even think about forgiving; and we had 
better be very careful indeed that we are not forgiving other's 
injuries, or no injuries, or merely the inevitable pain of 
existence. "99 
In order to forgive, it may seem rather pedestrian to comment, one 
must have been hurt in a profound way. 'Without a direct sense of 
present personal injury by a particular person or persons there can 
hardly be any question of forgiveness. "100 And his eye for the tragic 
dimensions of the ordinary can hardly help to observe that: "Many 
reconciliations have unfortunately broken down because both parties 
have come prepared to forgive and unprepared to be forgiven". 101 
It is for this reason that he sees snares for those who are genuine 
objects of forgiveness. "It is not easy to be forgiven; certainly not 
to continue in the knowledge of being forgiven. "102 It is the task 
therefore of the forgiver, the pardoner, to make forgiveness easy to 
bear. This is a tremendous responsibility which makes sense only 
when one sees that the writing is a commentary on the sacrificial 
forgiveness of Christ. However the same sentiment seems to make 
the forgiveness which is owed to an aggressor by a victim more than 
unreasonably burdensome. But given what he has said about the 
unity of all forgiveness it is proper to comment that the following 
remarks, while theologically constructive, or even creative, are 
99Williams, C. p199 
100WiIliams, C. p190 
101 Williams, C. p193 
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humanly and psychologically problematic. "Pardon itself is an 
example of [substitution]; the injured bears the trouble of another's 
sin; he who is forgiven receives the freedom of another's love. "103 
But for all that it speaks a truth. Forgiveness is as difficult as this. 
As Williams goes on to remark in the following chapter, forgiveness 
has its place among the particularly Christian virtues. "Pity is still 
half a pagan virtue; compassion is a Christian. To forgive is indeed 
compassion, the suffering with another. To refuse to forgive is to 
refuse that other as himself or herself; it is to prefer the spectre of 
him, and to prefer a spectre is to be forever lost. "104 Again and 
again he comes back to the personification of forgiveness in Christ 
and the implications which this has for human participation in 
divine life, the object of redemption, the restored co-inherence of 
all that is. "If our Lord was indeed the very Person of forgiveness, 
then certainly it is the very person of forgiveness which is 
communicated in the Eucharist; it is a mutuality between God and 
man which is also expressed between man and man. "105 But this is 
not just piety or religion, it is ethical duty: 
"We must forgive the evils we suffer because of the dreadful 
co-inherence of all mankind, even if we do not know who 
inflicts them; and we must be prepared to be forgiven when we 
discover, knowing wholly and wholly known, the results of our 
own sin. To dwell on this is superfluous. "106 
But Williams is pulled by theological conviction into an 
unjustifiably simplistic ethical position here. Certainly forgiveness 
participates in the virtue of compassion as he suggests and is at 
odds with the distant, objectifying sub-virtue of pity. But his 
argument about its ethical necessity is unfortunate given that there 
has been no discussion about the ethical questions raised by the 
imperative to forgive. The situation is redeemed to a slight degree 
by his suggestion that forgiveness is something to be learned and 
that instruction in this action is part of the purpose of the 
incarnation. "He as a man would forgive thus [that is as a person 
103Williams, C. p174 
104Williams, C. p180 
105WiIliams, C. p182 
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subject to the vicissitudes of other people's actions] because men 
also should not merely be forgiven but also, in every corner of their 
natures, learn how to forgive. "107 This is one half of his sense of 
the significance of incarnation; incarnation as human vulnerability. 
But, as we have seen, incarnation was also, for Williams, a 
materialising, that is to say a making concrete and real of the ideal: 
"It was this heavenly humanity which forgave; say, he forgave in his 
flesh, and therefore his very flesh forgave... It is therefore that the 
Eucharist is also that forgiveness of his flesh, and that we literally 
feed on forgiveness. "108 Forgiveness, therefore, is a mark both of 
the Church and eternity. 
"The Church consists only of those who have so gone out of 
themselves or are going or who desire to go out of themselves. 
The little word 'as' in the Lord's Prayer is the measurement of 
the distance gone. Its final reach is to the Union; the inGodding 
of man. "109 
For Charles Williams forgiveness is not so much a universal as an 
ultimate. He understands history not to be passing away or forever 
to be forgotten. Rather there is an eschatological cast to his 
thought such that memories and actions do not die but rather are 
brought either to forgiveness or to judgement. That is why, he 
explains, the article of belief in the forgiveness of sins is part of 
the final, eschatological, section of the Apostles' creed alongside 
the communion of saints, the resurrection of the body, and the life 
everlasting all of which are ways if describing the same 'co- 
inherence of relationship'. "The Communion of Saints involves the 
resurrection of all the past, and therefore the forgiveness of sins. 
The resurrection involves forgiveness and communion. But 
forgiveness is the necessity of all. "110 
107WiIliams, C. p186 
108Williams, C. p187/8 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this review chapter we have seen the way in which five 
theologians have developed their understanding of forgiveness 
through reflection on human experience and Christian doctrine. 
There is no doubt that the most important image and idea has been 
that of the cross of Christ. Christ died for our sins. This belief has 
informed most of what has been written on the subject of 
forgiveness and has led our authors to emphasise both the reality 
and the gravity of forgiveness. Forgiveness is costly they affirm, 
but it is also real. 
Some writers more than others refer to the mystery or 
inexplicability of forgiveness. Lyttleton emphasises this. It seems 
impossible that guilt, being guilt, can be removed and yet both on the 
theological and the human plane this is exactly what forgiveness 
does. Moberly tries to penetrate further into this mystery and in 
doing so seems to be in danger of destroying the essence of 
forgiveness. The significance of Moberley's argument is his 
emphasis that forgiveness is a positive response to an intimation of 
penitence. It is not the natural completion of a non-gracious 
process which is driven along by regret, remorse or repentance. 
Rather it is a gracious moment which initiates an educational 
process. 
As was remarked in the text of the chapter H. R. Mackintosh's work 
has been of great influence and importance in that it is the most 
extensive attempt to interpret the atonement in terms of 
forgiveness in the English language. Much of it is in fact an attempt 
to translate the traditional Pauline arguments about justification 
into the contemporary language of forgiveness. His view is that the 
experience of being forgiven is a life changing, indeed `shattering', 
experience,. His argument is not that the repentant are forgiven but 
that the forgiven repent. Forgiveness, like the grace it is, is 
prevenient and leads to ethical and holy living in the fellowship of 
the Church. 
William Temple breathes a more philosophical air than Mackintosh 
and his theology is more incarnational than the Scot's. When he 
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reads the Bible it is the gospels which attract his attention and 
when he thinks about atonement he also has in mind questions of 
theodicy. The result is that while he sees in the death of Christ that 
which transforms the sinner it is not into a penitent so much as into 
a forgiver. For Temple forgiving others is the necessary and theo- 
logical consequence of knowing oneself forgiven. Temple also offers 
a distinction which is along the lines of that spelt out more fully by 
Leonard Hodgson when he clarifies that forgiveness is a relational 
process whereas forgiving-ness is more like an internal attitude. 111 
Forgiving-ness is a slightly generic form of what Hodgson was to 
call intransitive forgiveness. It does not relate to the particularity 
of offences and injuries. Rather it is a part of the outlook of certain 
individuals. Less a particular response, forgiving-ness is more like 
a virtuous character trait. 
Charles Williams takes an even more radically incarnational view 
than Temple so that in his `theological poetry' he can talk about 
Jesus as `forgiveness in the flesh'. The constructs of rational 
theology are too limited to contain his thought and the current 
categories of theological writing too narrow to provide him with the 
material to make himself clear. His is a view which contradicts the 
thought that forgiveness is merely a matter of verbal or 
performative exchange. It is not the case that forgiveness is the 
product of the meeting of an expression of repentance with a word 
of grace. Williams draws less on the prophetic antecendents of 
Christian forgiveness in the Hebrew scriptures than on the priestly 
traditions of sacrifice. His view could be described as one of 
theological materialism. Sin matters and material must be involved 
in putting right, in redeeming and forgiving. His metaphysics are 
therefore quite different from those of Mackintosh or even Moberly. 
He is a radical realist and therefore in a different camp to William 
Temple although in some ways their thoughts about the relationship 
between divine and human forgiveness, between theology and ethics, 
are rather similar. 
Both Williams and Temple are clear that atonement is a product of 
the whole story of Jesus, from incarnation to resurrection rather 
111 Hodgson, L. The Doctrine of the Atonement (London: Nisbet) 1951 p63 
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than being the work that he did on the cross. Both are also clear 
that forgiveness is far more than a change of heart, far more even 
than the restoration of a good relationship. Forgiveness is like 
atonement for them because it is to do with the development of 
relationships of such profundity and significance that it is 
appropriate to speak in terms of the development of what Temple 
calls unity and Williams calls co-inherence. 
85 
CHAPTER THREE 
FORGIVING OTHERS: AN ETHICAL INVESTIGATION 
1. FORGIVENESS AND PARDON 
U. The Sunflower 
Simon Wiesenthal's The Sunflower is an account of a moral 
predicament. 1 While held in a Nazi concentration camp the author is 
involved in a working party at a hospital. He gets called aside by a 
nurse and taken to a room in which a young S. S. officer is dying of 
very considerable wounds. The officer, Karl, seeks forgiveness of 
Wiesenthal for the part which he played in the massacre of a group 
of several hundred Jews in Dnyepropetrovsk. Wiesenthal listens to 
his confession but he does not forgive him. Instead he leaves the 
room in silence. The following day a nurse finds Wiesenthal and 
gives him the small bundle of things which are Karl's belongings. It 
was the dying man's wish that he should have them. Wiesenthal 
refuses the gift. After he has been liberated Wiesenthal seeks out 
Karl's mother. When he visits her he reports that he had met her son 
but he does not tell her of her son's war crimes or of his request for 
forgiveness. The author is subsequently haunted by the question of 
whether or not he did the right thing by not forgiving Karl. This 
anxiety also motivates Wiesenthal to circulate his account to thirty 
six eminent people, Christians and Jews, diplomats and statesmen, 
writers and critics, for comment. 2 
1 Wiesenthal, S. The Sunflower (London: W. H. Allen) 1970 All the references to 
Wiesenthal in this chapter refer to this book. 
2Their replies are appended to The Sunflower as A Symposium in WH Allen's 1970 
edition. 
Forgiving Others 
The text places the encounter with Karl in the context of German- 
Jewish relations during the Nazi era. Conditions in the camp and the 
existence of the ghetto are the moral backdrop. Karl summons 
Wiesenthal to his bedside not in his individuality but as a 
representative. "I do not know who you are, I only know that you 
are a Jew and that is enough. "3 This dehumanisation is typical. The 
contrast between the lack of dignity, identity and acknowledgement 
afforded the Jews and the affirmation of every single Nazi is an 
important aspect of the moral background. Its symbol is the 
sunflower. The fact that Wiesenthal may soon lie in a mass grave 
whereas Karl will lie in a cemetery with a sunflower sprouting from 
the earth over his feet is a recurrent contrast. 
Karl's Catholic mother brought him up in that religious tradition and 
he alienated his parents when he joined the Hitler Youth. The 
repentant Karl structures the conversation on the model of the 
confessional: one talks about himself while the other listens; the 
truth about the confessing self is spoken in private; evidence of 
regret and repentance is important but not conclusive. In the end the 
confessee waits on the word of the confessor. However, this 
`confessor' is not an authorised representative of God but one 
randomly selected from the victims. Indeed, had things worked out 
differently the `confessor' may himself have been a victim. This 
raises the question of the relation between theological and racial 
aspects of the situation, one which several addressees of The 
Symposium take up. But there is more to this than the Jewish- 
Christian dimension. Wiesenthal frames the narrative with the 
suggestion that God is on leave during the Nazi era, and this angry 
agnosticism informs the whole text. 
When he returns to the camp after his encounter with the dying Nazi 
Wiesenthal asks several of his codeportees whether or not he had 
done the right thing by remaining silent when asked for forgiveness. 
Two of them (Adam and Arthur) do not even countenance the 
question. Their immediate reaction is that it is a good thing that 
there is one more Nazi dead. Another, Josek, is more idealistic. 
Wiesenthal's only error lies in worrying about his decision. The only 
86 
3Wiesenthal, S. The Sunflower p57 
Forgiving Others 
people who could forgive the man were those who actually suffered 
at his hands. Wiesenthal had no right to forgive. Later Arthur 
rejoins the discussion, taking Josek's line. "A superman has asked a 
sub-human to do something which is superhuman. If you had forgiven 
him, you would never have forgiven yourself all your life. "4 He also 
makes the ironic suggestion that had the man really wanted quick 
forgiveness the best thing would have been to send for a Christian 
priest. Two years later a polish seminarian named Bolek replaces a 
dead cohabitee of Wiesenthal's bunk. Wiesenthai then discusses the 
question of the encounter with the S. S. officer with him. Bolek's 
view was that there had been true repentance and a return to the 
childhood faith on the deathbed. Wiesenthal had thus been something 
of a saviour since it was his listening to the confession which had 
allowed Karl to die in peace. On the other hand, Wiesenthal was 
wrong not to have met the genuine repentance in some way. 
In The Symposium several authors refuse to answer the question and 
eshew the opportunity to be drawn into any discussion of the 
philosophy of forgiveness. Many couch their contributions around 
with remarks of the sovereignty of individual conscience or the 
importance of subjective, emotional or contingent factors in 
determining anyone's response in such a situation. The overtly 
religious, however, tend to be among those who have the clearest 
views about the question of whether Wiesenthal should have 
forgiven Karl. Immanuel Jakobvits, for instance, takes a very 
straightforward view. "It was neither within your power nor your 
right to absolve him from these crimes, or to forgive him. In the 
Jewish view, such a pardon is a Divine prerogative and not a human 
right or duty, whether he acknowledged his wrongs or not. "5 Primo 
Levi also supports non forgiveness arguing that although a word of 
forgiveness would have soothed the man for Wiesenthal it would 
have been: "an empty formula and consequently a lie. "6 Abraham 
Heschel affirms the point made by Josek in the narrative, that only 
the victims themselves can forgive, and so not to forgive was 
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correct. "According to Jewish tradition, even God himself can only 
forgive sins committed against Himself, not against man. "7 
Most of the Christians are motivated to comfort the dying man, even 
when, like Martin Niemdller, they agree that forgiveness is in the 
gift of the violated. 8 Jacques Maritain takes this point but goes on 
to counsel forgiveness in the name of God. He suggests a particular 
form of absolution for the occasion: "`What you have done is, 
humanly speaking, unforgivable. But in the name of your God, yes, I 
forgive you. "'9 Gustav Heinemann, President of the German Federal 
Republic, identifies with the remarks of Bolek in the narrative. He 
believes that Wiesenthal was wrong in his silence both with the 
dying man and his mother. Jesus Christ added the quality of 
forgiveness to that of justice and therein lies a path to salvation. 
Christopher Hollis also lines up behind the seminarian. The author 
should have offered a word of compassion. 
"The theology of the matter is surely clear... The law of God is 
the law of love. We are created in order to love one another, 
and when the law of love is broken, God's nature is frustrated. 
Such bonds when broken should be reforged as soon as possible. 
We are under obligation to forgive our neighbour even though he 
has offended against us seventy seven times. "10 
One way of describing this difference is as that between a 
retribution/justice ethic and a repentance/reparation one. Those 
who give the primacy to justice insist that the consequences of 
immoral actions cannot be done away with and that the anguish of a 
bad conscience is just part of the process. Those who value 
reparation pay closer attention to the anguish and if they discern 
regret and a desire not to repeat then they will do what they can to 
ease the burden and to restore the possibility of relationship. 
Several of the contributors to The Symposium use the language of 
strength or weakness either in their approval or disapproval of 
7Wiesenthal, S. The Sunflower pl 29 
8Wiesenthal, S. The Sunflower p169 
9Wiesenthal, S. The Sunflower p167 
10Wiesenthal, S. The Sunflower p133 
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Wiesenthal's silence. For some it is a mark of strength not to 
succumb either to pity or to deference at the death bed. To mouth a 
disingenuous forgiveness would be weak. For others forgiveness 
would have required real strength and courage. But Jacob Kaplan, 
Grand Rabbi of France, takes a more subtle view which does justice 
to more of the nuances of the situation. He sees that Karl was 
different to most S. S. officers in that he did not hate Jews or take 
pleasure in persecuting them. Moreover, he interprets his seeking 
out a Jew rather than a priest very positively. "He could have called 
upon a chaplain of his cult who would most probably have granted 
him absolution. But he valued the forgiveness of a Jew more highly 
than the absolution of a priest. "11 But while none of this authorises 
Wiesenthal to forgive him what he did against others there is some 
sense in Wiesenthal's continued discomfort over the memory of the 
encounter. "I have the feeling that you are disturbed not so much at 
not having given the S. S. man the forgiveness you were unable to 
grant him as not having given full expression to the pity you could 
have shown him. "12 And Kaplan is sure that Wiesenthal would have 
felt pity. "is this not a characteristic of the Jewish soul, so much 
so that the descendants of the Patriarch Abraham are called: 
merciful, sons of the merciful? But your pity was not expressed in 
words and because of this it has remained unsatisfied. "13 
The Spanish diplomat, Salvador de Madriaga, is at pains to avoid 
judging Wiesenthal and argues strongly that his subjective state 
would have been a profoundly important factor in determining his 
response. He interprets Wiesenthal's silence as a want of energy to 
do anything more. But he also examines what he calls the tension 
between the universal and the tribal man in Wiesenthal. The 
universal man would have forgiven, whereas the tribal man would 
not. Madriaga does agree that Karl was a murderer, but sees this as 
the tribal perspective. The universal man sees him as excused by 
the extenuating pressures that were brought to bear on him. 
Wiesenthal saw him in both ways and so when he died he took with 
him Wiesenthal's peace of mind. Whether or not one accepts this 
11 Wiesenthal, S. The Sunflower p144 




view it is consistent with a strand which emerges in some of the 
contributions which suggests that the expression of pity or 
compassion may have been appropriate. However improbable 
Madriaga's view may be it does give the lie to one oversimplification 
in many of the responses: Wiesenthal both is and is not a victim of 
Karl. At the entirely personal level he is not. But he certainly 
identifies with the victims and suffered greatly in listening to the 
confession. Moreover, by making the confession Karl made it clear 
that he was rebelling, at least in spirit, against the ideology which 
lay behind the massacre. So perhaps he too was beginning to 
identify with them, to see them as fellow human beings. His 
confession, while a monologue, was possibly an expression of his 
recognition of their humanity and his inhumanity in participating in 
the massacre. 
Wiesenthal's story is an important one for any theology of 
forgiveness but especially for a Christian one. The central question 
is one about the rightness of forgiving and this rightness depends on 
two further factors: the authority by which one individual forgives 
another and the meaning of that forgiveness. The second question is 
the primary one and in this instance needs to be approached not so 
much by defining forgiveness as distinguishing it from related 
concepts such as pardon and mercy. 
2. ESTABLISHING THE CATEGORIES OF FORGIVENESS 
2. i. Forgiveness and Condonation Aurel Kolnai 
For Aurel Kolnai the question of forgiveness, despite the importance 
which it has had as a religious question, is primarily an ethical one. 
Kolnai assumes an inter-personal situation in which one person 
knowingly injures another and accepts responsibility for the 
injurious action. He also takes it that the injurer and the injured 
have a sufficiently congruent morality and understanding of the 
episode of offence as to agree about what was wrong. He begins his 
paper to the Aristotelian Society with the stark and surprising 
alternatives: "forgiveness is either unjustified or pointless"14. 
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The argument begins with Kolnai establishing that forgiveness is 
quite different to condonation. Condonation is a reprehensible 
response to offence, it being a way of 'acquiescing' in it which 
makes no effort to either act or to engender a moral response. 
"[Condonation] is not only undignified and self-soiling but also 
unfair in so far as it may reveal that Fred15 is ready to put up with 
the starkly offending Ralph while being perhaps mercilessly hard on 
a far more lightly offending and possibly even repentant Robert. "16 
But in order for forgiveness not to be a disguised form of 
condonation, he argues, it must be based upon some distinction 
between the person as offender and the person as one being forgiven. 
Such a distinction can have two potential bases. The first is to 
distinguish, after Augustine, between the sin and the sinner and to 
love the sinner while hating the sin. The second is for the offender 
to repent. In the first case it is the offended who distances the 
offender from the offence, in the second it is the offender who 
effects the distance. But neither of these is satisfactory. 
Kolnai opposes the neo-Augustinian approach arguing that: 
"It postulates a neat separability between the sin and the 
sinner, which is fictitious, and insinuates a wholly misleading 
analogy between wrongdoing and illness: in fact a sick man is 
inflicted with his disease, whereas Ralph [the wrong-doer] 
inflicts a wrong upon [the forgiving victim]"17 
In other words the separation removes the sense of responsibility 
and so suffers from a similar fault to the response of condonation. 
Kolnai finds no problem with the action of forgiving a repentant 
offender. He doubts, however, whether it is reasonable to talk of 
forgiveness at all in the wake of thorough repentance: "forgiveness 
has now lost its ground and raison d'etre:... there is no room for it, 
seeing that there is nothing to be forgiven. "18 In short Kolnai's view 
is that to forgive is either to condone or to act redundantly. 
15Kolnai uses a phonetic alliterative code here and elsewhere in this article. Fred is 
the forgiver and Ralph and Robert are wrongdoers. 
16Kolnai, A. 'Forgiveness' p96 
17Kolnai, A. 'Forgiveness' p97 
18Kolnai, A. 'Forgiveness' p98 
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This is not, however, the conclusion of the argument, it is merely 
the point at which the case in favour of forgiveness begins. This 
takes the form of softening the starkness of the contrast presented 
in the first section and allowing that on the one hand forgiveness 
may be a response of the offended to less than complete repentance 
and on the other that it is also possible to take a larger view of the 
one who was responsible for the offence than that he is adequately 
described as the offender. Thus he allows the contribution of both 
the factors which he was at pains to eliminate from the process. He 
asserts that: "Genuine forgiveness on the part of the forgiver does 
not necessarily presuppose a dramatic and fundamental change of 
heart evinced by the wrongdoer. "19 In this way he characterises 
forgiveness as `a generous venture of trust'. It is to be entered into 
where there is some reasonable basis for a shift in the attitude of 
the offender in the direction which would, had it not already been 
granted, almost require forgiveness. It is because the forgiver does 
not know what the result of forgiveness will be that he describes it 
in the language of generosity and trust. Moreover: 
"The sin and the sinner are not separable but they are 
distinguishable, and this suffices for the possibility of one 
kind of forgiveness. It is possible to `re-accept' somebody - 
the essence of forgiveness - without exculpating him and 
without hoping for anything like a thoroughgoing repentance on 
his part. "20 
The conclusion, then, is that while cases of near complete 
repentance on the part of one who is responsible for an injury 
impose a quasi-obligation on the injured party, this is not the 
normal nature of forgiveness. Rather, "the standard situation which 
makes forgiveness legitimate and virtuous is that in which the 
injured party has at least some reason to hope for metanoia on 
Ralph's part and for making it easier for the injurer by forgiving 
him. "21 Thus even while it may seem to be such to an observer 
forgiveness is not mere, and immoral, condonation if it is based on 
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the judgement that there is a genuine basis for trust. None the less 
the distinction between forgiveness, which is based on at least 
putative repentance and condonation, which is based on none, is 
fundamental and significant. 
2. ii. Forgiveness and Pardon R. S. Downie 
Writing in the 1960s R. S. Downie began to formulate a distinction 
between forgiveness and pardon which has been received with 
approval by those who have written on the ethicality of both 
notions. 22 Two assumptions underlie his position: first that for A to 
forgive B, A must believe himself to be injured by B, and second that 
the forgiving spirit is itself always to be approved of. He goes on 
to argue that A can only be said to have forgiven B if he exhibits the 
forgiving spirit towards him. This does not mean that the injury is 
overlooked, nor that it is condoned, because in either case worse 
may come of such a response and forgiveness cannot issue in wrong. 
Of course pardon and forgiveness are often used inter-changeably. 
Both are based on the notion of a gift (perdonare means `to give', and 
forgiveness encapsulates the word `give') People might ask to be 
forgiven or to be pardoned for minor breaches of etiquette, for 
instance, but equally they might asked to be excused such breaches. 
It does not follow from this, however, that excuse and forgiveness 
are the same thing. Clearly they are not. To excuse is to fail to 
account a person responsible for an offence which they committed 
whereas to forgive is to find them responsible but not to let this 
responsibility be the only factor in framing the understanding of the 
offence or the future of the relationship. 
Downie develops his analysis of pardon and forgiveness in his book 
on social ethics Roles and Values. "To pardon a person" he argues, 
"is to let him off the merited consequences of his actions. "23 This 
`overlooking' is, of course, a condoning of the bad or injurous action. 
It is the declaration that it will not be counted or that it does not 
matter. But what are people pardoned for? Here Downie finds his 
first distinction between pardon and forgiveness. People are 
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pardoned for offences, such as the transgression of rules, whereas 
they are forgiven for injuring another person. It follows, then, that 
pardon is given by one who is in a sense responsible for the order 
which the rules establish and maintain. For instance, the club 
committee can choose to pardon one who breaks their rules but 
cannot so act with regard to injuries inflicted on another member. 
Moreover, an injured member can forgive a personal injury whereas 
he is not, unless perhaps he is the chair of the committee, in a 
position to pardon one who transgresses club etiquette. For Downie 
then, "we pardon as officials in social roles but forgive as 
persons. "24 This is the crucial distinction. Downie's concern is 
with social rather than theological ethics, but we might adapt his 
point to suggest that pardon is the product of a theological role and 
forgiveness is a personal act in the gift of the victim. He goes on to 
assert that it is for this reason that pardon is a performative action: 
it is no sooner said than done, the saying is effective, performative 
in Austin's sense. Forgiveness, on the other hand, is not. To say `I 
forgive you' is not the end of the matter. The victim's response to 
their injury is deeper than words. If `I forgive you' is hissed it is a 
lie. Pardon, however, does not depend upon the tone of voice or 
internal disposition. 
In this argument Downie himself moves beyond the social to the 
theological in his discussion of its implications. He makes the point 
that if it is the case that only God can forgive sins it does not mean 
that only God is injured by actions which are sinful but that: "If God 
embodies impersonal moral values in a manner similar to that in 
which a monarch embodies the laws of the land... we can say that God 
is able to pardon them. "25 
2. iii. Forgiveness and Supererogation David Heyd 
In his book Supererogation26 the philosopher David Heyd offers a 
comprehensive view of the morality of going beyond moral duty or 
obligation. When he comes to deal with practical examples of his 
moral case he discusses `forgiveness, mercy and pardon' as the 
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supreme, though generally neglected, paradigms. The idea of 
supererogation is caught up with Christian understandings of ethics 
and the value of various kinds of action, which may or may not be 
duties. Furthermore, the notion demands some clarity with regard to 
the question of the relationship between, say, forgiveness and 
virtue. In part this is clarified by Heyd's point that supererogation 
applies to actions whereas virtue applies to persons. Thus 
supererogatory acts such as forgiveness may or may not be carried 
out by people who are virtuous. It may be the case, however, that 
certain acts of forgiveness are ineluctably heroic, sacrificial or 
costly, but we should be on our guard against the assumption that 
they always or often are. 
Heyd surveys the place of supererogation in Christianity, 
Aristotelianism, Kantianism, Utilitarianism and Contract theory. 
His survey is objective, being neither historical nor doctrinal. He is 
concerned to see how the various systems can cope with this idea of 
actions which are moral and yet go beyond duty. Heyd's definition of 
supererogation is as follows:. 
"An act is supererogatory if and only if 
1. It is neither obligatory nor forbidden. 
2. Its omission is not wrong, and does not deserve- sanction or 
criticism - either formal or informal. 
3. It is morally good, both by virtue of its (intended) 
consequences and by virtue of its intrinsic value (being beyond 
duty). 
4. It is done voluntarily for the sake of someone else's good, 
and is thus meritorious. "27 
He then goes on to discuss the particular examples of moral heroism, 
beneficence (charity, generosity, gifts) favours, volunteering, 
supererogatory forbearances and, at last, forgiveness, mercy and 
pardon. "Forgiveness, mercy and pardon are all responses to some 
kind of wrongdoing (injury, offence, crime, insult, etc), which are 
alternative to other, and no less just, reactions - like resentment, 
punishment, and retribution. "28 If forgiveness, mercy and pardon are 
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in themselves good this generic description creates a puzzle. Why is 
it good to respond with forgiveness if, say, retribution is justified? 
Heyd argues against two theories of the goodness of forgiveness and 
pardon. The first, from Hastings Rashdall, is that forgiveness is 
'touching' because it involves sacrificing private resentment to the 
public good. The second, Alwynne Smart's view of mercy, is that 
punishment might be justifiably withheld because it would do more 
harm than good; there being more to any one situation than a 
particular offence, however culpable. This does not impress Heyd 
who pushes on with his project of explaining these actions in terms 
of a general theory of supererogation. 
"If forgiveness, mercy, and pardon can be shown to be 
supererogatory, the problem of reconciling them with just 
punishment naturally disappears. What is needed is not proof 
of the compatibility of the duty to forgive with the duty to 
administer justice, but simply an analysis which makes it 
plain that acting benevolently does not necessarily conflict 
with the requirements of justice. "29 
It is in pursuit of this proof that he offers distinguishing definitions 
of forgiveness, mercy and pardon. Forgiveness involves the 
restoration of personal relations which were severed by an act of 
injury. It is a reaction to an insult or an injury rather than to an 
offence which presupposes recognition by both parties of the 
wrongness of the action and its agent's responsibility. It is the 
alternative to continued resentment and must be expressed in 
actions other than a declaration of intent. Moreover because it is a 
matter of personal relationship, it implies the equality of the 
forgiver and the forgiven. Equally, forgiveness may, but need not be 
mutual. Finally, forgiveness is not subject to any rules. Pardon, 
however, involves the remission of penalty and is not exercised by 
the injured person but by a third party who, in pardoning, is 
exercising a power conferred upon some person in a special role or 
capacity. Pardon may be granted through a performative utterance 
and implies a superiority-inferiority relationship. No reciprocity 
can be expected in pardon which is guided by certain rules and can be 
96 
29Heyd, D Supererogation p156 
Forgiving Others 
granted to innocent people, or asked for by people who know they 
have done nothing wrong. In Heyd's view mercy is a less coherent or 
independent category than either pardon or forgiveness. To begin 
with it can mean a variety of things including the leniency of the 
courts, the pardon exercised by an official or benevolent concern for 
suffering people. Unlike forgiveness but like pardon it involves a 
superiority-inferiority relationship and can be requested without 
acknowledging culpability but thereby acknowledging or creating a 
relationship of dependency. 
3. ANALYSIS OF THE SUNFLOWER 
The distinctions drawn by Kolnai, Downie and Heyd provide some of 
the apparatus needed for a consideration of the issues raised by 
Wiesenthal's story and the commentary on it which has been noted. 
The central dynamic in the incident concerns the relation between 
what Karl was seeking and what Wiesenthal was able to offer. The 
possibilities generated by the consideration of Kolnai, Downie and 
Heyd are excuse, mercy, condonation, pardon and forgiveness. 
It does not seem from the account that Karl was looking to be 
excused. In confessing his involvement he does not argue that he 
was not responsible, nor does he argue that there were extenuating 
circumstances. He asks for forgiveness and this implies that he 
accepts responsibility for his actions. Karl is not looking to be 
excused. He confesses himself to be guilty. 
Equally Karl is not in pursuit of mercy. He is a dying man and seeks 
out a representative of his victims. The only power which 
Wiesenthal has over him is the power of giving or withholding either 
pardon or forgiveness. He cannot have Karl punished in any way; he 
is not in a position either to hasten or to delay his death nor to make 
it more or less painful. Karl neither needs nor seeks mercy. 
There is evidence of mercy in the story, however. This is when 
Wiesenthal visited Karl's mother. In this case his silence was 
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the atrocity. His silence before Karl was more ambiguous, however. 
In as much as he did not utter words of consolation to a dying man it 
was not an expression of compassion. But equally Wiesenthal did not 
take the opportunity to curse and abuse the S. S. Officer. It can only 
be said to have been a merciful silence, however, if it represented a 
forswearing of the second alternative. 
The question of condonation is similar to that of mercy. Karl was 
certainly not asking Wiesenthal to condone his actions. Had he done 
so the answer would of course have been negative, but it is clear 
from the account that part of Karl's problem was that he was dying 
with the memory of an action which while some would condone he 
could neither condone nor forgive nor pardon in himself. 
Karl used the language of forgiveness in his request but, as we have 
seen, this is often confounded with the quite distinct idea of pardon. 
In as much as Wiesenthal was not a victim but a third party it seems 
that Karl must have been looking for pardon. There is support for 
this in the fact that it was a death-bed confession. He was looking 
for a pronouncement, a performative utterance which would have 
removed his guilt rather than the restoration or creation of a 
personal relationship. 
Certainly some of the contributors to the symposium responded as if 
the request were for pardon. This is the force of the contributions 
of Jakobvits and Levi who put it that Wiesenthal did well not to 
presume to pardon that which he was not authorised to pardon. 
Other contributors, however, perceived a different level of desire in 
the request. Madriaga, for instance, suggested that he was looking 
for pity and Kaplan that he was making a positive gesture by 
confessing to a Jew. 
A crucial question concerns the degree to which Wiesenthal could be 
identified with the people who died in the house. From Karl's point 
of view there is no question that the identification is close. Jews 
are Jews after all, had Wiesenthal been there he would have been 
among the murdered. From Wiesenthal's point of view, however, the 
relationship was not so close. He was alive, for instance, how could 
98 
Forgiving Others 
he speak for the dead? For Wiesenthal to pardon Karl it must have 
been the case that he would have identified with the victims and 
that identification would have given him some power over Karl. But 
Wiesenthal is not empowered simply by the fact that he is 'another 
Jew'. Quite the opposite. Even his hearing of the confession is 
forced. He is not in a position to punish or to judge Karl and 
therefore he can no more offer pardon than he could extend mercy. In 
order for Wiesenthal to pardon Karl the circumstance would have to 
be quite different. In the first place it would need to be established 
by some cultural or socio-political process that Wiesenthal was 
authorised to judge Karl. Second, it would have to be clear that 
Wiesenthal or his delegate would be empowered to execute any 
punishment which was deemed appropriate. 
Finally, then, there is the question of forgiveness. Downie's point is 
that forgiveness is in the gift of the injured individual. On this 
ground alone it seems that forgiveness is not possible. Wiesenthal 
was not killed by Karl ergo Wiesenthal cannot forgive him as the 
murderer. On this argument, of course, murderers cannot be 
forgiven. But this is to neglect the fact that forgiveness is not so 
much a legal as a relational category. As Heyd insists, those who 
seek and offer forgiveness are making a contribution to a personal 
relationship. It is possible to imagine that Wiesenthal might forgive 
Karl, but this could only be for any injury or suffering which Karl 
has inflicted on him. 
It is manifest that Wiesenthal suffers and that part of his suffering 
has as its origin both the confession and the request which Karl 
made to him. Wiesenthal does have the potential to forgive him for 
inflicting these sufferings. Such a possibility, however, is beyond 
Karl's imagination. The whole incident is predicated on the Nazi 
assumption that individual Jews have no particular identity, 
personhood or right to respect. Karl's concern is not to do what he 
can to relate well to this one particular man whom he summons to 
his bedside. His attitude, as well as his imminent death, mean that 
there is no prospect of a healing relationship. By making Wiesenthal 
hear his confession he reveals that it is impossible for Wiesenthal 
to forgive him just as much as it is impossible for him to pardon 
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him. In order to pardon him Wiesenthal would have to have been 
empowered by the victims or those who were closest to them. In 
order to forgive him Wiesenthal would have to have been empowered 
by a word or gesture of Karl's which would have intimated respect 
for his personal identity. 
In short, Karl was not seeking to be excused or to be granted mercy. 
Moreover his request could not be considered as one for forgiveness 
because it was predicated on the denial of Wiesenthal's personal 
identity. The request was one for pardon, presumably based on the 
analogy of the absolution given by the priest in auricular confession 
which Karl had experienced in his youth. Wiesenthal was not 
authorised to pardon, however, and so was right to keep silence. 
This conclusion is only satisfactory on the abstract level, however. 
The truth is that there was more going on in the story than this 
analysis has revealed. What, for instance, of the significance of the 
bundle of clothes? It was a post-mortem gift and as such strangely 
gratuitous. Karl could not know whether or not it was received. On 
the one hand it is sad that Wiesenthal did not accept them because 
to do so would not be to forgive or pardon or to excuse or be 
merciful. It would be to be accepting. On the other hand there is no 
reason why he should accept such a gift. Even if it was the 
beginnings of an affirmation of his individuality this was 
inappropriate as the only effect it would have would be within the 
community of his fellow concentration camp inmates. Consequently 
the decision of Wiesenthal not to accept the gift is revealed to have 
been a wise one. It did no harm. Karl was dead and his gesture of 
giving was complete. It would have been wrong however for 
Wiesenthal to accept such a gift. He could not do so without 
accepting the implication that he was elevated to special 
significance by Karl's selection of him and that would be, of course, 
to capitulate to the Nazi ideal that Jews were not only without 
personhood but also without the possibility of enabling or helping 
each other to personal dignity. 
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many people in it through the collating of the symposium. While the 
matter was not one of forgiveness or pardon the exchange was 
certainly a surprising one. In it Karl did hint at the beginnings of a 
respect for the victims of his actions. Even to speak to `any Jew' is 
a improvement on saying or doing nothing. To hope that it might 
issue in instant pardon or the warm embrace of forgiveness was, 
however, naive. Part of the value of the narrative and the discussion 
which has ensued is to establish this point: that the need for 
forgiveness and the possibility of forgiveness are not always 
proximate. Forgiveness, and for that matter pardon, might best be 
considered as possibilities towards which individuals and the 
relational gambits and gestures which they construct might be in 
progress rather than ideals which either are or are not achieved in 
any given exchange. 
4. DESCRIBING THE DYNAMICS OF FORGIVENESS 
4. i. Forgiveness and Resentment Bishop Butler 
In the late seventeenth century Bishop Butler preached two sermons 
relevant to our theme. One was on the forgiveness of injuries, the 
other was on resentment. Both are based on Matthew 5: 43-44 which 
is one of the antitheses in the Sermon on the Mount. 30 
In the first sermon Butler asks himself why it is that the passion 
resentment exists at all. Surely if God is good there is no need for 
such a troubling emotion. In answer he replies that there is a 
crucial distinction to be drawn between a hasty and sudden passion 
of anger and the settled and deliberate attitude of malice and 
revenge. His conclusion is not however, that anger is acceptable and 
resentment not. Rather that they serve similar but distinct ends. 
Whereas anger is a natural instinct for self-preservation, 
resentment is implanted to prevent moral injury. Anger protects the 
individual in the natural world, resentment offers similar protection 
in the moral and social world. The possibility of resentment by an 
30"Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine 
enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to 




offended or injured individual is a way of inhibiting aggression from 
those who are not sufficiently virtuous to constrain themselves. 
Further it is an important ingredient in the matter of self-control; 
existing in the mind as a possibility it can encourage restraint by 
posing in potential self-condemnation. 
In his sermon on forgiveness he builds on this understanding by 
arguing that: "the precepts to forgive, and to love our enemies, do 
not relate to that general indignation against injury and the authors 
of it, but to this feeling, or resentment, when raised by private or 
personal injury. "31 This does not imply that all personal hurts 
should be merely taken. They can legitimately elicit a response in 
us. The doctrines of love and forgiveness, however, refer to the need 
to keep such responses proportionate and to the duty not to allow 
the passions of anger and resentment to develop an inertia or a logic 
of their own. Butler does not, however, encourage a retributive 
approach to personal wrong or injustice. He argues that retribution 
leads to an unending cycle of injury and response. "Malice or 
resentment towards any man hath plainly a tendency to beget the 
same passion in him who is the object of it; and this again increases 
it in the other. It is in the nature of this vice to propagate 
itself... "32 Resentment is not in itself a valid response to an injury 
because it is itself painful. It is a secondary passion and not to be 
indulged in, rather it is to be used in an effort to terminate wrong. 
Resentment is a vice, but it is a different kind of vice from all 
others as it aims at the termination of vice (although as we have 
seen, it can have the opposite effect. ) 
It is against resentment that the doctrine of love and forgiveness is 
taught. Forgiveness is no more and no less than the love of enemies. 
But equally love and resentment can co-exist in a relationship. "We 
may therefore love our enemy, and yet have resentment against him 
for his injurious behaviour towards us. "33 But this is not always the 
case. Resentment can become so strong as to destroy love and good- 
will. The point about the doctrine of forgiveness is that it is 
31 Butler, J. Butler's Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel and a 
Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue (London: SPCK) 1970 p81 
32ibid. 
33Butler, J. Fifteen Sermons p84 
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against the development of resentment. "The command... to forgive 
injuries, is the same as to love our enemies; because that love is 
always supposed, unless destroyed by resentment. "34 
Butler goes on to develop his understanding about the significance 
which it is proper to attach to moral injury received. One point is 
that we should value the community in which we live more than 
particular infringements of rules, even if this is to our cost, 
because not only are we social before we are moral but also because 
we are sensible before we are social. Thus while ever more serious 
injuries generate ever more angry and resentful responses it is 
never appropriate that the response should be allowed to escalate to 
the point where love and good-will are excluded. Another point is 
that individuals should not allow their passionate responses to 
injury to follow their own logic. He sees that people are too 
sensitive to wounds received and cautions that an injured person: 
"ought to be affected towards the injurious person in the same way 
as any good man, uninterested in the case, would be. "35 Resentment 
and anger ought to be felt in a dispassionate, reasonable, objective 
way. As he goes on to say: 
"[We] should not indulge a passion, which, if generally 
indulged, would propagate itself so as almost to lay waste to 
the world: that we should repress that partial, that false self- 
love, which is the weakness of our nature: that uneasiness and 
misery should not be produced, without any good purpose to be 
served by it: and that we should not be affected towards 
persons differently from what their nature and character 
require. "36 
The sermon concludes by commending the attitude of forgiveness as 
the limitation of anger and resentment and reinforcing it from the 
Matthean teaching, which as we have seen, has it that forgiveness is 
a matter of judgement. "A forgiving spirit is therefore absolutely 
necessary, as ever we hope for pardon of our own sins, as ever we 
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hope for peace of mind in our dying moments, or for the divine mercy 
at that day when we shall most stand in need of it. "37 
Butler's teaching is a locus classicus of the interaction between the 
theological, ethical, psychological and social aspects of forgiveness. 
The sermons were for several centuries the most profound Christian 
reflection on the subject. During the last thirty years there has 
been much more interest in forgiveness in ethics than before. One 
aspect of this can be considered as a development of Butler's notion 
of forgiveness as the forswearing of resentment. An important 
moment in the development of this idea was Aurel Kolnai's 1965 
paper to which we have already referred. In more recent years there 
has been very important debate which has touched on the ethical, 
legal, psychological and theological dimensions of forgiving others. 
In what follows the two most important books in the debate will be 
reviewed before being subjected to more thoroughgoing criticism. 
4. ii. Forgiveness and Mercy J. Murphy and J. Hampton 
This book is a dialogue between the two authors both of whom find 
aspects of received understandings of forgiveness problematic. The 
dialogue opens with Hampton proposing a Christian, if not a fully 
worked through theological, argument for forgiveness and Murphy 
presenting the case for punishment and retribution. Apart from an 
interest in forgiveness both authors share a dissatisfaction with the 
methodological assumptions of modern political and legal philosophy 
and are keen to rehabilitate the place of passion or emotion in the 
understanding of ethics and psychology as well as to engage with the 
moral significance of human reflexivity. The book does not have an 
argument. It is one. Murphy puts the case against forgiveness. 
Hampton is for it. 
Murphy begins with a moral critique of the idea that to forgive is to 
put resentment away. This is because resentment is an important 
moral emotion. Forgiveness is not the forswearing of resentment 
simpliciter but the forswearing of resentment on specifically moral 
grounds. He argues that in order to be moral, forgiveness must be, 
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"compatible with self-respect, respect for others as moral agents, 
and respect for the rules of morality or the moral order. "38 It 
cannot be given in the face of every injury. There are certain 
conditions, however, which justify the dropping of resentment. 
According to Murphy forgiveness can be appropriate if the offender 
repents, or if the offence was caused by the faulty application of 
good motives, if the offender has suffered enough already or has 
already experienced an appropriate humiliation or because the 
offended party recognises a positive value in the relationship which 
transcends the negative value of the offence; Murphy calls this old 
times' sake. Murphy goes on to distinguish between mercy as a legal 
concept and forgiveness as a personal or inter-personal one. 
"Forgiveness involves the overcoming of certain passions 
(resentment, hatred) when they are inappropriate, whereas mercy 
involves acting in a certain way because of certain passions (love, 
compassion). "39 
Hampton questions Murphy's point that there are times when 
forgiveness may not be appropriate and enquires into the nature not 
so much of forgiveness as of the passions which attend having been 
wronged and the relation of these to valuations of self and others. 
Hampton does not believe that the essence of forgiveness is to be 
found in the quality of the offender's repentance or in the status quo 
ante of the relationship but in the offended person's view of the 
offender. She distinguishes between `a person who offended me' and 
'a person who is of value in other ways' and sees the wrong which an 
agent does as less than the total and complete destruction of their 
personhood. "Forgiveness is the decision to see the wrong-doer in a 
more favourable light. "40 The action is not condoned, but neither is 
the actor damned. The sinner and the sin are distinguished, St 
Augustine is happy and Aurel Kolnai can relax. The key to 
understanding forgiveness, in her view, lies in the appreciation that 
it is a process. Murphy, like Bishop Butler, does not help the matter 
by using 'forgiveness' to refer to a particular part of that process, 
namely the change of heart with regard to the offender. Such an 
38Murphy, J. G. and Hampton, J. Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press) 1988 p24 
39Murphy, J. G. and Hampton, J. Forgiveness and Mercy p34 
40Murphy, J. G. and Hampton, J. Forgiveness and Mercy p84 
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approach, typical as it is, cannot capture the essence of forgiveness. 
Hampton attempts an analysis of the process, but only after a 
consideration of the psychology of response to moral wrong and the 
way in which such a change of heart takes place. 
The essence of the matter is that in offending the offender has 
insulted and degraded an innocent party. This may quite justifiably 
lead to indignation: "the emotional protest against immoral 
treatment whose object is the defence of the value which this 
action violated"41 or resentment "an emotion whose object is the 
defiant reaffirmation of one's rank and value in the face of 
treatment calling them into question in one's own mind". 42 But 
things are different if the offended person responds with hatred. 
And again there are different kinds of hatred: simple hatred, moral 
hatred and malicious hatred. For Hampton it is crucial to discern 
whether the feelings, be they indignation, resentment or whatever 
species of hatred, attach to a person or to actions. Generally and 
often, if not always, there is confusion, but the important steps 
towards forgiveness are made together with this distinction. 
Forgiveness can occur when the wrong-doer is viewed as, "not 
rotten as a person, but as someone with whom it may be possible to 
renew a relationship". 43 Not that this occurs because the wrong- 
doer proves their worth rather it is, after Kolnai, a matter of trust. 
"Forgiveness is thus the decision to see the wrongdoer in a new, 
more favourable light. "44 This is not condonation as the action is 
still viewed as wrong, the difference is in the relevance of the 
action to the status of the person of the wrong-doer. 
Murphy's next contribution to the dialogue is to define a special and 
important and much maligned sort of hatred: retributive hatred. 
This is exemplified by: "feelings that another person's current level 
of well-being is undeserved or ill-gotten (perhaps at one's own 
expense) and that a reduction in that well being will simply 
represent his getting his just deserts. "45 Such feelings, he argues, 
41 Murphy, J. G. and Hampton, J. Forgiveness and Mercy p59 
42Murphy, J. G. and Hampton, J. Forgiveness and Mercy p60 
43Murphy, J. G. and Hampton, J. Forgiveness and Mercy p83 
44Murphy, J. G. and Hampton, J. Forgiveness and Mercy p84 
45Murphy, J. G. and Hampton, J. Forgiveness and Mercy p89 
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are natural and ethical, and are therefore to be cast as neither 
immoral nor irrational. On the other hand they are strong and 
powerful. It is dangerous to be led by such passions as these. They 
should not have their own way. There is a case against such hatred, 
indeed, most of the chapter is devoted to outlining it. But it is not 
ultimate, rather there are a range of 'cautions' which it is proper to 
exercise when occupied by such hatred. It is rarely wise to proceed 
with retributive hatred. But retributive hatred is a moral and 
logical possibility. 
Hampton's discussion of the nature of retributive hatred begins with 
the observation that retribution comprises both a basic instinct and 
a more cognitive element. It is this cognitive aspect which she sees 
the need to analyse. Only in this way can there be reconciliation of 
what she calls: "Jesus' retributive-sounding anger with his attacks 
on the lex talionis, his insistence on loving one's enemies and his 
encouragement of forgiveness. "46 She is sure that the only way 
forward is with an understanding of retribution as a way of 
restoring the worth of the victim by bringing the offender low, that 
retribution, the infliction of suffering for wrong-doing against 
another is "the victim's value `striking back"'47. Retribution is thus: 
"our name for the Furies, and at a fundamental level it is punishment 
we desire because we see it... confirming that we are valuable, and 
that their actions (in offending us) were indeed wrong and that we 
must be treated with respect. "48 
This, as she notes, is a cool version of retributive hatred. "[What] 
Murphy characterised and defended as retributive hatred is in fact 
the desire for retribution coupled with the experience of moral 
hatred of the wrongdoer. "49 People who engage with this desire the 
harm of the wrongdoer both as a restoration of their own value, but 
also as a deterrent to the evil cause. Hampton's point is that it is 
possible both to believe that the wrongdoer should be punished for 
what they have done and also to seek a restored relationship with 
46Murphy, J. G. and Hampton, J. Forgiveness and Mercy p122 
47Murphy, J. G. and Hampton, J. Forgiveness and Mercy p123 
48Murphy, J. G. and Hampton, J. Forgiveness and Mercy p143 
49Murphy, J. G. and Hampton, J. Forgiveness and Mercy p146 
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them. She admires a colonial custom in New England of having a 
party with someone sentenced to death the night before their 
execution. The most important aspect of this approach is the 
distinction between the evil action and the person, who may 
certainly be pretty bad, but whom we must never think of as being 
rotten to the core. Forgiveness, and for that matter mercy, are 
never deserved as they depend on people going beyond the evidence of 
behaviour when making a judgement about an individual. 
It is this cool and social retribution, rather than Murphy's personal 
and hot retributive hatred, which is the proper method for re- 
adjusting the status of the injured person with that of the injurer. 
It is on this basis that she distinguishes forgiveness as 'the 
forswearing of resentment' and mercy as 'the forswearing of 
retribution' and that she advances the cause of what might be called 
merciless forgiveness. That is, a dropping of the feelings of hatred 
or anger but at the same time insisting that retribution takes its 
merciless but dispassionate course. It is just, she believes, to 
punish wrongs, but right for sinners to be friends. 
4. iii. The Ideal of Forgiveness J. B. Haber 
J. B. Haber delimits a Kantian model of inter-personal forgiveness, 
and identifies the conditions under which it might be justified. 50 
His interest is entirely with situations in which a person has been 
injured by the actions of a particular other. His concern is with the 
propriety of the two moral ways in which an injured party might 
respond to their offender: resentment or forgiveness. The model 
developed here owes much to Bishop Butler's understanding of 
forgiveness as the forswearing of resentment, but it is not quite 
that. Rather, Haber takes an Austinian speech-act approach and 
scrutinises the moral meaning of the phrase, `I forgive you'. In a 
parallel way, Nietzsche's antagonism to Christianity as the religion 
which sponsors the corruption of ressentiment is the backdrop but 
not the essence of his argument about the morality of forgiveness. 
The approach is also personal and absolutist. Forgiveness is what 
may transpire between an individual and the other who injured her. 
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It cannot exist elsewhere, for instance between someone who is 
indignant about but not yet personally injured by another's 
behaviour. Moreover, Haber is not interested in the circumstances in 
which tolerance, or forgetting, or ignoring may be the human 
response to injury. Neither is he concerned with social factors such 
as the nature of the relationship between the injured and the 
offender. However, his argument implies a critique of many of the 
ways in which too easy a peace with the past is made. 
Against what he considers to be the mainstream view that 
forgiveness is not forgiveness until the one who is offended rids him 
or herself of every last ounce of resentment against the offender, 
Haber considers the expression of forgiveness to be a performative 
utterance. When we forgive, according to Haber, whether we say 'I 
forgive you' or do something more subtle, we refer not to the fact 
that we no longer resent an action but that we are willing to 
overcome that resentment. In taking up this position Haber is 
responding to the suggestion of the philosopher N. H. J. Horsburgh who 
argued that forgiveness is always a personal response to a personal 
injury and that in order to be morally significant it must be based on 
an act of volition: namely a decision to forgive. 51 But Horsburgh 
goes on to argue that this decision is not in itself the act of 
forgiveness. There is also a second, emotional phase which is the 
putting away of all negative feelings towards the offender. This is 
more important, he argues, than either the restoration of the status 
quo ante in general or the restoration of the relationship. His point 
is that forgiveness occurs not at the level of observable behaviour 
but at the hidden level of volition and affect. Forgiveness does not 
happen 'just like that' and people often refer to being in the process 
of 'trying to forgive'. This, he insists, is evidence enough. 
Forgiveness takes time and is not complete, "until the negative 
feelings engendered by the injury have been eliminated. "52 
Haber concedes that resentment is often present long after a 
decision to forgive, 53 but does not see this as proving Horsburgh's 
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point. Rather it is evidence that the project of the removal of 
negative feelings is a long and complex one upon which the 
forgiveness does not necessarily depend. For Haber, Horsburgh's 
analysis depends on the false distinction between forgiveness and 
true forgiveness as well as on "a facile parsing of psychological 
states". 54 His response to this is to deny that the forswearing of 
resentment is a necessary condition of forgiveness and to locate it 
in the will and its linguistic expression rather than in the emotions. 
Haber is like those who stand in the Butlerian tradition of 
forgiveness as the forswearing of resentment in as much as his 
attention is devoted to the question of the response to injury. He 
follows Jeffrie Murphy in arguing for resentment on the grounds that 
it is a way of preserving self-respect. The point here is that. 
although resentment can be ugly and bitter, while it can lead to 
revenge or retribution or uncontrolled hatred, it need not necessarily 
do so. Resentment has had a bad press not because of what it is, a 
self-affirming response to being treated badly, but because some 
responses to being treated badly are themselves bad and make 
matters worse. Haber is at one with Murphy in reckoning resentment 
to be a moral emotion, one which preserves self-respect. But he is 
at odds with him with regard to the particular reasons why 
resentment may be forsworn. Murphy, it will be recalled, offers five 
reasons none of which Haber finds convincing. To begin with he 
finds little merit in Murphy's understanding of repentance which he 
suggests boils down to being no more than regret and is not 
necessarily being infused with either metanoia or contrition. The 
second reason is that the offender meant well. But Haber argues 
that this is to offer an excuse rather than to forgive. The third and 
fourth reasons, that the offender has suffered enough or has 
undergone some humiliation, are not relevant either. Suffering and 
humiliation may or may not be redemptive and so evidence of 
suffering or humiliation are not in themselves sufficient 
justification for forgiveness. Finally Haber does not recognise `old 
time's sake' as a reason for forgiveness. Indeed it is likely that the 
fact of friendship in the past may well deepen the sense of hurt. 
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But Haber has an even more profound disagreement with Murphy than 
this. Like Hampton, Murphy found the essence of ethical forgiveness 
to be in the preservation of self-respect in the act of forgiving. 
This much Haber concedes. He does not agree, however, that this is 
to be achieved by exercising the neo-Augustinian distinction 
between the immoral act and the immoral agent, the sin and the 
sinner. The problem with this is that it places the onus not on the 
wrong-doer but on the victim. "Before we as the victim tender 
forgiveness, we want the wrongdoer to withdraw her endorsement 
for what she did. Then, first we can join her in condemning her evil 
deed, and then we can forgive. "55 This distancing from the offence 
he calls repentance. 
When resentment meets repentance forgiveness might occur. But 
repentance is not mere regret. Haber follows Martin Golding in 
distinguishing three types of regret, I-regret, M-regret and O-regret. 
I-regret is the appreciation that, for whatever reason, the injurious 
act was not advantageous, M-regret ('moral-regret') is based on the 
idea that the injurious behaviour was wrong, but does not include 
the appreciation that it wronged someone in particular. Only 0- 
regret ('other-regret') recognises the injury inflicted on a particular 
person. While both M-regret and O-regret can therefore lead to a 
moral promise to change or desist, only in the case of O-regret can 
this be made to a particular individual and thus meet the particular 
resentment and thereby lead to forgiveness. 
Haber also addresses the important question of the value of 
repentance. The case has been made, by Spinoza and Nietzsche and 
others, that it is an unrealistic and unhelpful emotion, a form of 
self-deception. William James, for instance eliminates the element 
of regret in repentance when he writes that: "The best repentance 
is to up and act for righteousness, and to forget that you ever had 
relations with sin. "56 Why does Haber see repentance as consisting 
not only of the vow not to act thus again but also of O-regret? 
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The answer to this lies in the predicate of the book, namely that 
morality is more than action, it has to do with identity and emotion 
as well. Haber dismisses, however, the Kantian view of the efficacy 
of repentance. Kant argued that repentance indicated a change in 
personal identity so great that discontinuity overrides continuity. If 
this were right then it would hardly be possible not to forgive the 
'new' person. But Haber rightly questions the rebirth theory, 
although he does not enter into a description of the metaphysical 
mess it causes. However, remaining in the ethical realm, we would 
note that this renders notions of responsibility extremely 
problematic. Haber finds Norvin Richards' more modest claims for 
repentance more congenial. Richards sees repentance as part of 
moral development, "the repentant wrongdoer acquires a new moral 
principle when she realises that her old ones are morally bad. "57 
Seeing that a set of moral principles led to immoral behaviour the 
actor sets about revising these principles. Thus repentance, if not 
yet a change of identity, is substantial and real change. Forgiveness 
is always of an offender for an offence, as Haber is at pains to 
emphasise. Similarly, repentance refers to particular actions; 
although the transformation of moral cognitive apparatus implied 
may, of course, have ramifications for many actions both in the past 
and the future. 
Forgiveness, the expression of the intention to drop resentment, is 
therefore quite consistent with self-respect once it is clear that 
the offender now holds to moral principles which see the injury as 
injury. This view leads to a very high doctrine of apology: "By 
apologising, the wrongdoer makes it known that she need no longer 
be the object of her victim's resentment. "58 There is something 
unfortunate about the phrasing of this. It presumes that apology is 
necessarily acceptable and that when certain conditions are reached 
the offended has no choice but to forgive. This is inappropriately 
mechanistic and behavioural. Although the offender regrets a wrong 
action and vows not to do it again the offended party must retain the 
option of forgiving or not. Without this freedom forgiveness is not a 
responsible act of the victim. Haber sees this point later on and 
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contrasts the censure which is made of generally unforgiving 
persons with individual freedom to forgive or not in any particular 
instance. None the less he is in favour of a general predisposition to 
forgive, Butler's and Downie's `forgiving spirit', seeing this as 
something which builds moral communities. 
4. iv. The Reality of Forgiveness A Critique of Haber 
In a paper in Mind William Neblett engages very critically with the 
philosophical approach to forgiveness which derives, more or less, 
from the distinctions of R. S. Downie. 59 The nub of his critique is 
that it sets up an ideal of forgiveness as non-performative, psycho- 
emotional process. Haber, of course, agrees with the point that 
forgiveness is performative and volitional. His argument with 
Horsburgh is that while the latter thinks forgiveness to be complete 
only when the last remnant of negative affect is gone, Haber sees 
the decision to accept an intimation of repentance as the moment of 
forgiveness. But there is a dispute between Neblett and Haber with 
regard to the extent to which forgiveness is to be conceived in an 
essentialist or in a Wittgensteinian way. Neblett is of the view that 
forgiveness has a variety of meanings in everyday speech and that 
the meaning of forgiveness is nothing other than a compendium of 
these meanings. Haber, on the other hand, wishes to reduce 
forgiveness to a very particular set of circumstances. 
Haber was aware of Neblett's critique of the essentialist approach 
to forgiveness and deliberately forwent the Wittgensteinian 
alternative, advocated by O'Shaughnessy, of, as Haber puts it, 
`merely' describing its usage. But searching for a particular 
meaning for forgiveness which can be represented in a model, and 
thought of as paradigmatic, does not involve a contradiction of 
Wittgenstein's insights into meaning. 60 While it may be true, 
however, that there is no meaning without analysis it does not 
follow that Haber's analysis might not suffer from being idealist. 
There are two points to be made here. First that his model is too 
narrow and second that his moral psychology is too limited. 
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First it is clear that Haber has a very idealised understanding not 
only of forgiveness but also of the human beings who injure, resent 
and repent. This is a product of his Kantian approach. There are 
ways, however, in which the precision of this theory is the result of 
oversimplification. While it is a good theory in certain paradigmatic 
cases, it does not tell us enough about the complexity of forgiveness 
in many circumstances. Haber's person, be they one who resents or 
one who repents, is a rational creature with a good memory. 
Moreover they exist in a world of discreet and identifiable moral 
episodes in which responsibility can be simply and incontestably 
assigned. Throughout his presentation he uses this basic model: 61 
1. X did A; 
2. A was wrong; 
3. X was responsible for doing A; 
4. V was personally injured by X's doing A 
Haber shows us how difficult forgiveness is even when 
circumstances are as simple as this. But often, even generally, life 
is not so simple. Granted that we might be able to identify X and V, 
quite what A is might be confused, or at least described, in a variety 
of ways. Furthermore X and V might evaluate A differently. While it 
is implicit in his understanding of repentance and resentment that a 
common evaluation of act A is necessary for forgiveness, he offers 
nothing by way of analysis of what it means for V to come to terms 
with either act A or person X aside from this confluence of 
evaluation. In other words, his thesis concerns only forgiveness in 
his own sense, not forgiveness in the wider sense of making some 
kind of peace with a past which has included moral offence against 
one's self. 
Secondly there is a problematic assumption in what we might call 
Haber's moral psychology. He seems to believe, and this is most 
clear in his discussion of repentance, that people injure each other 
because they believe that it is morally right for them to do so. Thus 
he believes that repentance is caught up with the transition of 
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morality. There are two problems with this. First, people do not 
always do only what they think is right; for instance some people 
offend against their own moral precepts, and as a result are far 
from happy with themselves. It is curious that Haber has nothing to 
say about the phenomenon of the guilty conscience. Second, 
morality is not necessarily thought out and defined in terms of 
principles, and even when it is it does not follow that all actions 
can be classified as right or wrong with even internal consistency. 
If this were not so there would be no need for ethics at all. 
Ambiguity surrounds moral actions, whether something was right or 
wrong may often be a matter of perspective. 
A further problem is consequent on Haber's failure to take into 
account the fact that offences and injuries might vary very 
considerably in gravity. Haber has assumed that injury leads to 
resentment and that resentment may be diminished as part, at least 
sometimes, of a morally valid forgiveness. We have already 
considered the psychological possibility that injury may not lead to 
resentment simpliciter, but that guilt and shame may be responses 
of the injured. But in some cases there may be, because of the 
nature of the injury or the routineisation of an offence, a 
metaphysical aspect to the response. The very offence or injury, in 
other words, may rob the offended of their self-respect, or their 
sense of moral worth. Sometimes the word `injury' is not 
sufficiently serious to describe what people do to each other. 
Certainly murder is worse than injury. But fates are sometimes 
worse than death. Sometimes `injury' is violation. By violation I 
mean an action or set of actions which manage to convince their 
object that they are not worthy of respect. That they are sub-moral, 
neither dignified nor responsible human beings. Such injuries wound 
at the very core of the sense of self. Haber does not raise the 
question of whether or how they might be forgiven. 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter a number of views about the nature of inter-personal 
forgiveness have been considered. In the first part of the chapter 
distinctions were offered between excuse, condonation, pardon and 
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forgiveness. These distinctions were used in an attempt to analyse 
the ethicality of the request for, and the silence with regard to, 
forgiveness in Simon Wiesenthal's account of his experiences in The 
Sunflower. The conclusion was that Wiesenthal was faced with a 
request for pardon couched in the language of forgiveness and that it 
would have been inappropriate for him to have responded with a 
word of forgiveness as this would have been taken as a positive 
response to the veiled request for pardon. Pardon, it might be added, 
was not possible partly because Wiesenthal was not authorised to 
give it and forgiveness was not possible because there was no 
attempt on the part of Karl to repair his relationship with 
Wiesenthal. Indeed by insisting that he heard his confession and 
request for forgiveness Karl proved that he was not in a position to 
be reconciled to Wiesenthal as an autonomous and equal human being. 
In the second part of the chapter the tradition of ethical writing on 
forgiveness was considered. The most important ideas in this 
tradition are the Butlerian notion that forgiveness is the 
forswearing of resentment and the neo-Augustinian idea that 
forgiveness is achieved by distinguishing the immoral act and the 
immoral agent. The most significant recent writing on the subject is 
the monograph by J. G. Haber in which he argues against both of these 
ideas and suggests that forgiveness is only ethically appropriate 
when resentment, the moral emotion which preserves self-respect, 
is met by repentance, which includes both appropriate metanoia and 
what he calls other-regret but which might also be called sorrow or 
contrition. Forgiveness, then, can be the legitimate response of the 
victim to, for instance, apology. 
Finally a critique of Haber's theory and approach was offered. 
Although cogniscent of the claim that the tradition in which he was 
following was too idealist to provide an adequate theory of 
forgiveness Haber persisted in producing a very narrow, precise and 
particular model which was both psychologically and ethically 
simplistic. An adequate theory of forgiveness would have to be 
based on a broader range of cognitive and emotional possibilities in 
both offender and offended together with a more sophisticated 
analysis of the effect of various kinds of injury on the sense of self, 
11 5/; 
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wherein the adjustments of volition and emotion, which are basic to 
forgiveness, would occur. 
11 Ski i 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE DRAMA OF FORGIVENESS 
To enquire into the nature of forgiveness is not only to enter into 
the history of Christian theology but also, as the previous chapter 
made clear, to enter into the everyday world. For while forgiveness 
is that aspect of divine grace which those who describe themselves 
as sinners most earnestly seek, it is also that way of coping with 
the injurious or negative consequences of human actions which can 
lead to reconciliation and peace. Forgiveness, in other words, has 
both religious and secular references. The religious reference is to 
the divine action whereby the guilt of sin is removed from the 
individual, leaving that individual both responsible and healthy, 
whereas the secular reference of forgiveness is the restoration of 
human relations which have been rent by the injury of one party by 
another. But while it is possible and coherent to distinguish these 
two spheres of reference the meaning, indeed the theology, of 
forgiveness is a product of their mutual articulation. 
One of the features of the recent general interest in forgiveness is 
that it often issues in the suggestion that forgiveness should be 
considered in what behavioural scientists call `the field'. This is an 
approach which has been taken by writers such as Lord Longfordl and 
Brian Froste and was in 1989 the basis of a BBC television 
documentary produced by Catharine Seddon entitled As We Forgive. 
In the programme six case studies were presented, three of which 
were examples where after an injury there was no forgiveness on 
the part of the victim or in the case of a murder, a close relative of 
the victim, and three where forgiveness had ensued. The advantage 
of this approach was that it showed how the giving or withholding of 
forgiveness was a complex matter involving the personality of the 
injured, their relation with the person who injured them, the extent 
1 Longford, F. Forgiveness (Northampton: The Buchebroc Press) 1989 
2Frost, B. The Politics of Peace (London: Darton, Longman and Todd) 1990 
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of their injuries, the political and cultural context of the injuring 
incident and the religious convictions or want of them in the 
respective parties. The disadvantage, and similar remarks apply to 
Longford's book, was that it did not manage to transcend the 
particularities in order to establish anything about either the ethics 
or the psychology of forgiving. As Frank Delaney commented in a 
review of Seddon's programme in The Listener, an investigation of 
the limits of the human capacity to forgive would have been more 
valuable. The material, as he rightly observes, is not limited to the 
contingencies of the injurious or forgiving incidents themselves, nor 
to the answers which subjects give to questions about forgiveness. 
Rather, "the real material ranges all over the psyche and arises 
daily. "3 
1. SOME RECENT QUESTIONS ABOUT FORGIVENESS 
A resolution of the tension between the need to address the 
contingencies of particular situations and the importance of 
identifying the generalities of lay theories of forgiveness lies in the 
way in which questions of forgiveness are handled in drama and 
literature. In this chapter we therefore begin by considering the 
questions about forgiveness which are raised in Iris Murdoch's novel 
Bruno's Dream as well as in two contemporary plays, Ariel 
Dorfman's Death and the Maidens and Rudolf Shaffer's The Gift of the 
Gorgon. 
1.1. Bruno's Question 
In Murdoch's book, Bruno is a bedridden old man reflecting on his 
relationship with this wife Janie who died twenty years previously. 
He is not a religious person though his ruminations on his need to 
come to peace with his past bring a kind of pathetic religious 
yearning. 
3 The Listener 9 February 1989 
4Murdoch, I. Bruno's Dream (London: Penguin) 1975 
5Dorfman, A. Death and the Maiden (London: Nick Hern Books) 1992 
6Shaffer, P. The Gift of the Gorgon (London: Penguin) 1993 
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"Sometimes he would have liked to pray, but what is prayer if 
there is nobody there? If only he could believe in death-bed 
repentance and instant salvation. Even the idea of purgatory 
was infinitely consoling: to survive and to enter the embrace 
of a totally just love. Even the idea of judgement, a judgement 
on his cruelty to his wife, his cruelty to his son. Even if 
Janie's dying curses were to drag him to hell. "7 
Bruno has not lived a kind life. Both his wife and his son grew to 
hate him. His wife because of his infidelity, his son because Bruno 
was so hurtful about his marriage to an Indian woman. The focus of 
the tragedy is not these problems in themselves but the systematic 
way in which opportunities to overcome them, to give or receive 
forgiveness, were avoided. The starkest example of this was 
Bruno's refusal to visit his dying wife at her bedside. He had reason 
to refuse: "For weeks, months he was sorry, weeping, kneeling, 
buying her flowers which she threw out of the window, begging her 
to forgive him. `Don't be angry with me, Janie, I can't bear it, 
forgive me, Janie, oh forgive me, for Christ's sake. "8 But Janie 
never would forgive, and Bruno got to the point where he could no 
longer even beg for it so that in the end he let her die alone. "He 
could not bear it... He heard her call.. he did not go up. He feared a 
curse but perhaps she wanted to forgive him, to be reconciled with 
him. "9 
He condemns himself for not allowing the possibility of forgiveness 
and is lost in self-pity: "Supposing Janie had wanted to forgive him 
at the end after all? She held out her hands to him saying, "Bruno, I 
forgive you. Please forgive me. I love you dear heart, I love you... ' He 
would never know. The most precious thing of all was lost to him 
for ever. "10 The unforgiven Bruno is captivated by the need to be 
forgiven. He writes to his alienated son Miles in the hope of having a 
reconciling conversation, perhaps he can forgive him on behalf of all 
the others. But Miles is less than enthusiastic about adopting the 
7Murdoch, I. Bruno's Dream p8 
8Murdoch, I. Bruno's Dream p13 
9Murdoch, I. Bruno's Dream p15 
1 OMurdoch, 1. Bruno's Dream p36 
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role of confessor. 11 Bruno's situation is further complicated 
because he is so puzzled about this forgiveness which he so desires. 
As he puts it to his nurse Nigel when he tells him that he is to see 
his estranged son "Do you think that forgiveness is something, 
Nigel? Does something happen? Or is it just a word.? "12 
Bruno's question is an alternative to Boso's as a starting point for a 
theology of forgiveness. 13 Anselm's Boso asks why God could not 
forgive merely as an act of will and Bruno asks whether forgiveness 
is real. Bruno's pathetic question draws attention to some of the 
major issues which need to be considered in a contemporary 
theology of forgiveness. Both questions have to do with the arena in 
which forgiveness occurs, but while Boso's question is intended to 
suggest a particular theological agenda, Bruno's is much more 
general and far-reaching. In Boso's case the question is posed as a 
challenge to ways in which the cross of Christ has been interpreted 
as being central to divine-human forgiveness. But in Bruno's case it 
is not at all clear what he means by `something'. For instance, he 
might be referring to an ontological 'thing' which would be changed 
whereby he would be put at one with his late wife. Alternatively, he 
might be referring to the prospect of a change internal to himself 
whereby he would no longer be tormented by guilt. But then again 
the internal side of his experience may not be so much emotional as 
cognitive. He might be hoping not to lose his guilt but to be free of 
the repeated and unbidden memory of Janie's unanswered summons 
from her death bed. Against any or all of these he posits that it 
might just be a matter of words and that the utterance of words of 
forgiveness might not have any effects or implications. An 
important part of this study is to explore the possibilities 
suggested here and to show not only what they mean on their own 
terms but that they are all interconnected and that the 
interconnections between them are, in fact, a central aspect of the 
significance which attaches to forgiveness. 
11 Murdoch, I. Bruno's Dream "He did not want emotions and memories and 
unmanageable unforeseen situations. He did not want to go through all the rigmarole 
of forgiving and being forgiven. It would all be play-acting. It would be something 
hopelessly impure. " p65 
12Murdoch, I. Bruno's Dream p75 
13Boso is Anselm's interlocutor in Cur Deus Homo? 
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1. ii. Paula's Predicament 
Ariel Dorfman's play Death and The Maiden is set in a Latin American 
Country14 in the early years after the over-throw of a totalitarian 
regime. It is an intensely focused study of the chance encounter 
between Paula, a former victim of torture, Roberto, the doctor who 
presided over her torture, and her husband, Gerardo. The significant 
part of the play for our purposes comes towards the end when Paula 
has established that the man Roberto really is her torturer. But 
once his guilt is established, what next? What can or should Paula 
do? 
One way in which the drama allows us to focus on this issue is in 
terms of what the various characters want. It is Paula's desires 
which are important for our purposes. Candidly she explains that her 
initial sentiment is to want revenge. "Doing to them, 
systematically, minute by minute, instrument by instrument what 
they did to me. "15 But in the end, although she dwells for a while on 
the means whereby she would extract such retribution, she realises 
what she really wants. 
Paula: I want him to confess. I want him to sit down in front 
of the cassette recorder and tell me what he did - not just to 
me, everything, to everybody - and then have him write out in 
his own handwriting and sign it and I would keep a copy 
forever. 16 
In the end Roberto does confess, but his confession is forced, it is a 
version of events told by Paula to Gerardo and in turn relayed by him 
to Roberto. We rejoin the drama with the guilty Roberto still tied up 
and confronted by Paula. 
14Although not stated this is generally recognised to be Chile. 
15Dorfman, A. Death and the Maiden p34 
16Dorfman, A. Death and the Maiden p35 
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Paula: Don't move, Doctor. There's still a little matter 
pending. It's going to be an incredibly beautiful day. You know 
the only thing that's missing now, Doctor, the one thing I need 
to make this day really truly perfect? To kill you... 
... When I gave my word [To release him on confession] I still had a doubt ... that you really were that man... Now that I know, that you are that man, I could not live in peace with 
myself and let you live. 
She points the gun at him. 
You have a minute to pray and really repent, Doctor. 17 
At which point Roberto stands up to protest not the injustice of 
shooting him now that he has confessed, but his innocence. He 
claims to have made up the confession to placate Paula and escape. 
But Paula knows better. In making the confession accurate and full 
Roberto unwittingly convicted himself. But in his confession about 
the way in which he made the confession he revealed his lack of true 
repentance. 
17Dorf man, A. Death and the Maiden p51 
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Paula: I'm not going to kill you because you're guilty, Doctor, 
but because you haven't repented at all. I can only forgive 
someone who really repents, who stands up amongst those he 
has wronged and says, I did this, I did it, and I'll never do it 
again. 
Roberto: What more do you want? You've got more than all the 
victims in this country will ever get. A man who's confessed, 
at your feet, humiliated, 
He gets down on his knees. 
Begging for his life. What more do you want? 
Paula: The truth, Doctor. The truth and I'll let you go.... 
Confess and I'll let you go. You have ten seconds... Time is 
running out, Doctor. Confess! 
Roberto stands up. 
Roberto: No. I won't. Because even if I do confess, you'll 
never be satisfied. You're going to kill me anyway. So go 
ahead and kill me. I'm not going to let any sick woman treat 
me like this. If you want to kill me, do it. But you're killing an 
innocent man. 
Paula: Nine. 
Roberto: So we go on and on with violence, always more 
violence. Yesterday they did terrible things to you and now you 
do terrible things to me and tomorrow the same cycle will 
begin all over again. Isn't it time we stopped? 18 
At the end of the Act the characters freeze in these positions and a 
mirror descends between them and the audience. Schubert's string 
quartet, Death and the Maiden, is played while the spectators watch 
themselves in the mirror. Does she shoot him or not? The audience 
are invited by the mirror to perceive themselves as part of the 
situation and also to reflect on how they respond to it. 
Paula is a violated person wanting her violator to own the violation 
and thus to acknowledge not only her injury but also her status as 
person. Roberto is the violator who will neither admit any 
particular action nor its moral weight. He attempts to exploit the 
18Dorf man, A. Death and the Maiden p53 
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logic of forgiveness but his pleading is merely a crass attempt to 
distract the victim from the moral agenda of rediscovering her 
personhood. 
The final Act is set at a concert several months later. Paula is 
haunted. The music is Schubert, Death and the Maiden, and the 
unseen-seen ambiguous figure at the concert is Roberto. She is not 
free of him. She is not free of the past. The play has no answers. It 
is a statement of the complexity and gravity of forgiveness. 
1. iii. Edward's Passion 
For Bruno and Paula the unachievable possibility of forgiveness 
might be seen as an additional burden for them to bear in their 
distress. Poor Bruno, to use his self-description, does not even 
know whether what he longs for is real. Perplexed Paula, on the 
other hand, knows and understands that forgiveness is a possibility 
but also knows that it cannot just happen; it is not merely a matter 
of words or of will but is a possible outcome of an exchange 
initiated by genuine repentance. 
The main question which attracts attention is based on the 
appreciation that forgiveness is evidently an act of moral 
seriousness. To forgive is to respond to actions which are judged to 
be injurious or offensive. It is therefore to act on, among other 
things, that judgement. This raises the question of the justice of 
forgiveness. But while we might think of justice as an ethical 
abstraction it is more than this. In human terms, whether the arena 
is personal or political the question of justice is not only one of 
judgement but also of emotion or passion. This is one of the points 
which is made with great power in Peter Shaffer's play The Gift of 
the Gorgon. Indeed, in the central character in the play, the 
playwright Edward Damson, sees the pursuit of justice as the only 
moral passion. 
The drama revolves around the relationship between Edward and his 
wife Helen. Edward sees himself as the champion of a hot, angry and 
vengeful response to violence in the interests of justice and 
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engagement. In the second act Edward and Helen hear the following 
radio announcements: 
BBC MALE ANNOUNCER This morning a bomb exploded at a War 
Memorial in the town of Enniskillen, Northern Ireland. It 
happened without warning as a crowd was assembling for a 
Remembrance Day Service, commemorating the dead of two 
world wars. At least eight people have been killed and many 
more injured. 
IRISH FEMALE ANNOUNCER Among the dead is Marie Wilson, a 
twenty one year old nurse. Her father says that he forgives the 
terrorists responsible. `I bear them no ill will, ' he said. `I bear 
them no grudge. '19 
Edward is appalled: "What a terrible thing to say, " he exclaims. But 
Helen is delighted: "I think it's glorious! It's possibly the most 
moving thing I ever heard. "20 And a row ensues in which Edward 
calls Helen and all who would forgive `the Brigade of Avoiders'. 
Edward is stimulated by the news to write a play, 'IRE', which will 
be his manifesto for justice. "An IRA bomb explosion in the toy 
department of a large London store. Mothers and children blown to 
pieces: dolls and teddy bears splattered with blood and brains. "21 
One of the children is the daughter of a woman MP who captures one 
of the bombers in Belfast and then executes him ritually, before the 
eyes of the audience. But as the play goes on to reveal, Edward's 
feelings about justice are not positively received and when the play 
opens he is jeered by the audience. Helen had opposed the writing 
and production of the play from when she first heard the idea, and it 
is her early speech against his sense that only those who seek 
justice are motivated by passion is the most important speech in the 
play for our theme. 
19Shaffer, P. The Gift of the Gorgon p54 
20ibid. 
21 Shaffer, P. The Gift of the Gorgon p55 
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"You go on about passion, Edward. But have you never realised 
that there are many, many kinds? - Including a passion to kill 
our own passion when it's wrong. I'm not just being clever. 
The truest, hardest, most adult passion isn't stamping and 
geeing ourselves up. It's refusing to be led by rage when we 
most want to be... Stubbornly continuing to say no to blood. 
All right, the Greeks wouldn't have understood this, but they 
were savages, finally, the whole of their country ran with 
blood. It was all entrails and screaming: no pity for anyone. 
They had Gods to take the big view for them. Athena could 
come down suddenly and stop the boys fighting, like a 
schoolmistress in a playground. We haven't got anyone to do 
that. We're the boys and the mistress, both - that's the 
impossible and wonderful thing about us! No other being in the 
universe can change itself by conscious will: it is our 
privilege alone. To take out inch by inch the spear in our side 
that goads us on to bloodshed - and still make sure it doesn't 
take our guts with it. My dad invented that image. My liberal 
old daddy. "22 
As Helen puts it, forgiveness is not mere avoidance or lack of 
engagement. It is passion against passion. 
2. SOME RECENT THEOLOGIANS ON FORGIVENESS 
In this section of the chapter I offer a review of some recent 
theological writing on forgiveness. Much of this is based on the 
paradigm of the atonement but also draws upon or attempts to 
explain the phenomenon of human forgiveness. The various writers 
touch on different aspects of forgiveness and I have grouped them in 
such a way as to draw attention to similarities and divergences. 
Differences should not be interpreted as disagreements in every 
case. As we have already seen, forgiveness is a broad subject and 
therefore it is understandable that in different writings different 
questions or dimensions of the subject are the focus of attention. 
When I have reviewed the contribution of the writers under different 
headings I will offer some thoughts about what this theoretical 
work has to say to the situations and issues outlined in the first 
part of this chapter. 
22Shaffer, P. The Gift of the Gorgon p57 
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21 Forgiveness as Affirmation J. Baker and P. Hinchliff 
Although forgiveness between people has not been a major topic in 
theological ethics there have been some attempts to wrestle with 
the questions which it raises. The relatively recent and wide- 
ranging works by John Baker and Peter Hinchliff touch on 
forgiveness in productive and related ways. 
In his book The Foolishness of God John Baker argues that while 
forgiveness is the classic way of dealing with guilt, it does not 
eradicate it. 23 Rather, what makes forgiveness 'classic' or of great 
value is that it affirms guilt as "something that works for life and 
strength and good. "24 Baker considers the situations in which the 
offended and the one who offends are either known or unknown to 
each other and sees that forgiveness means different things in the 
two cases. In the case of an injury inflicted by a non-proximate 
stranger forgiveness is a refusal to add to the sum total of evil by 
entertaining bitterness. 25 In this case the new circumstances 
created by the infliction of the injury must be accepted and any 
resentment must be eschewed. 
In the case where there is a relationship between offended and 
offender Baker first insists that forgiveness is not a trivialisation 
of the offence nor a foregoing of the right to live within a just 
society: "There is nothing in the virtue of forgiveness which 
necessitates our enduring injustice in helpless silence. "26 The 
offence must, as it were, be brought into the relationship and seen 
for what it is. Most importantly the offender must not indulge in 
self-excuse but in confession and repentance. If this is the case 
then there is the possibility of forgiveness. But forgiveness does 
not undo the past so much as draw a line under it. "The evil has 
happened; it is there in history forever. We like to delude ourselves 
23Baker, J. A. The Foolishness of God (London: Darton, Longman and Todd) 1970 
24Baker, J. A. The Foolishness of God p120 
25ibid. 
26Baker, J. A. The Foolishness of God p121 
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that forgiveness rewrites the record, and makes us splendid 
characters once more, but it does not. "27 
Peter Hinchliff makes similar points in his Holiness and Politics. 28 
He understands forgiveness to be at the heart of Christian faith and 
ethics. It is that which, "enables us to accept the reality of 
imperfect human nature without lowering our standards of what 
human beings and human life ought to be. "29 Like Baker he sees an 
integral connection between guilt and forgiveness. Ethics exist and 
as we err we become guilty. Forgiveness however means that guilt 
is not terminal. On this argument forgiveness is functionally 
identical to punishment. They both remove the guilty part of the 
consequences of an offence. The difference is that forgiveness 
depends upon repentance. Hinchliff goes so far as to say that 
forgiveness is experienced in repentance. 30 Forgiveness is also a 
mark of the social, a way of being in fellowship. This is so because 
repentance is an attitude of mind in which the consequences not only 
of one's own but also of other people's failures are borne: 
"repentance involves not merely the determination to do what I can 
to redeem and alleviate the consequences of my own sin, but also to 
learn the meaning of forgiveness by bearing willingly the 
consequences of other people's failures, individually and 
collectively. "31 This makes sense of his conviction that forgiveness 
is at the heart of faith. It means that forgiveness is more than an 
occasional transaction. It is a mode of life, a way of being with 
others and for a certain kind of community. For Hinchliff, 
forgiveness is the reconciling nexus at the heart of both faith and 
koinonia. It connects with the cross of Christ but in a way which 
sees the cross as unfinished business. Hinchliff also adds another 
dimension to the depth of this interconnectedness by insisting that 
the cross and the `deeply ingrained and bitter sense of having been 
wronged mutually `earth' each other. 
27Baker, J. A. The Foolishness of God p122 
28Hinchliff, P. Holiness and Politics (London: Darton, Longman and Todd) 1982 
29Hinchliff, P. Holiness and Politics p59 
30Hinchliff, P. Holiness and Politics p53 
31 ibid. 
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Reflection 
Baker and Hinchliff would agree that Bruno was not to worry, 
forgiveness does exist. Baker would be the more salutary visitor 
however, assuring Bruno that while repentance was fitting it was 
not yet full reformation of character. He might also remind Bruno 
that he was in no position to demand forgiveness and that his self- 
pity was poor. We can be sure, however, that had he spoken to Janie 
he would have reminded her of her obligation to forgive the 
repentant Bruno, and he would certainly encourage Bruno in his 
endeavour to get in touch with his son, though again, he would 
remind him that whatever the outcome it should be accepted as a 
gift and that in any case, forgiven or not, Bruno's task was to be a 
loving and forgiving person in his own right. He would remind Bruno 
that whatever forgiveness he had not received he was also in receipt 
of manifold forgiveness. Similarly Baker would presumably 
encourage Paula to be forgiving in the first sense, that of letting go 
of her resentment for the sake of not adding to the evil in the world. 
Hinchliff's response to Bruno would be similar to Baker's. He would, 
however, have more to say to Paula. For as well as seeing that she 
should try to be rid of her resentment at least for her own sake he 
would also sympathise with her poignant protest against the fact 
that in the face of his crime she is required to pay the price of 
justice. "Why is it always people like me who have to sacrifice, 
who have to concede when concessions are needed, biting my tongue, 
why? " Hinchliff is alive to the political dimensions of forgiveness 
and would assert that there is, in a sense, no justice in that the 
offended are those who pay the price of forgiveness even if that 
forgiveness is in the service of a just and positive social order. 
This is one of the reasons why he would suggest care rather than 
abandon in the act of forgiving. It is also the reason that, unlike 
Karl Barth from whom he distinguishes himself, he does not see the 
work of divine justice as achieved in the historical event of the 
cross but as the continuing work of those who sacrifice in the name 
of forgiveness. Hinchliff would therefore reckon both the ethical 
and the theological significance of any act of forgiveness on her part 
to be very considerable. 
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2. ii. Forgiveness as Costly P Fiddes and R Swinburne 
According to Paul Fiddes, forgiveness is the basic process which 
operates in atonement and he is careful to distinguish this from 
`mere legal pardon'. Forgiveness is not the passionateless and 
distant mitigation of a penalty, it is, "a painful relational 
experience. "32 But more significant than the pain of forgiveness is 
the costliness: "Reconciliation is a costly process because there 
are resistances to it in the attitude of the person who has offended; 
the one who has set out to forgive must aim to remove those 
blockages and restore the relationship. Forgiveness then involves 
relationship which is costly. "33 It is this aspect of costliness 
which distinguishes forgiveness from pardon and which explains the 
cross: "Forgiveness as an act creating response is therefore bound to 
be expensive in time and effort, requiring mental and physical 
anguish. "34 
Fiddes stresses that it is productive and orthodox to think of 
creation and redemption as a unity. Moreover God is not above 
suffering but is in a sympathetic relation with creation. But if the 
combined effect of points such as these is to persuade that 
atonement is an event in the present he is equally determined to 
show that it relies on a decisive event in the past. In other words 
that there was an act of atonement as well as the continual process 
of salvation. 
Fiddes believes that the subjective and human aspects of salvation 
must have a priority in theology, but he is also convinced that the 
objective reality of atonement must be taken into account: 
32Fiddes, P. Past Event and Present Salvation: The Christian Idea of Atonement 
(London Darton, Longman and Todd) 1989p15 
33Fiddes, P. Past Event and Present Salvation p16 
34ibid. 
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"We are bound to understand reconciliation by analogy with the 
process of healing rather than by analogy with a legal or 
commercial transaction. Using traditional terms this might be 
called subjective, but it will work hard at understanding the 
'objective focus' of God's activity, both in past and present 
events. This means... understanding the cross of Jesus as an 
event which has a unique degree of power to evoke and create 
human response to the forgiving love of God. "35 
More than this, it can be a resource for generating hope, indeed it is 
the basis, he claims, in an argument about the ability of the 
atonement to transcend time, of hope itself. "It is not just that 
there is an interesting parallel between the past event of atonement 
and the future hope of completed salvation. Each unlocks the 
meaning of the other. "36 This leads to the characteristic Christian 
way of recalling the past and expecting the future so that the 
individual can, "respond to the God who draws near in 
forgiveness. "37 
Fiddes is convinced that the reasons for the death of Christ must be 
allowed to interpret the meaning of the atonement. He sees the 
death as a product of Jesus' ministry in which: "he was creating a 
new climate of understanding about the way that God deals with 
people, placing the emphasis upon God's free offer of forgiveness for 
sinners rather than upon a style of life shaped by the keeping of 
regulations for right living. "38 To give but one vivid example: 
"Jesus outraged the religious establishment by eating with sinners 
while, in their view they were still sinners. "39 As a result of 
interpreting the reasons for Christ's death in these ways Fiddes 
comes to particular conclusions about the meaning of the atonement. 
35Fiddes, P. Past Event and Present Salvation p29 
36Fiddes, P. Past Event and Present Salvation p33 
37Fiddes, P. Past Event and Present Salvation p34 
38Fiddes, P. Past Event and Present Salvation p42 
39Fiddes, P. Past Event and Present Salvation p44 
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"Since the atonement of the cross sums up and completes the 
whole course of Jesus' life, the controlling aspect of any 
doctrine of atonement must be the forgiveness and acceptance 
of God. As Jesus showed his sovereign freedom over the way 
of the law, so a doctrine of the atonement must be free from 
any notion of 'transaction' which somehow satisfies the 
demands of a divine law code. "40 
The point is well put. There is more irony than justice in the 
suggestion that the Gospel of forgiveness is proclaimed in an action 
which is the very opposite of forgiveness. 
Richard Swinburne also suggests that divine-human atonement is a 
specific example of forgiveness. Basing his case on a metaphysical 
understanding of merit, he holds that wrongdoers have an obligation 
to see to it that their guilt is removed in some way. This is, in part, 
like repaying a debt, but guilt, he claims, is only incompletely 
analogous to debt and as such can only be imperfectly removed by a 
quasi-financial transaction. The truth is that guilt is more like dirt: 
"Objective guilt makes its bearer in a way unclean". 41 It is for this 
reason that the removal of guilt involves the wrongdoer making 
atonement which, he asserts, involves four elements: repentance, 
apology, reparation and penance. 
But the objective aspect of guilt is only part of the problem. There 
is also the way in which the wrongdoer is responsible to himself for 
making himself a wrongdoer. It is for this reason that, having done 
wrong, the agent must express his disowning of the wrong act both 
to the one offended, which is apology, and also to himself, which is 
repentance. Swinburne stresses that apology and repentance are 
both difficult. He also stresses that they must be done seriously, 
and that the point of penance is precisely to add the gravitas which 
makes the apology and the repentance real. Thus, although a debtor 
may return a long-overdue debt, even accounting for the interest 
lost, `something else' would be required for forgiveness. Swinburne 
suggests that offering a bunch of flowers or box of chocolates is a 
performative act whereby the wrongdoer disowns his wrongdoing 
40Fiddes, P. Past Event and Present Salvation p47f 
41 Swinburne, R. Responsibility and Atonement (Oxford: Clarendon) 1989 p81 
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and owns his repentance and apology. Such is the significance of the 
costliness of this that we can say not only that penance is the cost 
of repentance and apology but that eventual forgiveness depends on 
this price being paid. 
Swinburne's analysis of human forgiveness has some value. He goes 
on to say that it remains for the victim to forgive, that is to accept 
the apology, reparation and penance by, "undertaking that in future 
you will not treat me as the originator of an act by which I wronged 
you. "42 Forgiveness is acceptance of the gifts offered by the 
wrongdoer. Like penance, it is a performative act. But pedestrian as 
this account might seem, Swinburne acknowledges that the act of 
forgiveness can be done in a variety of ways: "perhaps achieved by 
saying solemnly 'I forgive you', or perhaps by saying 'That's all 
right', or maybe by just a smile. "43 
On this analysis successful forgiveness is the meeting of two 
performative acts: `I apologise' and `I forgive', however phrased. In 
this way it is not only the quasi-financial debt incurred by the 
wrongdoer which is removed but the unclean status of the debtor is 
also dealt with: indeed it was precisely this which required not only 
repayment but `work' from the debtor. From this Swinburne goes on 
to stress that it is wrong for a victim to forgive, "in the absence of 
some form of atonement at least in the form of apology from the 
wrongdoer. "44 This is a point criticised by Brian Hebblethwaite who 
feels that, when transposed to the question of divine-human 
relationships and taken to mean that divine forgiveness requires 
prior repentance, it "seems to fly in the face of the whole Gospel 
story". 45 
Swinburne's insistence on adopting not only an objective but also a 
sacrificial model does of course fit with his understanding of the 
need for the wrongdoer to offer gifts to the injured party. He takes 
his paradigm from the Old Testament: "a sacrifice is the giving of 
42Swinburne, R. Responsibility and Atonement p85 
43ibid. 
` 4Swinburne, R. Responsibility and Atonement p85f 
45Hebblethwaite, B. L. 'The Doctrine of the Atonement: Does it make moral sense? ' 
Epworth Review 13 Sept 1993 p70 
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something valuable to a God who consumes it whole (by inhaling the 
smoke) and often gives back some of it to be consumed by the 
worshippers (who eat the roasted flesh. )". 46 But he goes further and 
suggests that Trinitarian theology is the best background for 
understanding the crucial sacrifice of the cross. God makes the 
sacrifice available, and human beings become penitent as they plead 
precisely that offering and thereby make it their own. Indeed: 
"Christ's death has no efficacy until men choose to plead it in 
atonement for their sins". 47 Thus: "forgiveness is available through 
repentance and baptism in the name of Jesus Christ". 48 
In terms of the model of human forgiveness this offering of the 
sacrifice of Christ is seen not to be a repaying of the debt which we 
have accumulated vis a vis God by reason of our sins. Rather: "It is 
simply costly penance and reparation sufficient for a merciful God 
to let men off the rest. "49 
Swinburne contrasts this sacrificial model positively with the penal 
model which has God as a punishing judge in this first stage of the 
process of atonement, and argues that his approach as not so much 
Anselmian as Thomist. Anselm has as fundamental the rendering of 
satisfaction, "of an amount of reparation equal to the harm done and 
penance required". 50 Aquinas, on the other hand, maintains that 
Christ's life and death were not necessary for our forgiveness. What 
is necessary is human repentance and apology. However this itself 
is not a human possibility. It is only the sinless Son of God who can 
make the perfect sacrifice, just as it is only the particular, 
responsible sinner who can plead it on their own account. 
In a concluding section Swinburne enters briefly into the ecclesial 
and sacramental dimensions and dynamics of his sacrificial and 
objective theory. Entering into the death of Christ in baptism is, on 
his model, a redeeming act of penitence, as is participating in the 
Eucharist. "We plead the sacrifice of Christ in joining and rejoining 
46Swinburne, R. Responsibility and Atonement p152 
47Swinbume, R. Responsibility and Atonement p153 
48ibid. 
49Swinburne, R. Responsibility and Atonement p154 
50Swinburne, R. Responsibility and Atonement p155 
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ourselves to the new humanity, the new and voluntary association of 
those who accept Christ's offering on their behalf, the Church. In so 
doing we repent and apologise and offer that sacrifice as our 
reparation and atonement. "51 
The theory is sacrificial and objective, based on a transaction with 
which we can choose to identify that the impurity of guilt might be 
removed from us. It is a separate act from sanctification, which he 
allows may be effected by the extent to which we find the life of 
Christ exemplary and moving. But this is essentially the clearest 
example of an objective sacrificial but non-penal model of 
atonement which one could hope to find. Unlike penal models we can 
not say that it removes the subject from the atonement. As 
Swinburne points out, the death of Christ has 'no efficacy' until 
pleaded and owned by sinners. "If the sinner could be forgiven as a 
result of Christ's death, without using it to secure forgiveness, we 
could be forgiven by God as a result of what had happened on Calvary 
independently of our knowing about it; and that seems a suggestion 
very distant from the New Testament. "52 This, then, is a model of 
atonement which is both objective and therefore not violated by the 
caprice or recalcitrance of the individual's will or imagination, and 
yet which is subjective in that it depends for its efficacy in any 
particular case on the response of the subject. 
Reflection 
Fiddes and Swinburne write in an apologetic and rational mode. 
Their consideration of the cost of forgiveness is forced upon them 
by their analysis of the logic of the problem of forgiveness. 
Forgiveness seems impossible and yet is also necessary if people 
are to live without the burden of the past. The idea is that if a price 
is paid, in some way and in some currency, then the fault is amended 
and life can proceed. How does this thought illuminate the 
situations of Bruno, Paula and Edward? 
One way of interpreting the problems which led to Bruno's despair is 
to suggest that Bruno could not bear the pain of his situation. To 
51 Swinburne, R. Responsibility and Atonement p161 
52Swinbume, R. Responsibility and Atonement p153 
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make sense of this it is necessary to go behind the question to the 
time when he was begging his wife for forgiveness but getting no 
answer. This was certainly painful for him and he gained from it an 
intimation of the pain of unforgiveness. When she was on her death 
bed he had a further intimation of this, realising that this was an 
opportunity which she could use to inflict more pain on him by 
denying him forgiveness for ever. The interpretation being offered 
here is that he chose not to take the risk of that radical pain but to 
avoid it. The tragedy of this, of course, is that he also avoided the 
possibility of being forgiven by her and was left, after she died, both 
with the pain of being unforgiven and the recriminations due to not 
having the courage to avail himself of his final opportunity. 
Bruno's predicament also helps to clarify some reservations about 
the fullness of Swinburne's writing on forgiveness. In particular 
with regard to the role of the victim, the would-be forgiver, in the 
process of forgiveness. Too much of what Swinburne writes 
neglects the very freedom which Bruno's wife exercised; the 
freedom to say: "No. I will not forgive. " Unpleasant as such an 
utterance will always be its possibility is crucial to the meaning of 
forgiveness. Swinburne's suggestions that it is incumbent on the 
one who seeks to be forgiven to make good their repentance with, 
say, a bunch of flowers, is shown up for its want of depth by this. 
As Murdoch's narrative relates, the flowers were thrown out of the 
window. It is too much to say that they meant nothing to the woman 
but it is clear that such symbolic gestures can be read in many ways 
and that they may, rightly or wrongly, prove to be unacceptable 
adjuncts to apology. Bruno's situation is a salutary reminder of the 
freedom of the victim not to forgive. 
Turning to the predicament of Paula the question of her bearing the 
cost of forgiveness is inevitably raised. It would seem from a first 
reading of the account that she was unwilling to accept the 
humiliation and apology of the man who wronged her and at this 
point we must ask whether her action is commendable or even just. 
There is an ambiguity in this case, however, and it takes the 
following form. Is the question one of Paula being ready to forgive, 
or is it one of the necessary conditions for forgiveness not being 
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reached? It is part of the art of Dorfman to make this situation 
really complicated in this way. For on the one hand we have even 
Roberto arguing that she must forgive for all the good reasons which 
theologians and ethicists cite about bringing cycles of retribution 
and hatred to an end. But on the other hand we have Paula saying to 
Roberto that what she requires from him is true repentance. It 
seems that Roberto has a point when he protests that he cannot 
speak honestly and candidly with a gun to his head. But this protest 
should not be taken at face value because it is used as a reason for 
not repenting, for not confessing. Roberto, while fluent in some of 
the arguments in favour of forgiveness is not fluent about the 
necessary pre-conditions. In his view Paula should be satisfied with 
his humiliation. There must, he suggests, be some satisfaction in 
this for her whether or not he is himself guilty and that satisfaction 
should be enough to let him go. This is precisely where Roberto's 
position falls apart because what he offers is not the basis for 
forgiveness but the basis for the termination of punishment or 
retribution. That he has suffered enough to satisfy her is a 
sentiment which does not connect with the logic of forgiveness. 
Roberto fails to see this precisely because he has no understanding 
of that logic. 
This conclusion is borne out by his refusal to confess or repent with 
a gun at his head. Paula, who is beside herself with rage, professes 
to believe in forgiveness of those who repent; indeed part of what 
has become clear in the play is that she has progressed from a 
retribution-revenge view (`Doing to them instrument by instrument 
what they did... ') to a repentance-forgiveness view (I want him to 
confess, and write it out in his own handwriting and sign it'). 
Roberto's professed reason for not confessing is not that he is not 
guilty. The real reason is that he does not believe that she will 
forgive him because he does not believe in forgiveness. Roberto does 
not confess or repent because he is sure that as soon as he admits 
his guilt she will pull the trigger. This is why the curtain comes 
down. The drama cannot be concluded on these terms. Paula cannot, 
believing in forgiveness, pull the trigger. But Paula cannot, 
believing in repentance, let him walk free. Roberto cannot, having 
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revealed his guilt, claim innocence. But Roberto cannot, because he 
does not believe that he will be forgiven, confess or repent. 
Turning now to The Gift of the Gorgon it can be said immediately 
that Edward is at one with Fiddes and Swinburne in believing that 
once there is an injustice there is also a price to be paid. They 
diff er however in that Edward has very limited ideas about the way 
in which this cost can be borne. Swinburne would agree that it was 
not enough for a terrorist simply to repent and so one might suspect 
that he would side with Edward against the response of Gordon 
Wilson to his daughter's killers. Before concluding in this way 
however it is helpful to use a distinction between two types of 
forgiveness. On the one hand there is forgiveness which leads to 
relationship, whether new or restored, between the two parties. 
This could be called 'reconciliatory forgiveness' and is typically a 
matter of dialogue conducted over time and with generosity of 
spirit. This was the kind of forgiveness which Bruno failed to 
achieve with his wife. On the other hand there is what could be 
called `pro-active forgiveness'. The initiative in this case does not 
lie with the wrong-doer but with the victim. Rather than wait for 
apology or repentance the victim responds in a pro-active way to a 
perhaps unknown offender by announcing that an attitude of 
resentment will not be taken up, nor will retribution be sought. 
It is this pro-active sort of forgiveness which Gordon Wilson offers. 
Sadly it is a form of forgiveness about which Swinburne and Fiddes 
have very little to say. This is puzzling since such forgiveness is 
clearly costly. It is also strangely authoritative. If an individual 
reports that he bears no grudge then he must be taken to bear no 
grudge unless there is unequivocal evidence to the contrary, in which 
case the individual is either mad or lying. But this sort of bearing 
no grudge is not the sort of forgiveness which Fiddes and Swinburne 
are talking about. It is rather the sort of forgiveness which, as 
Vincent Taylor has argued, is the primary meaning of the word 
forgiveness in the New Testament. 53 It has to do not with the 
creation of a reconciled relationship but the removal of a barrier 
which would inhibit the process of relationship-making. As Taylor 
53Taylor, V. Forgiveness and Reconciliation (London: Macmillan & Co) 1946 
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argues, while this is the focus of the meaning of the words 
translated as forgiveness (aphesis, apheimei and charisoma, ) in the 
New Testament, the New Testament teaching on the subject, 
especially that of Jesus, has within it the germ of the larger and 
deeper form of forgiveness in the sense of `reconciliatory 
forgiveness' which has become such a feature of later theology. 
Swinburne and Fiddes are speaking about reconciliatory forgiveness 
and therefore it is not appropriate to speculate about what their 
views with regard to pro-active forgiveness might be. 
2. iii. Forgiveness as Re-Creation Colin Gunton and 
Vernon White 
In his The Actuality of Atonement Colin Gunton offers a 
contemporary interpretation of the historical doctrine of the 
atonement which is based on a re-appreciation of the value of 
metaphorical language. While emphasising the importance of 
objectivity for the understanding of atonement Gunton does not 
suppose that this means that exemplarist or subjectivist aspects of 
atonement are unimportant: "If... we are to establish a case for an 
objective, past atonement, it cannot be at the cost of denying the 
subjective and exemplary implications. "54 
Gunton offers an account which uses his rekindled metaphors to 
integrate the creative, redemptive and eschatological dimensions of 
atonement in a model which recognises the connectedness of 
substitution and representation, and of the objective and subjective 
dimensions. Thus he constructs an understanding of the universe 
which has the relationship of the Trinity at the centre and the cross 
at the atoning heart of the Trinity. 
By beginning with the notions of relation and Trinity Gunton gets 
straight to the heart of the atonement. His argument is not 
historical, and for all his emphasis on substitution is not 
materialist. His work is one of theology rather than apology, it is 
about the way in which God is involved in relating, the way in which 
54Gunton, C. The Actuality of Atonement (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark) 1988 p157 
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human beings are involved in relating and the way in which God's 
involvement in humanity is the foundation of human relating with 
God. As he shows in his final chapter, his work issues in practical 
and ecclesial reflections and implications. His thoughts about 
forgiveness lie at the heart of his conception of the nature of `The 
Community of Reconciliation' which he describes in his final 
chapter. 
Central to his understanding of forgiveness is his thought about 
baptism. Disparaging infant baptism on the grounds that it leads to 
unhelpful understandings of both original and acquired sin he 
contests that baptism should be seen to be what it really is: a 
genuine initiation into a new kind of community. 
"Baptism institutes a person into a new set of personal 
relationships, in a community ordered around the justifying 
death of Christ... Thus baptism is a way of making concrete 
the atonement achieved by God through Jesus. It is to enable 
participation in the justifying action of God. In turn such a 
doctrine is definitive of the kind of community that the church 
is. It is the one called to live by the justice of God: accepting 
for itself the judgement of God in sin, borne on the cross by 
Jesus, so that it may in turn be the locus of transformed 
relationships. "55 
That is to say that the community of reconciliation orders itself 
around the theological ethics of the forgiveness of sins or, to put it 
another way, the justice of God. This justice, Gunton argues, is 
transformational rather than punitive or distributive. Justice is 
done by a transformation in which acknowledged evil becomes the 
basis of future good. This temporal locus is crucial for an 
understanding of Gunton's vision of the church. 
55Gunton, C. The Actuality of Atonement p188 
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"God gives time to those who are incorporate in Christ. 
Forgiveness on such an account is about the free 
acknowledgement of offences alongside a refusal to allow 
them to define the future of relationships. On such an 
understanding, those who share baptism will form a 
community that lives on such a basis. The form of life shaped 
by the gospel will then involve the acknowledgement of faults 
before God and each other alongside confession that the basis 
for human living is to be found in a common incorporation into 
the body of Christ. To enter the church is to enter a form of 
community in which the vicarious suffering of Jesus becomes 
the basis for a corresponding form of life, one in which the 
offence of others is borne rather than avenged. "56 
One complication which such a way of connecting forgiveness with 
ecclesial life throws up is of the relevance of the justice of God 
beyond the bounds of the church. Gunton argues that there is a more 
general relevance in that the theology of the church `contains 
elements of universal moral truth'. However, his main interest is 
ecclesial; it is the task of the community of the forgiven to live the 
life of the age to come in the present. This has implications for the 
way in which the church' engages with political realities: "The 
primary task is not to organise the world, but to be within it as a 
particular way of being human, a living reminder of the true basis 
and end of human life". 57 Gunton's thought about forgiveness is thus 
caught up in this eschatological perspective in a double way. First, 
forgiveness is itself eschatological in that it brings in the justice 
of God, secondly, it is definitive of the eschatological community of 
the church. The place of forgiveness is to be found in this time 
between times, in this arena of transformation which is reconciling: 
"There is reconciliation and justice only through the judgement of 
God and the cross of Christ that lead to repentance and forgiveness: 
only through the creative transformation of relationships. "58 
Vernon White's model of atonement is that in the Christ-event God 
became authorised to forgive by virtue of the experience of living a 
self-less, sinless life which culminated in the cross and ended in 
56Gunton, C. The Actuality of Atonement p190 
57Gunton, C. The Actuality of Atonement p193 
58ibid. 
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resurrection. The source of this moral authority argument is to be 
found in Brian Hebblethwaite's contribution to the Myth Of God 
Incarnate debate of the 1970s. In his essay on The Moral and 
Religious Value of the Incarnation he makes the point against John 
Hick, who argues that a universally incarnate God would be 
authorised to forgive because of being present in every pain, that it 
is the manner of God's participation in human pain that is crucial. 
"Only if we can say that God has himself, on the cross, 'borne our 
sorrows' can we find him universally present `in' the sufferings of 
others. "59 He believes that only concrete real participation is 
authorising, and that various forms of compassionate observation 
count for nothing: 
"This whole dimension of the Christian doctrine of the 
incarnation, its recognition of the costly nature of God's 
forgiving love, and its perception that only a suffering God is 
morally credible, is lost if God's involvement is reduced to a 
matter of 'awareness' and `sympathy'. "so 
Hebblethwaite insists that his argument refers to the significance 
not of the death of Christ but of the incarnation: 
"It needs to be stated quite categorically that God's forgiving 
love does not depend on the death of Christ, but rather is 
manifested and enacted in it. It is precisely because the Spirit 
who converts our hearts and builds up our life in the Spirit is 
the Spirit of the crucified God and that God's forgiveness and 
our reconciliation have a profoundly moral quality that has 
been the real inspiration of Christian piety down the ages, 
despite its often crude forms of expression. "61 
White discusses what he calls the conditions for real reconciliation 
at some length. His aim is to test the reaction to evil implicit in his 
atonement model, that of reconciliation, against the approach of 
59Hebblethwaite, B. L. The Moral and Religious Value of the Incarnation' in Ed. 
Goulder, M. Incarnation and Myth (London: SCM) 1979 p94 
60ibid. 
61ibid. Hebblethwaite had not changed his mind on this subject when in 1993 he 
wrote that incarnation "involves a sacrificial self-emptying love that both renders 
God morally credible and wins our penitence and self-offering" p73 while insisting 
that: "what is necessary for the salvation is not so much the death of Christ as the 
incarnation. " p73 Hebblethwaite, B. L. The Doctrine of the Atonement' 
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retribution, what he calls 'our moral intuition'. 62 White is against 
retribution on the grounds that it leads to attenuated notions of 
reconciliation. Retribution is a reaction against damage wrongfully 
inflicted which is aimed at restoring the status quo. But as White 
argues the theory of retribution rests on the assumption that it is 
good that suffering be equally distributed. 63 Thus, while others have 
drawn attention to the restoration of harmony or balance which 
retribution brings about, White draws attention to the fact that it is 
only a balance of suffering and pain. The only restoration here is of 
the equivalence of suffering, and while this may seem appropriate it 
does nothing to restore relationships. In White's view two wrongs 
not only cannot make a right, but neither do they restore a 
relationship to its former state. 
Instead of aiming to restore that which was spoilt or broken through 
sin or when an offence was committed, White advocates that there 
is a need to seek what he calls recreation. "Mere compensation 
leaves past evil unredeemed, whereas the creation of new goods out 
of past evil transforms its significance, and therefore `deals' with 
it more effectively. "64 To return to the example, it is repentance 
which is effective, so that what is paid back is, he claims, a new 
and healing love: "This `undoes' the offence by creating something 
new and better out of it; it is the destruction of evil through 
recreation and redemption, rather than the fantasy and nostalgia of 
restoration. Reaction to offence is moral, therefore, as the intended 
catalyst to this kind of event. "65 
In White's view recreative logic actually does more justice than 
retributive logic because it requires more strenuous action. In 
addition, recreative logic does not require the opposition of wrath 
and love but sees them as compatible. Recreative logic also has a 
place for substitution, as White's model is designed to explicate. 
The point is that only one who transcends as well as participates in 
the suffering of the world can effect the transcending of evil. 
62White, V. Incarnation and Atonement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
1991 p87 
63White, V. Incarnation and Atonement pp9l - 98 
64White, V. Incarnation and Atonement p99 
65ibid. 
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This approach clarifies the need for creativity in redemption: "the 
only adequate `undoing' of past disruption involves the attempted 
recreation of something new. "66 In the case of our redemption by 
God, White argues the selfless life and the death of Christ fashions a 
unique relationship. "He is made perfect through suffering and rises 
with the capacity to make others perfect through theirs... the 
meaning of justification (right relationship) includes the 
prospective meaning of sanctification. "67 
Such recreation is not the mere reformation of the offender's will 
but that of the whole context which was affected by the evil action 
and intent. In this way he has made an argument which undergirds 
Hebblethwaite's intuitive support of the need for a particular 
atoning incarnation. 
"Forgiveness is only finally and fully possible, only morally 
complete, through a kind of universal providence. And that is 
just the traditional claim: forgiveness is fully possible only 
through the Christ figure, both historically particular and 
`cosmic'. Specifically, it is made effective through the Christ 
who, having achieved in his own particular space and time the 
reshaping of appalling evil into greater good, takes that 
recreative activity throughout the whole universe. "68 
In addition to arguing for a recreative rather than a retributive 
approach to offence, White has established that incarnation is 
necessary to forgiveness. That is because forgiveness is by 
definition about the restoration of relationships and only the 
incarnate God can be in relation with material human beings. We 
cannot relate, that is to say be with and for another, in anyway 
analogous to the way in which are with and for other people unless 
that other is in important ways human. We can only relate to those 
who know what it is like to be like us because their experience is 
like ours. But similarly we can only relate to those who have had 
different experiences to ourselves. There is nothing to say to your 
mirror image. God incarnate, therefore, is necessary to the building 
66White, V. Incarnation and Atonement p104 
67ibid. 
68ibid. 
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up of a sense of relationship with God and it is for this reason that 
God incarnate is necessary to forgiveness. It is only God incarnate 
who can enter into the creation and re-creation of relationships. 
God not incarnate can enter into an ordering of creation and can rule 
it as a judge and as such can function as a pardoner. But God the 
judge cannot forgive. The model of retribution allows some 
confusion between God as law-giver, God as judge and God as 
suffering and incarnate and thereby atoning one. The model of 
recreation, on the other hand, is based on personal relations, and as 
such does not allow for the possibility of abstract and distributive 
justice. It demands that the model be repair of personal relations 
which, as we have seen, depends on congruity but not identity 
between persons. 
Reflection 
Gunton and White stress that forgiveness is an alternative to 
retribution as a response to offence or injury. They tend not to 
emphasise cost in the same way as Fiddes and Swinburne because 
their attention is focused on the logic and not the actions which 
make forgiveness possible. As we have seen, it is the logic of re- 
creative justice, that which seeks to move on from injury to 
something better, which is the ethical engine of acts of forgiveness. 
What does this have to say to Bruno, Paula and Edward? 
To begin with it would seem that Gunton, at least, has little to say 
to any of these because his concern is so ecclesial. His focus is so 
clearly on the baptised community that it would seem that he has 
nothing much more helpful to say to those outside it other than to 
suggest that they join it. There is more to what Gunton has to say 
than this. For instance, his affirmation that forgiveness is real is 
part of the answer to Bruno. But there is more in a negative way 
too, and that is because according to Gunton the offender has such a 
significant role in forgiveness. "Forgiveness is about the free 
acknowledgement of offences, " he states. If this were all that there 
was too it Bruno would have little to worry about. But it is not. 
Forgiveness only occurs when freely acknowledged offences are 
freely and generously responded to. 
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Does Gunton have anything to say to Paula's predicament? Certainly 
his approach endorses the rightfulness of her desire for complete 
confession; indeed the pain of the drama lies precisely in the fact 
that this positive and legitimate desire is not fulfilled by Roberto's 
response. But there is a deeper tragedy involved because free 
acknowledgement of offences is not possible for a person who has a 
gun pointed at his head. We have considered this already however 
and turn now to the question of whether or not Gunton or White's 
argument can take us any further along the lines developed in the 
previous reflection. 
The distinction used there was between pro-active and 
reconciliatory forgiveness. A useful question to raise concerns 
whether the authority to forgive can be construed similarly in the 
two cases. White's contribution was to argue that divine 
forgiveness is a possibility for human beings because of the moral 
authority which God in Christ gained through incarnation, death and 
resurrection. The only authoritatively forgiving God, to put it 
another way, must be the cosmic Christ who is God incarnate. This 
is clearly an argument about atonement but it is based so closely on 
the dynamics of human forgiveness that it is worth playing it back, 
as it were, in the human key. Consider the pro-active forgiveness of 
the IRA bombers by Gordon Wilson. An obvious question to ask about 
this is whether or not he is entitled to pronounce forgiveness in this 
way. The answer to this must be that he is. This is because he is 
clearly speaking for himself; he says that he will bear no grudge. 
This does not mean that the IRA bombers are to be forgiven by 
anyone else - the dead daughter or Wilson's wife for instance, or 
anyone else affected by the explosion. Wilson is clearly authorised 
to speak for himself. Indeed this is such an obvious point that there 
has to be some sort of reason for making it. And the reason is that 
Wilson's words, which are of course a point at which Shaffer's play 
does reflect reality, did cause a very significant and startled 
response when they were uttered. It was as if the world did not 
believe its ears. This too is remarkable. Of course it is not 
surprising that many wounded people respond with anger and 
resentment to those who hurt them, even the most ardent supporter 
of the ethics of forgiveness might expect the vast majority of 
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people to be quick to anger and then to fall into a bitter resentment. 
But in the case of Enniskillen and Gordon Wilson one voice in favour 
of pro-active forgiveness provoked a huge response. Why? Certainly 
the awful drama of the day added to the power of the words but the 
power was there without the hype as the subsequent section and 
refection will make clear. 
However a further point needs to be made about this matter. As we 
have seen, while Gordon Wilson was authorised to say whatever he 
felt to be true about his own response to the bombers he was not 
authorised to speak for anyone else. This means that at the end of 
the day the bombers could not think of themselves as absolved, they 
could only think of themselves as forgiven by Wilson and he was but 
one of a multitude of people who were wounded and damaged by what 
happened. But Wilson's words were more important than those of 
one man for another reason. They were compelling because of what 
they said. Had he said in simple but blunt terms that he was angry 
or shocked or that he wanted justice his words would have died on 
his lips. But because he spoke of forgiveness his words became 
authoritative. There is a strange paradox here. For while White 
argues, rightly and necessarily in a climate where questions of 
theodicy are easier to coin than those of atonement, of the way in 
which God in Christ gained the authority to speak and work a gospel 
of forgiveness, the point which I am making here is that Wilson 
gained moral authority precisely by speaking of forgiveness. 
This is why Edward, in The Gift of the Gorgon, was so appalled by the 
announcement. It was not that one man forgave but that his 
forgiveness was compelling and authoritative. He did not say that 
others must forgive. He did not say why he felt that he must forgive. 
All he did was to utter words of pro-active forgiveness and these 
were strangely powerful and self-authenticating. 
2. iv. Forgiveness, Memory and History A Falconer and C 
Duquoc 
Forgiveness always involves memory. This point is taken for 
granted so that most writers do little more than suggest that to 
forgive and to forget are different verbs. But if forgiveness does 
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not involve forgetting, whatever that is, it certainly does involve a 
change in memory. The simplest form of this is the notion that an 
injurious action would be remembered but without the attendant 
emotion, be it guilt or resentment, which troubles the rememberer. 
But forgiveness need not be reduced to the emotional cleansing of 
memories. 
Writing in the context of hope for reconciliation in Ireland, Alan 
Falconer suggests an understanding of forgiveness which illuminates 
the question of the way in which forgiveness connects with and yet 
alters the way in which meaning and history is constructed in a 
situation. Falconer suggests that forgiveness is in essence a new 
and unpredictable response to a situation of sin which he 
characterises as, "a broken relationship". 69 Falconer sets his 
remarks in the context of an understanding of human beings as 
doomed to the repetitions of history: `The sense of impotence in the 
face of the past is matched by an equally powerful sense of 
impotence to fashion the future"? ° But this powerlessness is not 
engendered so much by history as by memory: "Memories of past 
injury and pain are carried with us, as they have formed our 
contemporary stances, postures and identities. They imprison us in 
relationships fashioned prior to our era, yet sustained and nourished 
in us by the appropriation of our heritage. Only forgiveness can 
break the cycle. "71 But if forgiveness is to break the cycle it is 
itself powerful. It exercises the power of Christ which, 
"counteracts the destructive modes of exercise of power and 
releases people to act anew. "72 
Forgiveness is therefore an act of integrative power which has as 
its primary goal the bringing of the other into being. 73 Such 
forgiveness was, he argues, characteristic of the ministry of Jesus. 
69Falconer, A. 'The Reconciling Power of Forgiveness' in Ed. Falconer, A. Reconciling 
Memories (Dublin: Columba) 1988 p91 
70Falconer, A. 'The Reconciling Power of Forgiveness' p84 
71 Falconer, A. 'The Reconciling Power of Forgiveness' p84 
72Falconer, A. 'The Reconciling Power of Forgiveness' p92 
73This idea of integrative power is borrowed from Rollo May, exisitential 
psychologist and student and biographer of Paul Tillich. He develops the notion in his 
book Power and Innocence in contrast to 'domination power which is exploitative, 
manipulative or competitive. See Falconer pp 87 - 89 
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"It was above all through forgiveness that Jesus of Nazareth seems 
to have liberated men and women from the burden of their pasts. "74 
This theme of ridding the other of the burden of the past is central 
for Falconer's understanding of the power of the act of forgiveness. 
It does not obliterate the past, nor does it say that the past is no 
longer important, the point is rather that the past is no longer a 
burden. But forgiveness does not come alone. Certainly it must be 
unconditional and it issues in freedom, but this liberty is not to be 
squandered in the generation of new processes of enslavement to 
memory of hurt. "Forgiveness involves the acceptance of 
responsibility for our actions as Christian communities in relation 
to each other, and for the fracture in our relationships which we 
perpetuate because of our memories. "75 Forgiveness, then, is an act 
of assertion, but not of self-assertion so much as an assertion of 
the importance and the possibility of relationship and future. It is 
quite undeserved and unexpected and enables growth in relationship. 
it is needed if people are to be free of the burden of the past. 
The Roman Catholic writer Christian Duquoc reflects on the nature 
and meaning of forgiveness in a way which has similarities to 
Falconer's approach. 76 Both emphasise the repetitive and cyclic 
nature of the processes of justice, law, retribution, revenge and so 
on. In Falconer's case the history of Ireland provides the real 
background which proves the theory, whereas Duquoc works at a 
more general level. Both speak of vicious circles, and both are 
articulate about the need to open the future. "Jesus opposes legal 
justice because it encloses: it blocks any future... Forgiveness 
breaks a logic that lies at the heart of human relationships [one 
which is] subject to a system of justice thought of in terms of 
equivalence". 77 This does not mean giving up the fight against evil, 
but it does mean that to engage in certain types of fighting is to 
concede the battle: "What is required is an attitude that is not 
determined by what has already been done, an innovative, a creative 
gesture. "78 
74Falconer, A. 'The Reconciling Power of Forgiveness' p90 
75Falconer, A. 'The Reconciling Power of Forgiveness' p94 
76Duquoc, C. 'The Forgiveness of God' in Concilium 184 2 1986 
nDuquoc, C. 'The Forgiveness of God' p40 
78 ibid. 
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This emphasis on creativity connects with Falconer's view that 
forgiveness must be an unpredictable response to a situation. 
Forgiveness certainly cannot be predicted by the circular processes 
of law, and those who seek it are not assured of receiving it. 
Creativity and vulnerability are integrally related in forgiveness, 
the seeker and giver can never be sure that it will work out because 
neither knows what will happen next. "Forgiveness is not a 
forgetfulness of the past, it is the risk of a future other than the 
one imposed by the past or by memory. It is an invitation to the 
imagination". 79 It is also the way of God: `The believer imitates 
the creative God when he exorcises the demands of legal justice and 
works at a new relationship with the one he has forgiven. This is 
the way in which forgiveness transforms human relationships and so 
possesses a capacity to reveal the original face of God. "80 
Forgiveness is not forgetfulness. On the contrary: "it maintains the 
offending past in all its concreteness". 81 It is not laxism, because 
it calls for conversion. But it is not imprisoned by evil events. 
Rather it seeks, by dint of its own spiritual effort, to transcend 
such realities. Forgiveness breaks the mindless cycle of offence and 
vengeance by questioning it from outside. For Duquoc forgiveness is 
necessary because it allows a future of freedom and uncertainty to 
be: "Forgiveness is the proclamation of the kingdom". 82 
Reflection 
Whether or not Duquoc is consciously following Hannah Arendt is not 
clear from his text, but it is plain that this is what Falconer is 
doing. Arendt stresses the fact that forgiveness is a way of 
interrupting and thereby destroying the vicious circle of injury 
leading to resentment and further injury. This is of course the view 
propounded by Roberto when faced by Paula but we have already seen 
that self-interest makes his speech vain and vacuous. 
79Duquoc, C. 'The Forgiveness of God' p41 
80 ibid. 
81 Duquoc, C. The Forgiveness of God' p42 
82Duquoc, C. 'The Forgiveness of God' p43 
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Gordon Wilson's espousal of pro-active forgiveness had a profound 
impact both in reality and on the narrative of Shaffer's play. This 
draws appropriate attention to the significance of Falconer's 
position that forgiveness has a certain power. Falconer affirms that 
forgiveness is not a form of quietism or passionatelessness and the 
speech from Shaffer's play where Helen cites her Father's image of 
passion against passion makes the point that there is passion in 
forgiveness. For the goad to be removed without taking away 
passion for justice and interest in the future: that is the goal of 
forgiveness. 
It is the emphasis which Falconer and Duquoc have on memory which 
connects them and which is the key to this matter of forgiveness not 
being the end of justice or ethics or passion. As Duquoc has it: 
`forgiveness is not a forgetfulness about the past'. No one could 
accuse Gordon Wilson of willing the past away with his words of 
forgiveness. It was clear in this case that the past was 
acknowledged. Similarly in Bruno's story. The past was there, 
horrible and painful as it was, but his desire for forgiveness was 
wrongly thwarted if this was done on the grounds that it was his 
attempt to forget the past. The point of Bruno's pain was, in part, 
that he-was trying to work out how he could live with the past; and 
some form of reconciliatory forgiveness from his wife before she 
died seemed, to him, to be an appropriate strategy for this. The idea 
of putting the past to death is nearer the surface in Death and the 
Maiden. It is the playwright's art which makes the past explode in 
the faces of the proponents, and that in a most disturbing way for 
the victim, Paula. This is ever the case. It is the victims who bear 
the scars of their violators' actions and who seek relief from them. 
It is Roberto who says in several ways that as far as he is concerned 
the best thing to do with the past is to forget it. The tension here is 
between Paula who won't forget it and Roberto who won't 
acknowledge that it ever happened because, as we have seen, he does 
not believe in forgiveness. 
A final question is whether or not Falconer and Duquoc have any 
comfort to offer Bruno. The answer to this must be in the negative. 
Indeed it is impossible to see a way of relieving Bruno's position 
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precisely because it is so self-absorbed. The only person who could 
have relieved Bruno from his agony was his wife, but as we have 
seen his agony is now compounded because he did not avail himself 
of the final opportunity to gain her forgiveness before she died. 
Bruno is therefore left in a tragic situation. Does he repent? He 
does. Is anyone in a position to forgive him? There is his son but as 
the text makes clear the younger man is not interested in the 
emotionality of it all. There remain two other possibilities. The 
first is God, but Bruno does not believe in God although he sees that 
there would be, if he believed in him, a possibility here. The other 
alternative is that he might be able to forgive himself, but that is a 
possibility which Murdoch's text does not entertain. 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Perhaps the most important aspect of these reflections on the 
relationship between the questions of contemporary drama and the 
answers of contemporary atonement theology has been the way in 
which it has forced us to follow a hint found in the writing of Peter 
Hinchliff and distinguish clearly between two kinds of forgiveness. 
On the one hand we have identified pro-active forgiveness which is 
in many ways like pardon except that it comes from one personally 
involved in a situation who speaks only for himself. On the other 
hand there is the slightly more familiar and more process-like 
matter of reconciliatory forgiveness. It was noted that it is this 
second form which most atonement theology attends to, which is 
interesting given the analysis of Vincent Taylor that the basic 
meaning of the word forgiveness in the New Testament context is 
much more akin to the idea of pro-active forgiveness. This 
distinction is not entirely sustainable in all circumstances, 
absolution for instance presents a particularly difficult case, but 
the application of this distinction can clarify some of the confusion 
which clouds much discussion of forgiveness. 
Two of the most important practical questions about forgiveness 
have been encountered in imaginative if not factual narrative 
structures in this chapter. This encounter has revealed some of the 
complexities involved in answering them. Bruno's question was 
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whether or not forgiveness is real, whether or not the need of 
forgiveness can actually be met. Paula's predicament is of 
perceiving that in the face of her violator she is free either to kill 
him or to forgive him, but that she has no power over her violator 
which can ensure that he repents. This is tragic because she 
realises that only the combined acknowledgement of what he has 
done to her, coupled with a turning of himself from the mentality 
which allowed him to do it and a sense of responsibility for his 
actions and sorrow for her suffering, can enable her to live with her 
experiences. Paula's problem is that as victim she does not have the 
power to inflict repentance on the one who inflicted injury on her. 
As both the one who needs to forgive and to be healed she finds no 
salvation in forgiveness. 
Paula's situation is not unlike that of many victims in that some of 
the emotional and spiritual wounds are deeper than the physical 
ones. This is because the significance of the injurious or violating 
actions is not within the control of the victim. Whether they like it 
or not such injuries and violations are important, they are 
remembered with pain and distress. One reason for this is that they 
disrupt the narrative of personal value and dignity on which the 
person predicated a meaningful biography. In other words they need 
to be able to forgive the one who has brought them to shame. 83 
This thought can be developed to make it possible to assert that 
people need to forgive precisely and only if they have been harmed in 
a way which matters. If it does not matter then they cannot be 
induced to forgive. In this way offence has its meaning relative to 
the offended person's sense of self. From the point of view of the 
offended, then, forgiveness can be seen as a change in the 
significance of an injuring action. If, for instance, the injurer 
issues a fulsome apology which is taken as evidence of sincere 
regret, if, in other words, the offender can establish that they do, in 
fact, value the injured party in the way in which that party expects 
to be valued, then the action can become insignificant, and thereby 
forgiven. In terms of memory, forgiveness occurs when the offence 
or injury is recontextualised in such a way as to minimise its 
83The nature of shame is examined in detail in chapter seven. 
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THE CRISIS OF CONFESSION IN THE ROMAN CATHOLIC 
CHURCH 
Introducing her important and widely read book on the sacrament of 
penance, Sign of Reconciliation and Conversion, Monika Hellwig 
writes that: 
"There is perhaps no corner of Catholic life and experience 
more fraught with questions and problems today than the 
sacrament of penance or reconciliation. The questions were 
becoming urgent long before the Second Vatican Council and 
diminishing participation was evident in most western 
countries even then. The reformed rites that came into 
existence after Vatican II were a response, at least in part, to 
the challenge of the contemporary questions and the challenge 
of the absences from the sacrament. Nevertheless the 
reformed rites do not seem to have answered the Catholic 
people's nagging questions and problems because the absences 
have not grown less but seem rather to have grown to include 
many even of the devout. "1 
Hellwig's judgement is far from idiosyncratic. It is widely agreed 
in the Roman Catholic Church that there is a crisis in the sacrament 
of penance. The problem was first officially acknowledged when the 
Vatican II Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy limited itself to the 
following brief statement on penance: "The rite and the formularies 
for the sacrament of penance are to be revised so that they more 
clearly express both the nature and the effect of the sacrament. "2 It 
did, however, as Hellwig notes, develop with the promulgation of the 
new Ordo Paenitentiae in 1974. 
1 Hellwig, M. Sign of Reconciliation and Conversion (Wilmington, DI: Michael Glazier) 
1986 p1 
2Sacrosanctum Concilium para 72 
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The new rites offered three forms of penance. The first was the 
familiar individual confession and absolution. The second placed 
this in the liturgical context of an act of worship which included 
both communal preparation and personal confession, and the third 
offered no opportunity for individual confession but was a communal 
celebration of penance and forgiveness involving a general 
absolution. The promulgation of the new Rite was understood by 
many to be a victory of the liberal desire to diversify the forms of 
the sacrament, so that Nathan Mitchell would write that: `The new 
Rite is a kind of mosaic fashioned out of the many historical ways 
Christians have sought and received the reconciliation offered by 
God at work in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus. "3 However, 
voices from the Vatican were soon making it clear that the 
possibility of general confession and absolution in the context of a 
service of penance was not an alternative to auricular confession 
but a possibility to be used in extremis. Paul VI emphasised that 
general confession and absolution is, "by way of an exception, of 
necessity, in cases sanctioned by the bishops, and with the 
continuing obligation of individual accusation of grave sins. "4 The 
division is between those who consider that auricular confession 
conducted within the anonymity of the confessional is the normative 
form of sacramental penance and those who consider that this is a 
transitory method of appropriating divine forgiveness whose time 
has past. This division has been the central aspect of the 
theological crisis. Alongside this has run a pastoral crisis with 
regard to the sacrament, namely that the practice of confession has 
reduced significantly-5 
In 1983 a World Synod of Bishops assembled to consider the 
sacrament of penance in the light of the reception of Ordo 
Paenitentiae. The bishops were concerned that there was not enough 
flexibility in the celebration of the sacrament to cover all their 
3Mitchell, N. The Rite of Penance: Commentaries (Washington: The Liturgical 
Conference) 1978 p36 
4 Address to a general audience 3 April 1974 Documents of Liturgy 
5James Dallen relates that 38% of American Catholics confessed monthly in 1964 
but by 1974 this had declined to 17%. However during the same period the 
proportion of American Catholics receiving communion weekly had risen from 20% 
to 80%. Dallen, J. 'Reconciliation, Sacrament of' in Ed Fink, P. E. The New 
Dictionary of Sacramental Worship (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan) 1990 p1060 
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various circumstances. 6 None the less the bishops did affirm the 
practice of individual confession and saw in it the acceptance of 
personal responsibility. They were divided, however, as to whether 
general absolution and confession to laity are valid practical 
solutions in problematic situations. The theologians who advised 
the bishops in synod, on the other hand, were much more concerned 
with questions of the relation between the theological and 
anthropological discussion of penance and conversion than the 
bishops themselves. Approaching the questions more theoretically 
they stressed the connections between the social and the personal 
dimensions of sin and forgiveness. The theologians also drew 
attention to the variety of interpretations of the history of the 
sacrament, distinguishing between certain historical non-variables 
and other variables. "The essence of the sacrament is that 
reconciliation of the sinner takes place by reconciliation with the 
Church. Both the personal acts of the penitent and the action of the 
ecclesial community under the direction of the bishops constitute 
the sacrament. "7 
It was some while after the synod, however, that the Pope gave the 
Apostolic Exhortation Reconciliatio et Paenitentia. As Dooley 
remarks, it is quite different in tone from the closing address at the 
synod, being a contradiction of the view of the theologians that the 
future of the sacrament was to be found in the exploration of the 
many varieties of form which had been disclosed by historical and 
theological scholarship. The exhortation reaffirms both auricular 
confession as the normative form of the sacrament and participation 
in the sacrament as normative in Christian life. Far from being 
focused on the social and ecclesial questions of reconciliation with 
the Church, attention has returned to the individual who is placed in 
a `tribunal of mercy' awaiting a judgement which has a `medicinal 
character'. Confession and absolution thus replace penance and 
reconciliation as the focus of attention. Dooley, like many 
theologians, is disappointed: "... the document seems to reduce the 
156 
6Dooley, C. 'The 1983 Synod of Bishops and the "Crisis of Confession"' Concilium 
190.2 1987 
7Dooley, C. The 1983 Synod of Bishops and the "Crisis of Confession"' p13 
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sacrament to the confession of sin and to reinforce a privatised 
understanding of relationship with God". 8 
1. BEHIND THE CRISIS KARL RAHNER 
Before moving on to consider various kinds of response to this crisis 
it is important to pause, even briefly, to consider the contribution of 
one of the leading modernist and modernising theologians of the 
Roman Catholic Church, Karl Rahner. 
Rahner was both a historian of penance and also a theologian 
working out what the sacrament might come to mean in the new 
conditions of the late twentieth century. In his essay `Problems 
Concerning Confession' written and published in the 1960s, however, 
he articulated many of the anxieties which prefigured the debate 
regarding confession in particular and penance in general after the 
promulgation of the new rites in 1973. In this essay he argued that 
the very considerable amount of change in the nature of the 
sacrament and the discussion of problems concerning it in the 
contemporary era were all signs that this sacrament, at least, was 
alive. 
"What is alive undergoes its changes even though its innermost 
essential form remains the same. It would be silly to 
conclude, eo ipso from these changes that we might or should 
bring back an earlier outward form and arrangement in theory 
and in practice. The historically minded person more and not 
less than anyone else knows the falsehood of the statement 
that just because something existed at one time, it can also 
exist again. But if the Church's institution of penance is alive, 
it will also change again in the future, without losing its 
proper nature. "9 
Given not merely the likelihood but also the inevitability of change 
Rahner goes on to hypothesise about the kind of change which will 
ensue. "The theory and practice of the sacrament will in future tend 
towards a theologically fuller and also more personal 
8Dooley, C. 'The 1983 Synod of Bishops and the "Crisis of Confession"' p18 
9Rahner, K. 'Problems Concerning Confession' Theological Investigations III 
(London: Darton, Longman and Todd) 1967 p192 - 
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accomplishment of this sacrament. "10 He proceeds to sketch out 
what this will mean arguing that there will be fewer, more sincere 
confessions with less attention to the legalistic, mechanical and 
even magical aspects of confession and absolution than 
characterised the earliest decades of this century. 
In talking about a 'theologically fuller form of the sacrament' 
Rahner intends to get away from the thought that confession is a 
means to absolution. Forgiveness is a mystery which can only be 
entered into to the extent to which the penitent is engaged in open- 
hearted repentance. It is for this reason that the sacrament must 
become more liturgical. 
While being a prophet of change Rahner does not prophesy the end of 
the sacrament, even the end of confession and absolution. The focus 
of the sacrament remains forgiveness of sins: 
"We do not want to be psychotherapists in the confessional. 
This is not our job and would merely be silly charlatanism. We 
must simply be priests, and that wholly. We lend historical 
tangibility to God's effectively forgiving word in a personal 
happening; we are not applying magical machinery. "' 
Before this forward-looking essay however, Rahner wrote two 
others which were more conservative: one on `forgotten truths' and 
the other on the meaning of `frequent confession of devotion'. It is 
important to mention these because they give the lie to the idea that 
Rahner was any sort of revolutionary in this area. The tone of these 
essays is deeply conservative and strangely pragmatic. He puts it 
that despite the diverse forms which the sacrament has taken 
`confession' has too long a history to be discarded. The essay 
entitled `The Meaning of Frequent Confession of Devotion' is an 
attempt to explain why this is the case. 
In the first part of the essay he considers three reasons which he 
seems to estimate to be quite good but quite sufficient on their own 
to justify continuing to keep confession normative. These are that 
1 ORahner, K. 'Problems Concerning Confession' p193 
11 Rahner, K. 'Problems Concerning Confession' p205 
The Crisis of Confession 159 
frequent confession can be a place of spiritual direction and the 
growth of grace as well as the remission of, admittedly minor, sins. 
A deeper rationale for the retention of habitual confession is to be 
found in the way in which the baptised penitent relates to the 
Church as a whole but also as a community. The point is that every 
member of the church who is in venial sin is a `spot or wrinkle' on 
the visible Church12. It is for this reason that venial sin is seen as 
an injustice against the Church which needs to be repaired. He goes 
on to argue that: 
"This could not happen more meaningfully and impressively 
than by acknowledging the sin before the priest, who is the 
representative of the community of Christ's believers, by 
having it forgiven by him and atoning for it by the penance 
imposed, in order to make reparation for the injury done to the 
Body of Christ. To this extent, confession of devotion is not 
merely continued practice of the love of God but also a unique 
form of sacramental love of neighbour and a visible turning to 
the visible Body of Christ which is the Church. "13 
This tendency to see the act of confession in a rich ecclesiological 
context which is also a human context is one of the characteristics 
of Rahner's approach, and while it is both provocative in as much as 
his is a central voice in forcing and shaping the crisis of confession 
which was to follow, it is certainly not, as we have seen, either 
revolutionary or programmatic. Indeed his views on the 
contemporary form of the sacrament were surprisingly conservative. 
When he published his largest work, the Foundations of Christian 
Faith in the 1970s his understanding of the human being as guilty 
sinner in need of forgiveness was quite orthodox. Where Rahner 
differed from traditional Catholic teaching, however, was in his 
theology of grace, insisting that there was no need to think of 
extrinsic grace or a different supernatural level. But these 
ontological considerations did not influence his understanding of the 
existential of the human being before God. Sin, both original and 
acquired, are real and while baptism is the remedy for the one, 
sacramental confession, the current form of the sacrament of 
12Rahner, K. 'The Meaning of Frequent Confession of Devotion' Theological 
Investigations III (London: Darton, Longman and Todd) p187 1967 
13Rahner, K. 'The Meaning of Frequent Confession of Devotion' p188 
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penance was the necessary corollary of the other. Human guilt 
before God is terrifying because it is humanly irredeemable. The 
only valid human response is penitence which opens up the 
possibility of receiving divine forgiveness. 
Forgiveness, to be sure, is articulated in a variety of ways including 
both baptism and prayer. But as he goes on to clarify: 
"This word of forgiveness continues to live and to be 
efficacious in the prayer of the Church. In this prayer the 
Church asks with confidence again and again for God's mercy 
for itself, the Church of sinners and for every individual. 
Hence it accompanies for ever new and ever to be deepened 
conversion of each person which does not reach its fulfilment 
and its definitive victory until death. This word of 
forgiveness which always builds upon the word which was 
spoken in baptism, is addressed again to the individual by the 
Church in a special way if and when this person, who also 
remains a sinner after baptism and can fall into new and 
serious sin, repents and confesses his serious guilt or the 
poverty of his life to the Church in a special way or if under 
certain circumstances he brings them before God and his 
Christ in the common confession of a community. When the 
word of God's forgiveness is addressed to an individual 
baptised person upon the confession of his guilt by a 
representative of the Church who has been expressly 
designated for this, we call this event of God's word of 
forgiveness the reception of the sacrament of penance. "14 
Rahner's understanding of the sacrament is theological and holds 
together many sides of what is certainly a complex sacrament, some 
of which as we shall see in the course of this chapter, have been 
drawn apart. But even Rahner's magisterial theological 
hermeneutics were not enough to prevent the dawning, after Vatican 
II, of a profound crisis with regard to the sacrament of penance. 
14Rahner, K. Foundations of Christian Faith (London: Darton, Longman and Todd) 
1976 p422 
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2. THE REACTIVE RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS 
21 The Nature of `Confession' 
Paul VI described confession as: "the self-accusation made by a 
person seeking God's pardon of personal sins and the details of their 
moral and personal circumstances, to a minister authorised to hear 
and absolve the penitent. "15 This is the core of the idea but 
confession is not just an aspect of the sacrament, parallel for 
instance with contrition, because confession is an objective 
material action which has not only been an annual obligation on 
Catholics since the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, but has also been 
the metonymic name by which the sacrament of penance has been 
most widely known. Moreover, within the Roman Catholic Church 
confession has been, since the time of Charles Borromeo, the 
activity and encounter which has occurred within the booth known as 
the confessional. Thus while it is minimally true that confession is 
exactly what Paul VI described above, and that it is this when 
considered within the context of the sacrament as a whole (whether 
the sacrament be considered to be one of penance or reconciliation) 
confession is a much broader concept than that. `Confession' is what 
goes on in the confessional and the sacrament can be considered to 
be `confession' when this aspect of penance is considered to be 
primary and normative. 
Although it is not the concern of this chapter to trace the history of 
penance but to examine the current crisis it is important to be clear 
about the most basic parameters of that history. The system of 
private confession was formed as the Celtic monks engaged with the 
catechetical challenge of meeting the spiritual needs of those whom 
James Dallen calls 'scarcely more than baptised pagans'. In the high 
middle ages the pattern of individual confession coupled with 
absolution and penance and accompanied by the appropriate interior 
condition of contrition was canonised by scholastic theology as the 
sacrament of penance. It was a varied phenomenon with a whole 
variety of accidental factors attaching themselves to it. As 
Thomas Tentler has shown: "It was legalistic and evangelical, 
15Address to a general audience 5 March 1975 Documents of Liturgy p974 
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Pelagian and Augustinian, laxist and rigorist, magical and 
rational istic"1s 
This confusion should not detract us from the central points, 
however. Confession has come to mean the obligatory self- 
accusation in the context of a box and in the hearing of a priest who 
is authorised to assess contrition, give penance and pronounce 
absolution. It can be referred to as Latin because it has its patristic 
origins in the writing of Tertullian and is marked by the western 
developments of Augustine and the scholastics; moreover it became 
a hall-mark, alongside the use of Latin in liturgy, of the Roman 
Catholic Church. Finally, it seems to become problematic precisely 
when the Church decides to introduce the vernacular in liturgy. 
`Confession' belongs to a religious and cultural era which ended at 
the Second Vatican Council. 
2. ii. Criticism of `Confession' 
Writing from the point of view typical of the Northern European and 
American Laity who find 'confession' more of an obstacle than a help 
in their piety John Harriott listed some of the difficulties with 
regard to confession which are commonly voiced in his circles. 17 He 
includes such practical factors as the physical and social 
awkwardness of the confessional, and what he calls the unreality of 
the demand of frequent confession (for confessors as well as for 
penitents); he also refers to more psychological factors such as the 
impersonality of the confessor and the encouragement of the 
'shopping list' approach with the attendant emphasis on what is bad 
(sin) rather than on what is good and virtuous, as well as to the 
matter of individual differences, particularly the differences 
between the difficulties encountered by different penitents, both in 
sensitivity of conscience and self-consciousness, and also in quality 
of introspection and ability to produce the required list. In addition 
he mentions the danger of meeting an unsympathetic or harsh 
confessor. But he also explains how the theology of the confessional 
16Tentler, T. Sin and Confession on the Eve of the Reformation (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press) 1977 p364 
17Harriott, J. F. X. 'Rites of Reconciliation' in New B/ackfriars Special number on 
Sin November 1989 
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is antipathetic in many ways so that, for instance, it encourages an 
understanding of sin as `isolated acts rather than as a state issuing 
in particular symptoms' and fails to give scope for a developmental 
approach to the spiritual life. In all this confession is perceived as 
promoting the privatisation of what he calls the `me and God' 
relationship which is characterised by the emphasis on individual 
sin at the expense of an appreciation of communal influences on 
personal sin. 
Harriott's perspective is complemented by John Mahoney's analysis 
of the influence of auricular confession on Roman Catholic moral 
theology. Mahoney concludes that this aspect of Catholic practice 
has led to a spirituality which is preoccupied with sin, concentrated 
on the individual and obsessed with law. A good part of this 
impression is gleaned from his reading of the penitentials, the 
`ready-reckoners' which, while they facilitated a sympathetic 
realism with the complexity of human fallibility and sinfulness, 
"also reflects a mentality in which objective morality appears to 
preponderate over subjective guilt, and which all too easily serves 
to instil, or increase, a pervasive sense of self-mistrust on the 
penitent's part. "18 Confession in the spirit of the penitentials is as 
likely to inculcate anxiety as to alleviate guilt. Another effect of 
the institution of confession is that it both (almost) trivialises and 
domesticates sin. 19 When Mahoney notes that it is the ineluctable 
individualism of the confessional which makes social justice and 
corporate responsibility so difficult to handle, he is alluding to an 
issue which is important from the point of view of forgiveness. The 
means of liturgical forgiveness, in as much as they amount to 
`confession', are inadequate to the task of mediating the grace which 
will heal, restore and forgive anyone other than the committer of 
discrete, small scale and predictable offences. 
In his comments on the way in which the confessional has generated 
a moral theology obsessed with law he observes that the categories 
of law are important in both the Old and the New Testaments, but he 
18Mahoney, J. The Making of Moral Theology: A Study of the Roman Catholic 
Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 1985 p30 
19Mahoney, J. The Making of Moral Theology p32 
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rightly insists that this is only part of the story of the way in which 
God deals with sinners: "[It] must be asked whether the [legal and 
forensic] analogy is the most apt to describe what is primarily the 
Sacrament of God's reconciling forgiveness, rather than a legal 
apparatus of vindictive justice. "20 Thus he welcomes the extent to 
which medical and therapeutic models are used to fill out the 
understanding of forgiveness in ways which the analogy of law is 
incapable of doing. He finds it necessary, however, to remind that 
therapeutic medicine is equally only an analogy: "if the sacrament 
of reconciliation is not to be located forever in the Old Bailey, no 
more is it now to be found exclusively in Harley Street. "21 
2. iii. `Confession' Defended 
As we have observed, Reconciliatio et Paenitentia is the 
reaffirmation of the normativity of `confession' from Pope John Paul 
II which followed from the Synod of Bishops held in 1983. It is 
evident that the Pope is committed both to the Church as a sacred 
institution with a hierarchy, a law and a mission, and also to a view 
of humanity in which people attain dignity by shouldering their own 
responsibilities. These two convictions mean that when it comes to 
penance it is catechesis which is prior, the sacraments in general 
which are helpful and the sacrament of penance in the form of 
auricular confession which is the supreme and primary way of 
dealing with human sin. And human sin, while it has its social 
dimensions, is always and most importantly individual. 
"Sin, in the proper sense, is always a personal act, since it is 
an act of freedom on the part of an individual person, and not 
properly of a group or a community... The human person is free. 
This truth can not be disregarded, in order to place the blame 
for individuals' sins on external factors such as structures, 
systems or other people... there is nothing so personal and 
untransferable in each individual as merit for virtue or 
responsibility for sin. "22 
20Mahoney, J. The Making of Moral Theology p35 
21 Mahoney, J. The Making of Moral Theology p36 
22Reconciliatio et Paenitentiae (London: Catholic Truth Society) 1988 p50 
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And yet the Pope is clear that it does make sense to speak of social 
sin. Several distinct meanings are identified: sin which influences 
harmfully the lives of other people, sin which is directed against 
other people, and there is precisely social sin or evil in the 
struggles between classes, communities, groups or nations. But that 
is the end of the matter; what the liberation theologians call social 
sin does not exist. Sinful situations are real, "but these are the 
result of the accumulation of many personal sins". 23 
A parallel case against social sin is made by Hans Urs von Balthasar 
who, in his brief essay on personal confession, asserts that: "there 
is no collective guilt"24 He concedes that social and political 
factors are in themselves the source of great unnecessary suffering 
and therefore sinful but argues that what is decisive is the way in 
which the individual responds to his or her knowledge of such 
factors. It is always possible to refuse to collude with such 
structures and to work against them. But it is also possible to 
acquiesce, and while that is sinful it is personal not social sin. 
Individuals are accountable for their negligence as well as for their 
actions. He does not deny that there is a social dimension to sin, and 
he stresses something different to John Paul when he suggests that 
every sin has an immeasurable `social echo'. This is not to diminish 
personal responsibility, however, but to increase it. The social 
echoes of personal sin are the many unknowable ramifications of 
individual sins, all of which must be included in confession. While 
Balthasar is against general absolution for allegedly social sins it 
does not follow that he is in favour of the confession of a list of 
sins in a box approach to penance. Indeed this same essay concludes 
with the suggestion that confession be understood to be connected 
with a conversation about one's entire life situation. He does not, 
however, spell out what the liturgical implications of this 
connectedness are. 
For John Paul and for Balthasar confession is crucial because it 
animates the conscience which is the seat of freedom. This sacred 
23Reconciliatio et Paenitentiae p55 
24von Balthasar, H. U. 'Personal Confession' in Eds Kehl, M. and Loser, W. The von 
Baithasar Reader (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark) 1982 
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faculty which must not only be maintained but also cleansed, freed 
from guilt, absolved. This is the reason why the sacrament of 
penance can be described as a sign of forgiveness, and why it is 
essential to preserve it in a valid and efficacious form. If humans 
are free and responsible then they certainly need to be able to avail 
themselves of whatever saving help might be available. The Pope is 
sure that: 
"[With] regard to the substance of the Sacrament there has 
always remained firm and unchanged in the consciousness of 
the Church the certainty that, by the will of Christ, 
forgiveness is offered to each individual by means of 
sacramental absolution given by the ministers of penance. "25 
And he stresses that: 
"The Sacrament of Penance is the ordinary way of obtaining 
forgiveness... it would therefore be foolish, as well as 
presumptuous, to wish arbitrarily to disregard the means of 
grace and salvation which the Lord has provided and, in the 
specific case, to claim to receive forgiveness while doing 
without the sacrament which was instituted by Christ 
precisely for forgiveness. "26 
His reading of the new Rites, informed of course by Paul VI's gloss 
that the third form is not normal but a special provision, does not 
contradict this fundamental. 
Pope John Paul's position derives from the conviction that secular 
thought reduces human beings to religiously insignificant creatures 
for whom ethics are irrelevant. However, it is of the nature of the 
doctrine of sin and the practice of confession to entrench and 
encourage a religious or sacred self-understanding. The human 
sciences do have their limited uses but errors have been made in 
evaluating their findings: `on the basis of certain affirmations of 
psychology, concern to avoid creating feelings of guilt or to place 
limits on freedom leads to a refusal ever to admit any 
25Reconciliatio et Paenitentiae p113 
26Reconciliatio et Paenitentiae p115 
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shortcoming. "27 And the list continues: sociology encourages the 
view that society is to be blamed, and cultural anthropology 
sometimes denies the possibility of human action and therefore 
human sin. Ethics based on historical relativism are a problem too, 
as norms are dismissed and moral values are overthrown. For John 
Paul the combined legacies of Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud are 
utterly corrosive of the human sense of sin and therefore of human 
dignity, freedom and holiness. It is not that people have developed 
beyond the need to be disciplined by weekly confession but that 
forces are actively destabilising the sacramental order. 
"The Sacrament of Confession is indeed being undermined, on 
the one hand by the obscuring of the moral and religious 
conscience, the lessening of a sense of sin, the distortion of 
the concept of repentance, and the lack of effort to live an 
authentically Christian life. And on the other hand it is being 
undermined by the sometimes widespread idea that one can 
obtain forgiveness directly from God, even in an habitual way, 
without approaching the Sacrament of Reconciliation. "28 
2. iv. Confession as a means of Forgiveness; Two 
Reflections 
Two aspects of confession contribute greatly to the contemporary 
crisis which surrounds it. First there is the self-accusation which 
confession demands, particularly with regard to the demands which 
this places on the linguistic abilities of the penitent and the way in 
which this constrains the theology of sin which may be seen either 
to under-gird or to be a product of it. Second there are the issues 
which derive from the language and place of confession in relation 
to the language and place of the rest of ecclesial, liturgical and 
sacramental life. 
2. iv. a. Talking about sins 
In a special number of Concilium entitled `The Fate of Confession' 
David Power and Gail Ramshaw Schmidt have offered distinct 
critiques of the standard form of confession, based as it is on the 
idea of talking about one's sins. In his editorial comments at the 
27Reconciliatio et Paenitentiae p67 
28Reconciliatio et Paenitentiae p107 
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end of the volume, David Power explained that the edition had its 
origins in a feeling of dissatisfaction with the work of the 1983 
Synod of Bishops and described the aim of the volume as: "to isolate 
this confession from the other acts of conversion, to see what 
problems arise from its misconception and misuse, to seek out its 
own inner intentionality and forms, and to discuss its appropriate 
place in contemporary Christian living". 29 He acknowledges that 
there are seeds of a narrative, praise-filled and personal approach 
to confession not only in the writing of Augustine and Cassian but 
also in the thinking of Paul VI whose thoughts on the nature of 
penance as metanoia or conversion were incorporated in the 
introduction to Ordo Paenitentiae. But the reality does not match up 
to these high and healthy ideals: "today's penitential practice as 
prescribed by Church canons and ritual does not adequately serve the 
naming of sin. "30 
The question of the nature and the naming of sin is of profound 
importance in any consideration of penance as, or incorporating, 
confession. Confession always involves the naming of sin and in 
order to name sin one has to know the language of sin. This is not a 
natural language. It has to be learnt. Power observes that the old 
language of sin, although archaic and closely attached to the 
description of sexual disorders and conduct, remains useful. He 
notes that these old symbols of stain, deviation and guilt are being 
applied to new areas such as social disorder or environmental 
destruction, offering as a specific example the word `pollution'. He 
also remarks that there is a renaming of sin going on, so that the 
sins of, "fatalism, individualism, greed, ambition and exploitation 
constitute the guilt of a new generation". 31 
What Power fails to observe, however, is that these `guilts' are not 
necessarily considered to be sins. Indeed, the very word sin has lost 
much of its moral credibility. It has followed the English word 
'naughty' into semantic and moral triviality only in part because it 
is the word to describe human responsibility for and involvement 
29Power, D. 'Editorial Conclusions' in Conciiium 19 2 1987 p127 
30Power, D. 'Editorial Conclusions' p129 
31 Power, D 'Editorial Conclusions' p130 
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with that which is shameful. Religious critics of confession speak 
about the trivialisation of sin, but secular critics take it that sin is 
a trivial term and use it to express moral lightness. The word has 
lost its gravitas in common coin not only because secular culture 
assumes an atheistic or agnostic humanism but because the items on 
the lists of the confessional are perceived to belong, at best, to any 
other business on the contemporary moral and ethical agenda. 32 
Gail Ramshaw Schmidt's argument is that the language of sin does 
not have its primary meaning in fault so much as in limit or distance 
from God: 
"Religion sees God answering the needs occasioned by human 
limits: because we are creatures we need a god. In the West 
the dominant image for our creatureliness, the recurring model 
of human limitation, has been sin. But sin has not been the 
sole image for human need, and presently it is not the 
existentially operative image for many Christians. "33 
Writing under three headings she draws attention first of all to the 
inter-relatedness of self-awareness, sin and sins. Her point here is 
that: "the earliest understanding of sin is actually closer to our 
word sins". 34 It is this self-consciousness as one who does wrong, 
who is alienated by specific acts, which makes the self-confessed 
sinner the paradigm of the western human who would be in 
communion with God but cannot be precisely because of this 
difference and limitation. Considering the difficulty of confessing 
in the face of moral confusion she clarifies the problem of the 
relationship between sin and sins. "'To confess sin' is to 
acknowledge one's distance from God, to declare oneself human 
before God. But `to confess sins', has come to mean a grovelling 
under guilt, a listing of infractions, a laundry list of what must be 
32There is also a sense in which 'guilt' has had a similar history, so that while it 
once referred to objective accountability for action, it is now understood as a 
subjective response to a situation, or at least an existential, for which 
responsibility is as likely denied as assumed. These are in part shifts in the process 
of secularisation, but they are part of a widespread ethical revolution which in part 
defines the crisis of confession. 
33Ramshaw Schmidt, G. 'Sin: One Image of Human Limitation' in Concilium 190 2 
1987 p3 
34Ramshaw Schmidt, G. 'Sin: One Image of Human Limitation' p4 
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cleansed before one can come to the table. "35 Ramshaw Schmidt's 
analysis is that the person identifies not merely with what is bad 
about themselves but with an exaggeration of the bad. The 
significance of the moral infringements is emphasised to the point 
that they are perceived as central to self-identity. Her response to 
this problem is to relativise it. Certainly it is reasonable to use the 
language of sin to articulate one's sense of self in the presence of 
God. But this is not the only or even the best language in which to do 
so. It is equally valid and important to think of oneself as involved 
in the complexes death/life, injustice/justice, disease/wholeness, 
chaos/meaning. The point about Christianity, it seems to her, is 
that it is a religion in which all these symbol systems can operate 
at different times. They are all facets of the Christ centred story of 
salvation/liberation/enlightenment/healing. 
Her critique is of the way in which a rich and human soteriological 
language has been narrowed in the liturgical and ethical focus on 
`confession' in the Roman Church. She does not despair of the 
possibility of having liturgies of liberation, of which a sacrament of 
penance might well be an example, but the stranglehold of the 
sin/forgiveness image and the praxis of the confessional must be 
broken. 
"We need articulated Christologies and explications of 
soteriology which develop these significant images for human 
existence upon which to base liturgical formulas. For the 
people need the images true enough to their experience and 
deep enough in the Christian tradition that they may have the 
foundational language on which to base their lives. "36 
2. iv. b. Questions of Language and Style 
One important but overlooked effect of the change to the liturgical 
use of the vernacular is that it reduces the difference between the 
sacrament of penance and the rest of liturgy. There is paradox in 
this because while at one level it connected penance with the rest of 
liturgical life, in other ways it seemed to undermine the practice of 
private confession. For instance `confession' loses some of its 
35Ramshaw Schmidt, G. 'Sin: One Image of Human Limitation' p5 
36Ramshaw Schmidt, G. 'Sin: One Image of Human Limitation' p10 
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mystery when the `I absolve you' replaces ego absolvo te. Also it 
may be that the priest who uses the vernacular in liturgy is easier 
to relate to but harder to confess to than his Latin-speaking 
counterpart. `Confession' is not at one with a spirituality which is 
liturgically vernacular. An ineluctable strangeness, or exoticism, is 
associated with the idea of 'confession' and this is connected with 
the confused desire both to include and to exclude the notion of 
forgiveness of sins in piety and liturgy. This paradox runs very deep 
so that while sin is inevitable it is still a matter of guilt and 
responsibility. It is both needed and shameful. Consequently 
'confession' is both incorporated into and alienated from liturgy and 
piety. 
Within a liturgical culture based on Latin the language of sin used in 
the confessional is not the same as the language of the mass. This 
discontinuity is part of a collection of strange cultural disjunctions 
between `confession' and the rest of the Latin sacramental and 
liturgical system. The theology of confession is itself both 
continuous and discontinuous with the rest of sacramental theology 
being based on the sanctification of quasi-matter rather than actual 
matter. But the disjointedness is not only at the level of abstract 
theology. The physical structure of the confessional also shows this 
pattern. 
The practice of having a special booth or church within a church, the 
confessional box, is a very concrete aspect of the disjointed 
connectedness of the sacrament. It is off-centre, it belongs within 
the sacred space but to one side. It is a place of privacy but within 
a public arena so that it is in a sense public. It is a place of meeting 
and encounter and yet designed to limit and channel the degree of 
intimacy and demands a very particular kind of relating. It is a 
place of professional amnesia in which amateur memories are 
disclosed. It is a place where people are squeezed into the ecclesial 
mould to which they are ordained or which is ordained for them. 
Moreover to enter into the confessional is to declare oneself both a 
sinner and yet to initiate one's own forgiveness: it is to be a 
penitent which is simultaneously a source of shame and pride, of 
guilt and glory. 
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Gustav Aulen described the theology which underlies this approach 
as Latin. 37 The primary theory of the atonement here is that of 
Anselm which is based on the restoration not of relationship or 
intimacy but of order and honour. The effect of sin is to put things 
to confusion and the effect of atonement is to put them back to their 
hierarchical order. It is the restoration of legal order through the 
pardoning of sins. Coupled with this is the old idea that penance is a 
kind of payment or tariff, a way of gaining that quantity of merit 
required to deal with the guilt acquired through the sinful actions of 
the subject. `Confession' has the same effect as punishment; it 
removes guilt. In terms of the distinctions developed in chapter 
three this leads not so much to a form of forgiveness as a form of 
pardon. It is not the re-building of relationships but the removal of 
penalty. 
3. THE PROGRESSIVE RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS 
3. i. Penance as Ongoing Conversion 
Concluding his classic study, The Origins of Private Penance, R. C. 
Mortimer makes some remarks which are of more significance to us 
because of what they reveal incidentally than because of their 
surface content. His conclusion is that it was the Irish monks who 
swept away the rules of unrepeatable penance. "They took the old 
public penance and adapted it to suit the requirements of a mission 
field and a half-converted church. And by so doing they restored 
penance to its proper place as a means of renewing and deepening 
Christian life. "38 
In referring to the role of penance as 'a means of renewing and 
deepening Christian life' Mortimer alludes to one of the most 
important aspects of penance which it was part of the intention of 
Vatican II to recover. Namely that at base penance is not about 
confession but about conversion; confession, along with contrition 
and satisfaction, being necessary but not sufficient or primary parts 
37Aulen, G. Christus Victor (London: SPCK) 1950 passim 
38Mortimer, R. C. Origins of Private Penance (Oxford: Clarendon) 1939 p189 
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of the process. This is an idea which has resurfaced in a good deal 
in post-Vatican II writing. Monika Hellwig, for instance, discerns 
that for the patristic Church the personal conversion of the sinner 
was equally as important as the reconciling response of the Church 
in constituting the efficacious sign of forgiveness. 
"While there is [in the patristic and medieval period] constant 
explicit reference to the inner conversion of the heart, 
symbolised by the oft-mentioned `weeping and lamenting', 
there is evident conviction that such inner conversion of heart 
is not attained in a vacuum but in solid and arduous works of 
penance, under the categories of prayer, fasting and 
almsdeeds, which should effect a deep and pervasive change in 
the future character of one's everyday life and conduct in the 
world. "39 
This emphasis on conversion is, of course, a development of the 
Biblical concepts of metanoia and teshuva. Developing the meaning 
of it for an understanding of the sacrament of penance as pastoral 
liturgy Mark Searle writes that: 
"The sacrament of penance is no longer seen as an isolated and 
exclusive means of obtaining forgiveness of one's sins, but as 
the source and summit of a whole Christian life of conversion, 
where the one grace of forgiveness, won and mediated by 
Christ, and operative at many levels, emerges in a clear and 
manifest way in the celebration of the Church. "40 
Searle stresses the inwardness of penance: "the importance of 
conversion as a change of heart, rather than just the repudiation of 
isolated acts". 41 But more than this he appreciates the shared or 
communal aspects of human life, `of its nature, it is coexistence"42 
and this leads him to suggest that the integration of the social 
dimension into penance is important. 
39HeIIwig, M. Sign of Reconciliation and Conversion p95 
40Searle, M. 'Penance' in Pastoral Liturgy: A Symposium in Ed. Winstone, H. 
(London: Collins) 1975 p193 
41 Searle, M. 'Penance' p194 
42Searle, M. 'Penance' p194 
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"The early Church recognised very clearly the social 
dimensions of sin and conversion, and the revival of 
penitential services in our own time undoubtedly owes 
something to modern social consciousness and orientation 
towards the future - two characteristics shared by the early 
Church. "43 
Searle's understanding of the sacrament is not based on a negation 
of the heritage of confession, but on a pastoral relocating of that 
heritage within the life of conversion in the Church which is itself a 
'community of conversion' concerned for welfare and well-being on a 
broad front, and "to pursue incessantly the path of penance and 
renewal". 44 Searle sees the priest as a 'leader of the community', a 
preacher of the Good News, one who knows the penitents and who 
stirs people to repent on the basis not of imminent judgement but on 
the appreciation of the, "irreversible will-to-reconciliation of 
God". 45 The Church is, "the sacrament of healing and forgiveness in 
a world torn and twisted by sin and its consequences" and the 
sacrament of penance must be, "a confrontation of the believer with 
the tragedy of human history, and with his own part in it, and at the 
same time it is his opportunity to break through to a new future 
with Christ. "46 For reconciliation to take place it is the penitent 
who must change in order to avail himself of God's permanent offer. 
And this pious revolution, "makes possible, and necessary, 
reconciliation with one's fellow men which overflows into family, 
social and even political life. "47 
Monika Hellwig adds to this account of penance as conversion in her 
reflections on the efficacy of the contemporary sacrament. She 
brings a typically modern concern with the subjectivity of 
participation in the sacrament and the Thomistic conviction which 
was so positively renewed at Vatican II, that the sign must be 
inwardly perceived to connect with that which it signifies. "Many 
43Searle, M. 'Penance' p194. He is writing in 1975 after the promulgation of the 
new Rites but before the Apostolic Exhortation and the deepening of the crisis to 
which we have referred 
44Searle, M. 'Penance' p198 
45Searle, M. 'Penance' p199 
46Searle, M. 'Penance' p199 
47Searle, M. 'Penance' p200 
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people", she claims, "reckon the sacrament of penance to be the sign 
of something which it does not effect"48 from which she concludes 
that it is not an efficacious sign and therefore not a true sacrament. 
This is a failure of tragic dimensions because the need for 
forgiveness, reconciliation and the blessings of peace which 
conversion can bring are commonly and deeply felt, she argues. Sin 
may not be experienced as such but the suffering which results from 
sin is accessible to consciousness, and liberation from this is 
urgently sought. People are seeking salvation as, "total personal, 
even communal, rescue from disorientation, alienation, 
frustration. "49 Her concern is that the sacrament of penance should, 
but largely does not, connect with such felt needs. Her programme 
is that the sacrament should continue to be reformed until it 
engages with the spiritual needs of the unredeemed baptised. 
Although Hellwig suggests that stronger and more satisfying works 
of penance should be given she does not intend to suggest that 
forgiveness is dependent upon such action. Indeed, it is on the basis 
of a theological understanding of the willingness of God to forgive 
that she is able to place such emphasis on penance as conversion. 
"[It] is clear that the forgiveness of God and the reconciliation 
of the sinner is not something that happens at a later stage in 
consequence of the repentance and conversion. To repent is to 
be forgiven; to turn is to be reconciled because the father has 
been waiting only for the response that makes the outpouring 
of his compassion possible within the freedom of the creature 
which he respects and therefore will not annihilate. "50 
3. ii. Penance as Ecclesial Reconciliation 
That reconciliation is the concept most distinctively connected with 
the revision of the rite of penance in the spirit of Vatican II is most 
authoritatively expressed in the address given by Paul VI to a 
general audience on the Ordo Paenitentiae in April 1974. It is worth 
quoting at length because it explains precisely and fully the 
48Heliwig, M. Sign of Reconciliation and Conversion p106 
49HeIIwig, M. Sign of Reconciliation and Conversion p110 
50HeIIwig, M. Sign of Reconciliation and Conversion p25 
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ecclesial and social significance of the idea of penance as 
reconciliation. 
"[From] now on we will do better to speak of [the sacrament of 
penance] as the sacrament of reconciliation. By that we mean, 
first, reconciliation with God; this is something we are 
familiar with even if it will always be a reason for endless 
and joyous wonder. We mean also reconciliation with the 
Church; the sacrament brings us back to the Church from the 
condition of being sick and dead members to that of being 
healthy and alive. It is at this point that a new matter for 
reflection begins... just as every personal failure has its 
impact on our own vital and personal relationship with God, so 
too that failure has its impact on our relationship with the 
community which in an analogous sense is also essential and 
vital and which binds us to Christ's mystical body, that is with 
the holy and living Church whose members we are. "51 
Many other writers have presented reconciliation as the normative 
concept in the sacrament of penance. Among these were the 
essayists who contributed to the special numbers of the journals 
Resonance52 and Concilium53. Many were of the view that while the 
development of private penance had brought with it the great benefit 
of being repeatable, its form as confession had eclipsed the social 
and ecclesial aspects of penance which were so prominent in the 
practice of the early Church. The texts which were written to 
explain the new Rites such as the commentaries edited by Nathan 
Mitchell54 also sought to expound reconciliation. The most 
important and substantial text, however, is James Dallen's The 
Reconciling Community. 55 
Dallen is of the view that a renewed understanding of penance as 
reconciliation is a central aspect of the resolution of the crisis of 
penance. He believes that the sacrament derives from the very 
special vocation of the church to be an effective witness to and 
51 Documents of Liturgy p970 
52Resonance No. 1 (Resonance was a short-lived journal which did not publish the 
date of its publication on its first number. ) 
53 Concilium 5171963 
54Mitchell, N. The Rite of Penance: Commentaries 
55Dallen, J. The Reconciling Community: The Rite of Penance (New York: 
Pueblo)1986 
The Crisis of Confession 177 
place of moral, humane and gracious living. The real Church, 
however, is but a poor community of reconciliation. 
"The root difficulty lies in achieving a credible experience of a 
penitent church, a reconciled and reconciling community that 
mediates the experience of a merciful, compassionate and 
loving God. It is safe to say that the majority of Catholics do 
not perceive their Church as a reconciling community, even 
though they themselves do celebrate the sacrament of penance 
with some regularity for various reasons. "56 
He understands the crisis of penance to be one of liturgical variety: 
"If there is a crisis of penance, it is that an impoverished and 
limited ritual language, spread so thinly, is still expected to express 
[he does not say mediate] our experience of the mysterious character 
of a forgiving God". 57 He notices a trend away from a penitent and 
towards a Eucharist spirituality but is concerned that this will 
issue in a limited spiritual life: "there is a nagging fear that the 
average Catholic may be relying too much on the Mass to fill 
devotional needs and express all dimensions of prayer and 
worship. "58 But the answer to the crisis lies not in the reform of 
individual Catholics, and he notes the nice irony that it is unlikely 
that things are right if people need to be converted to a sacrament 
which is understood as a crucial means of conversion: "The call, 
then, is not to individuals to confess more often but to the Church to 
be converted". 59 Furthermore, 
"The present state of penance is a clear sign of the need for 
reconciliation within the Church. The need is not simply for 
more frequent confession and absolution. That has itself been 
a source of the so-called crisis of penance, as conversion, a 
process of life in Christian community, was compressed, 
individualised, and identified with a ritual. "60 
But the problem is wider than that of confession. Sacramental 
theology itself needs to be reconsidered in the light of the different 
56DaIIen, J. The Reconciling Community p354 
57Dallen, J. The Reconciling Community p352 
58DaIIen, J. The Reconciling Community p351 
59DaIIen, J. The Reconciling Community p354 
60DaIIen, J. The Reconciling Community p396 
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theological atmosphere generated by the Council. The criteria for 
contemporary sacraments cannot be uncritically used from the past 
any more than ancient liturgies can be. 61 Dallen's polemic is that 
the sacrament of penance has had a varied history and that its 
present and future should be equally varied. He holds the view that 
there is a need for distinct rituals of reconciliation and that the 
penitent aspects of piety should be liturgically expressed and. 
answered, and yet his view is that the essence of the sacrament, 
that of reconciliation, should also be the essence of the Church. 
This draws attention to the social, ethical and process aspects of 
the way in which the Church should live with the legacy of human 
sin, but Dallen does not get very close to the detail of this 
encounter. His concern is with a revolution in the spiritual ethos of 
ecclesia rather than the detail of liturgical reconciliation. 
3. iii. Conversion and Reconciliation Reconsidered 
The foregoing has established the importance of the concepts of 
conversion and reconciliation in the progressive response to the 
crisis of confession. It may also have been apparent from that 
account that the language of conversion and reconciliation is 
confused in much of the writing in this area. The theology and 
liturgy of the rites in Ordo Paenitentiae is, as M. Francis Mannion 
puts it, `systematically disordered'. As Paul De Clerk pointed out 
the words `reconciliation' and `penance' have very little semantic 
stability in the new rites of penance. 62 Furthermore the words are 
often used interchangeably so that even when a coherent distinction 
is suggested, as it is in Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, it is not 
adhered to. Mannion observes that, "at the theological level, we may 
point to an inadequate differentiation between penance and 
reconciliation, accounted for in part by lack of stability in these 
terms themselves. "63 Mannion therefore sets about the task of 
clarifying and distinguishing these important ideas. In his view 
reconciliation is the reconciliation of sinners to the communion of 
the Church. It derives from the earliest forms of the sacrament, 
61 Dallen, J. The Reconciling Community p398 
62De Clerk, P. 'Celebrating Penance or Reconciliation? ' The Clergy Review 68 1983 
63Mannion, M. F. 'Penance and Reconciliation: A Systemic Analysis' in Worship 60 
1986 p99 
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particularly canonical penance which aimed at restoring to 
fellowship those who had to be excluded because their sins (murder, 
apostasy or adultery) "were like an acid that ate away the very 
bonds which united believers around the table". 64 Penance, on the 
other hand, is something more general: it refers to the metanoia or 
internal conversion which has objective effects. The 
"comprehensive dynamic that involves the whole Church, as well as 
the individual believer, in building up and ennobling corporate 
existence in Christ. "65 There can, however, be no reconciliation 
without penance, and any penitential community must always be in 
process of reconciling those who have gone outside it. 
When it comes to a consideration of the new rites of reconciliation 
it becomes clear that while a relative minority of the baptised, the 
serious sinners, need to be reconciled, all need to live penitential 
lives. The rites are commended to the faithful as valuable in the 
battle with venial sin. Mannion's worry is that it is too much to ask 
of even the revised rites to facilitate reconciliation and penance. He 
also articulates a second point which is that while sacramental 
confession (as he now calls it) is reasonable and helpful and 
appropriate for reconciliation of serious sinners, the real problem is 
with confession as a means of penance or conversion. The reason for 
this to be found in the consciousness and conscience of the modern 
catholic: "the changing self-image of Catholic Christians severely 
limits their ability to translate every dynamic of conversion and 
sanctification into terms of sin and reconciliation". 66 In this sense 
the catholic who attends mass regularly but only rarely makes a 
confession has moved, to borrow some terminology of Pannenberg's, 
"from a piety of guilt consciousness with its intense sense of 
separation from God to a Eucharist piety which promotes a profound 
sense of participation within the communion of Christ's body". 67 
The clarity which Mannion has brought to the relationship between 
penance and reconciliation is fundamental to a meaningful study in 
64Mannion, M. F. 'Penance and Reconciliation: A Systemic Analysis' p111, quoting an 
image used first by Nathan Mitchell 
65Mannion, M. F. 'Penance and Reconciliation: A Systemic Analysis' p109 
66Mannion, M. F. 'Penance and Reconciliation: A Systemic Analysis' p115 
67Mannion, M. F. 'Penance and Reconciliation: A Systemic Analysis' p115 
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this area. However, there are important questions which he does not 
raise. First he has nothing to say about the idea and practice of 
`confession'. Second he fails to use the language of forgiveness. 
This, like `confession' is a concept with different resonances in 
different contexts. At one moment it might mean absolution, at 
another time it might mean reconciliation, at another it might refer 
to what has already happened or is implicit in the sacrament. The 
limits of this analysis are evident in his statement that confession 
and absolution present no problem with regard to the reconciliation 
of serious sinners. To say this is to overlook important questions 
about the nature of forgiveness which are themselves fundamental 
to an understanding of the meaning and means of the sacrament of 
penance. 
4. PASTORAL RESPONSES To THE CRISIS 
41 An Order of Penitents 
Joseph Favazza's study, An Order of Penitents, has its origins in the 
1983 Synod of Bishops which preceded the publication of 
Reconciliatio et Paenitentia. 68 Arguing for further diversity in the 
way in which the sacrament was celebrated, as well as finding a 
form which did more justice to the fact that reconciliation was a 
process, Cardinal Bernadin of Chicago had suggested the revival of 
the ancient order of penitents which would parallel the 
contemporary Rite of the Christian Initiation of Adults. Favazza 
presents his study as the historical research on which such a revival 
might be based. 
His finding is that there was a form of the order of penitents in the 
third century which was quite distinct from the harsh and rigorous 
canonical penance of the following centuries. His case is that the 
third century order of penitents reflected both a relationship 
between members of the Church and a status within the Church 
itself. Penitents would therefore be both within the Church and yet 
without full status, and this would be reflected in their liturgical 
68Favazza, J. A. The Order of Penitents: Historical Roots and Pastoral Future 
(Collegeville, MI: The Liturgical Press) 1988 
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and sacramental participation. Noting that there are some parishes 
in the United States which are experimenting with the order of 
penitents, he proposes that a revised form of the order might be a 
way of continuing the development of the sacrament initiated at 
Vatican II. But he is at pains to clarify that his proposal does not 
amount to a return to canonical penance, which he considers to have 
been rightly overthrown by a laity who were not prepared to live 
with its rigours. 
"Let the order of penitents be restored, but let the present 
Church have the historical acumen to know what is being 
restored. It must be a transitional order, respecting the 
exigencies of conversion as it leads a penitent out of the 
marginalisation resulting from sin, back to the loving embrace 
of Christ, sacramentally experienced in the Church. It must be 
an order that allows for the full participation of all the 
baptised in the ministry of reconciliation. Formed around the 
nuclei of the liturgy of the Word and the presence of clearly 
delineated penitential stages, it must be historically grounded 
in the experience of the Church in the third century. "69 
Favazza argues that there are pastoral advantages which will be 
achieved not by replacing other forms of penance with this order but 
by having it as a supplementary form. At the synod Bernadin 
proposed a four stage process: confession of sins, doing penance, 
the celebration of the sacrament, and the prolongation of the 
sacramental experience. As Favazza somewhat inadvertently shows 
the structure of a process need be no different from that of the first 
form of the sacrament in the new Rites. 7° The main differences 
reside in involving the community of the Church more broadly and 
fully and in dispersing the act over a relatively lengthy, indeed 
indeterminate, period of time. 
69Favazza, J. A. The Order of Penitents p256 
70Favazza, J. A. The Order of Penitents pp268-9 
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"[The stages proposed by Bernadin] accentuate the role of the 
community in the ministry of reconciliation and respect the 
divine initiative of grace in a person's conversion. Finally, the 
stages model a sacramentology that emphasises not only the 
sacramental event but the process preceding it and the 
reflection flowing from it. In this way it becomes possible to 
relish the full experience of a sacramental encounter. "71 
A restored order of penitents would be a way of developing the 
experience of both conversion and reconciliation. Like Hellwig, 
Favazza draws upon the subjective experience of participation in the 
sacrament as evidence of its appropriateness. He considers 
conversion to be an ineluctably temporal experience. "Time is 
necessary to the whole experience [of conversion], in order that a 
person might be able to experience, interpret and celebrate the 
entire transition from crisis or change (death) to a new level of 
existence (life). "72 This form of penance would be advantageous 
with regard to canonical or public penance in that it would be 
repeatable, and yet also have the advantage over private penance or 
`confession' that it would not be a momentary episode. 
As well as being temporal in a very developed way this form of 
penance is also ecclesial in a more sophisticated and social way 
than auricular confession. It would be a very explicit sacrament of 
reconciliation. But the point is not that the unworthy 
excommunicate is restored to the fellowship of the sufficiently 
holy. Rather the order would be based on the understanding, and 
inculcate the conviction that: 
"The Church is a Church of sinners, who rely on the mercy of 
God for forgiveness. In the same way, sacramental 
reconciliation is not just a sign of God's forgiveness of the 
sinner; it also `entails reconciliation with our brothers and 
sisters who remain harmed by our sins' (Rite of Penance No 
5)... A restored order of penitents would allow the community 
to claim the ministry of reconciliation to which they are 
rightfully called by the new rite itself. "73 
71 Favazza, J. A. The Order of Penitents p254 
72Favazza, J. A. The Order of Penitents p258 
73Favazza, J. A. The Order of Penitents p265 
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Favazza makes the links between the theological developments 
which we have observed which suggest that penance should be a 
sacrament of conversion and reconciliation and the liturgical 
practice of the third century Church. He does not claim that this 
would be an appropriate form of the sacrament for all penitents, and 
although he does not make this explicit there are hints in his writing 
that the form would be especially suitable for lapsed or apostate 
Christians. 
The order of penitents on Favazza's third century model is certainly 
humane and historical, and it has the advantage of making sense of 
the temporal and ecclesial dimensions of penance as he has shown. 
One problem, however, is that of introduction. Liturgical formation 
is responsible for a tremendous proportion of catechesis within the 
Roman Catholic tradition. This can certainly be effective in the 
sacrament of penance, so that, given encouragement from the 
hierarchy, a move to more communal celebrations of the sacrament 
could easily be brought about. But recruiting for the order of 
penitents would be problematic. First it is not especially 
appropriate for those whose sins are in contravention of the law of 
the land, murderers and others who are in prison, second it is not 
appropriate for those whose sins are not already in the public 
domain, third it is hardly appropriate for the lapsed as they will not 
have had the liturgical formation which will enable them to make 
sense of it. 
But there is a more profound, indeed a basically theological, 
problem. The method of reconciliation proposed by the introduction 
of a new order of penitents departs very radically from the spirit of 
the Lucan narrative of the loving father where the returning son is 
immediately the focus of an act of celebration (Lk 15). The idea that 
conversion is a temporally extended phenomenon is not in question 
here. The question is whether or not the sacrament is the 
appropriate locus for this extended penance. The assumption of an 
order of penitents is that absolution and reconciliation should be 
delayed. One reason for this must be that repentance is construed as 
necessarily lengthy, that it is by definition a temporally elongated 
process. The alternative is that repentance alone is not enough to 
The Crisis of Confession 184 
allow reconciliation with the Church, that some penance or 
satisfaction is also required. It is this notion which is such a stark 
contradiction of the parable of the prodigal son and so this is not 
considered an appropriate form of liturgical forgiveness. That is not 
to say that there can never be a place for penance or satisfaction or 
that the ideas that repentance is an extended temporal process can 
never be admitted. The point is that liturgies of reconciliation must 
somehow be able to marry the divine intention to be generously and 
instantly forgiving with the human need to take time to accept that 
forgiveness. The problem is that the order of penitents as envisaged 
by Favazza inevitably suggests that the penitent must in some way 
earn their forgiveness. Liturgies of forgiveness, however, must 
symbolise the belief that forgiveness is precisely that which is not 
earned. The difficult thing about divine forgiveness is not to wrest 
it from a punitive God but to fully accept it and to live with the 
ethical and spiritual consequences of being a forgiven sinner. 
Favazza's promotion of Bernadin's suggestion clarifies a critique of 
the understanding of penance as conversion and reconciliation which 
has been the hall-mark of the progressive response to Vatican II and 
the Ordo Paenitentiae. It is that the temporal and social dimensions 
which are so important in conversion and reconciliation belong not 
so much to the rite of penance as to the life of the Church. Favazza 
and others are right in saying that the whole of Christian life is 
conversion but are wrong in trying to mould the sacrament of 
penance to fit this fundamental aspect of the life of faith. The 
reaction of John Paul II and Balthasar is best interpreted not as a 
desire to reintroduce `confession' but as an expression of the need to 
have a discrete, episodic encounter in which contrition is 
articulated and absolution given. Penance as conversion and 
reconciliation loses sight of the primary purpose of the sacrament 
which is to be a particular encounter of the guilty penitent with 
what Margaret Hebblethwaite has called `a fountain of tenderness'74 
which is an encounter with that form of divine forgiveness or pardon 
which is an immediate and generous response to an intimation of 
contrition, repentance or sorrow. The sacrament of penance needs to 
be developed in such a way as to bring this meaning to bear and to 
74Hebblethwaite, M. Motherhood and God (London: Geoffrey Chapman) 1985 p120 
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mediate precisely this experience. The nature and the effect of the 
sacrament to which Sacrosanctum Concilium75 referred should be 
thought of as divine pardon. 
4. ii. General Absolution 
Many voices have been raised in favour of mediating the sacrament 
of penance by resort to seasonal use of general absolution. 
Proponents of this include the American priests Robert Hayter, John 
Gilbert and Robert Garafalo all of whom have written in support of 
general absolution in Worship. 
Hayter's paper paints a picture of the way in which Catholic 
attitudes with regard to sin and reconciliation are changing. While 
few people attend 'confession', when people hear that there will be a 
communal penance service with general (he uses the phrase 
communal) absolution, "the place is often packed". 76 Gilbert's essay 
describes a similar observation?? As priest at a Church in 
Minnesota he participated in services of communal penance, 
following the provision of the third option offered in Ordo 
Paenitentiae during Advent and Lent which over the last decade had 
been attended by between three and four thousand people in each 
season. At one level his point is very practical: there is no way in 
which the two priests could have heard all those confessions. The 
other point is more important: that had they been offering penance 
as `confession' many or even most of the three or four thousand 
people would not have been there. As he insists this is a genuine 
pastoral experience and while he would still advocate private 
confession for serious sinners he argues that such experiences must 
be treated as a theological source by Church officials. It is not, he 
insists and pace the official reaction from Rome, laziness, but a 
genuine and significant development in the experience and life of the 
sacrament which accords well with the way in which it has 
75See note 2 above 
76Hater, R. L. 'Sin and Reconciliation: Changing Attitudes in the Roman Catholic 
Church' in Worship 59 1985 
77Gilbert, J. R. 'The Reconciliation Service: A Reflection On Pastoral Experience as a 
Theological Source' in Worship 591985 
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developed since Tertullian thought of it as a second plank to save a 
drowning man. 
Hayter puts the development into a more social context, suggesting 
that the interest in the self and personal healing which is 
associated with the rise of psychiatry and psychology is important, 
as is the growing awareness of the significance of relationships and 
intimacy in communal life of all kinds. In addition to this, factors 
such as a distancing of many Catholics from the moral teaching of 
the Church in the sixties had led neither to a lack of concern about 
the standing of the individual before God, nor to an eclipse of the 
sense of sin. On the contrary there was, if anything, increasing 
attention to both the spiritual and the social aspects of forgiveness 
and reconciliation. Thus: "a growing number of Catholics sought 
God's forgiveness through personal prayer, "78 but equally: "serious 
minded Catholics sensed in a new way that God forgives them if they 
forgive each other. "79 In short: `The need to be reconciled to God 
and one another was taking priority over the need to confess sins to 
the priest. "80 These changes were coupled with theological 
developments with regard to the way in which priesthood and 
sacraments were construed. The doctrine of the priesthood of all 
believers began to come to the fore as did the sense that many 
actions or experiences can be sacramental in the sense that they 
mediate the divine mystery. The result, in terms of penance, was 
that the notion that `confession' was necessary for salvation lost a 
great deal of credibility. In other words, as we observed above, the 
era of 'confession' came to an end with Vatican II. Among the 
implications of this shift is that there should be: "A 
reconsideration of granting communal absolution as one liturgical 
form of reconciliation. Pastoral practice tells us that this is the 
only form to which people enthusiastically respond. "81 
Garafalo offers an analysis of this pastoral case, and suggests that 
liturgies of penance leading towards general absolution have a 
78Hater, R. L. 'Sin and Reconciliation' p20 
79Hater, R. L. 'Sin and Reconciliation' p21 
80Hater, R. L. 'Sin and Reconciliation' p21 
81 Hater, R. L. 'Sin and Reconciliation' p31 
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legitimate role in the celebration of the penitential seasons. He 
argues that Advent and Lent have a dynamic of expectation which, 
because it is eschatological, inevitably creates a tension which 
manifests itself as a general sense of sin and inadequacy so that in 
confession penitents do not disclose a desire for forgiveness for 
specific acts nor yet for reconciliation with the Church. Rather, the 
need to feel better about themselves and to get in touch with the 
spirit of the season is uppermost in their minds. His view is that 
general absolution is the fitting liturgical response to such an 
existential. This is the pattern which he perceives in the gospels. 
"When Jesus encounters individuals for whom he creates a 
personal crisis (kairos), his typical response to such 
situations is an immediate and unexpected release of that 
critical tension, thereby releasing the energy of conversion. 
The releasing of that tension typically takes the form of 
announcing freely given forgiveness that constitutes a new 
reality for the sinner. "82 
Garafalo makes a point which is too often overlooked by those 
proposing a process approach to penance, and that is that 
forgiveness is not classically understood as something which takes 
time, and that the taking of time can be seen as a kind of 
grudgingness or lack of grace on the part of the forgiver rather than 
a generous response to the human inability of the forgivee to accept 
what is immediately offered in all its fullness. His conclusion is 
that: "the Church must duplicate the ministry of Jesus in a freely 
given, spontaneous gesture of forgiveness that restores the 
scriptural link between reconciliation and celebration. "83 Garafalo 
is right that an emphasis on forgiveness as a process can eclipse 
this fundamental aspect and inculcate the misunderstanding that it 
has in some way to be earned. Garafalo's contribution to our enquiry 
is to make it ever more clear that an engagement between the 
sacrament of penance and the language of forgiveness is crucial. 
82Garafalo, R 'Reconciliation and Celebration: A Pastoral Case for General 
Absolution' in Worship 63 1989 p451 
83Garafalo, R. `Reconciliation and Celebration' p456 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Despite the attempts to reinstate 'confession' as the normative 
form of the sacrament of penance it continues to be subjected to a 
complex critique. The view which identifies penance with 
confession is constructed in such a way that the spirituality is 
functional, the theology is legal and the liturgical practice is 
isolating and alienating. The cultural location is best thought of as 
having the quality of dislocated continuity coupled with an 
exaggerated self-consciousness. It is marked by profound 
discontinuities and divisions. It is an analytically structured, 
juridical and individualising rite which is designed to allow the 
application of the merit of the sacrifice of the cross to the guilt of 
the sinful soul. 
Alternatives to `confession' also have their problems. The ideas of 
reconciliation and penance have been discussed in some detail here. 
The advantage of these approaches is that they do give due emphasis 
to the process of penance or reconciliation. The disadvantage with 
this approach is that it can eclipse the reality of a gratuitous and 
abrupt initiative of forgiveness. 
The practical suggestions of an order of penance and general 
absolution have also been considered. A consideration of the 
discussion around these approaches has revealed that these two 
approaches have complimentary merits. The order of penitents is a 
temporally extended and serious response on behalf of the penitent 
and the approach of general absolution is a model for the immediacy 
and generosity of the divine compassion. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
LITURGICAL FORGIVENESS IN ANGLICANISM 
While the debate in the Roman Catholic Church about liturgical 
forgiveness can reasonably be reckoned to be a consideration of the 
crisis of confession since Vatican II, the comparable debate in the 
Churches of the Reformation covers a much longer period of history. 
The first two of Luther's ninety five theses make it clear that one of 
the focal issues in the Reformation was liturgically mediated 
forgiveness. 
1. Our Lord Jesus Christ when he said 'Repent' willed that the 
whole life of believers should be repentance. 
2. This word cannot be understood as referring to sacramental 
penance, that is, confession and satisfaction, which is 
performed in the ministration of priests. "1 
Luther was, of course, making a complex response to a situation of 
Penance in the fifteenth century but the issue has remained a matter 
of controversy ever since. 
The understanding and practice of the liturgical forgiveness of sins 
in the Reformation Churches is not so much in crisis as chronically 
problematic: the debate and confusion has occurred over several 
centuries rather than decades. This time scale means that in 
several ways the situation in the Reformation Churches is more 
complex than that in the Roman Church. Personal forgiveness is 
prized and sought and is generally reckoned to be a product of faith. 
But in addition to this there are in Lutheran and Anglican Churches, 
as well as in some of the teachings of Calvin, acknowledgements of 
the value of auricular confession as a means of forgiveness. There 
are fundamental differences, however, in the way in which 
confession is located within the religious systems of Protestantism 
1 McNeil, J. T. A History of the Cure of Souls (London: SCM) 1958 p163 
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and Catholicism. What Protestantism rejected at the practical level 
was the understanding that auricular confession is necessary for 
forgiveness. What it rejected at the theological level was the 
Thomist view that absolution, the product of auricular confession, 
was itself the cause of contrition which was the basis of 
forgiveness. 2 Further, Protestantism is traditionally and 
understandably nervous about the whole notion of penance, fearing 
the theological and ecclesiastical situation which emerges if the 
sense that forgiveness is a product of anything which might be 
thought of as `works' be allowed to develop. But there are other 
debates too. Questions about the role of the ordained minister in the 
hearing of confessions and the particular words which it is 
appropriate to use in absolution, and the need for confessions to be 
'integral' are invariably raised when the non-Roman Western 
Churches engage in forms of liturgical forgiveness. 
It is not possible in the space of one chapter to attempt to cover in 
detail all the debates about and practice of liturgical forgiveness in 
the Churches of the Reformation. The focus of this work as a whole 
is the coherence of the Christian doctrine of forgiveness and to 
facilitate our exploration of that question the main emphasis will 
be, as in other chapters, on the contemporary situation. But in this 
particular area the historical debates have an uncharacteristically 
great significance because the theological questions are connected 
not only with questions of the cure of souls but also with larger 
issues of ecclesiastical identity. This has been particularly the 
case in our main area of consideration, liturgical forgiveness in the 
Anglican Church. Here questions of the degree to which the Anglican 
Church is primarily Reformed or Catholic have to some extent been 
argued out with reference to the practice of auricular confession. 
This is of course the case in the English Anglo-Catholicism of the 
2See Ross, K. Hearing Confessions (London: SPCK) 1974 p14 Ross writes that "On 
the one hand (Aquinas) believed that contrition won forgiveness from God; on the 
other hand, he believed that absolution conferred contrition. " This teaching is 
affirmed in the Council of Trent "If the sinner have recourse to the tribunal of 
penance with a sincere sorrow for his sins, and a firm resolution of avoiding them in 
future, although he bring not with him that contrition which may be sufficient of 
itself to obtain the pardon of sin; his sins are forgiven by the minister through the 
power of the keys. " In Tentler, T. Sin and Confession on the Eve of the Reformation 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) 1977 p379 
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late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries where as one 
commentator has put it, the advertisement of times for confession 
on the Church noticeboard would "leave no doubt that the Church is 
catholic". 3 Liturgical forgiveness in Anglicanism, then, is a much 
larger question than that of forgiveness or of liturgy. The questions 
of liturgical forgiveness in Anglicanism remain controversial and 
cut to the heart of the theological and pastoral complexes by which 
that Church understands and identifies itself. 
The depth and the strangeness of this controversy ought to be 
emphasised. On the one hand there are those who argue that penance 
as in confession is a sine qua non of Christian discipleship, as basic 
as baptism and communion; while on the other there are those who 
either ignore it altogether or who are equally passionate that 
confession, or `shrift in the ear' as Tyndale had it, is a superstitious 
practice; not so much a sacrament of the Church as Article 25 has 
it, but one of the `vain things fondly invented' referred to in Article 
22. It is equally important, however, not to over-emphasise the 
extent to which confession is currently a matter of controversy. 
Much of the writing on the subject is of course driven by passionate 
conviction but it is also true that it is those who are passionate who 
tend to write. A feature of contemporary writing on the subject, by 
which I mean writing which is concurrent with that marking the 
`crisis of confession' in the Roman Catholic Church, is that it is if 
anything less polemical and more diverse than that of previous 
generations. 
As has already been intimated this chapter will have to have a 
broader historical compass than the others in the work. The starting 
point is the teaching of the Book of Common Prayer because the 
strengths or weaknesses of Anglican complexity derive from the 
rubrics and formularies of this theologically diverse compilation. 
Secondly the writing of Richard Hooker in Book VI of his Laws of 
Ecclesiastical Polity is of considerable importance, reflecting 
Reformation theology in a particularly Anglican and High Church way. 
In the Oxford Movement of the nineteenth century there was a 
revival of many aspects of ecclesiastical and religious seriousness. 
3Pickering, W. S. F. Anglo-Catholicism (London: Routledge)1989 p32 
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One of these was the revival of the practice of auricular confession. 
Although this was first characterised by great hesitancy on the part 
of the leaders it was to become, as we have seen, a defining aspect 
of the Anglo-Catholic wing of the Church of England. It is not 
surprising, then, to find the two most important small books on 
confession written by Anglicans in the last twenty years to be by a 
member of a religious community4 and the former vicar of All 
Saint's Margaret Streets and the only recent book of essays on the 
subject to be the product of the Church Union Theological 
Committees. More surprising perhaps were the writings of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer and Max Thurian on the question of confession, both of 
which underlined the view that the reformers were not against 
confession as such, rather that they were rightly antagonistic to 
abuse of the confessional and the idea of its necessity? These 
writings, however, are of very considerable significance in the 
rediscovery of the personal forgiveness of sins in the Anglican 
Church. This is partly for political reasons; for while the very 
Romishness of confession was part of its attraction to some 
twentieth century Anglo-Catholics this remained a problem for 
liberal and evangelical Anglicans. It is the rediscovery that 
confession existed on their side of the Reformation, together with a 
tendency to pay attention to the fifth chapter of James rather than 
the sixteenth chapter of Matthew which has opened the door to more 
relaxed and positive attitudes to the possibility of personal 
liturgical forgiveness among, for instance, evangelical Anglicans. 8 
The final area which it is relevant to survey is the place which is 
given to liturgical forgiveness in the revised Prayer Books of the 
later twentieth century. While the Alternative Service Book (ASB) 
is devoid of features to match the authority to exercise a ministry 
of confession and absolution found in its sixteenth and seventeenth 
century predecessors, the Book of Common Prayer of the Episcopal 
4Smith, M. Reconciliation (London: Mowbray) 1985 
5Ross, K. Hearing Confessions 
6Eds. Dudley, M. and Rowell, G. Confession and Absolution (London: SPCK) 1990 
7Bonhoeffer, D. Life Together (London: SCM) 1954 and The Cost of Discipleship 
(London: SCM) 1948 Thurian, M. Confession (London: SCM) 1953 
BSee for instance Foster, R. Celebration of Discipline (London: Hodder and Stoughton) 
1980 pp125-137 
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Church of the United States of America (BCPECUSA) has a rich 
selection of penitential material. Moreover the ASB is not the last 
word on Anglican liturgy and some of the supplementary materials 
produced for particular seasons or occasions reaffirm the 
importance of the distinctly Anglican approach to penance and 
liturgical forgiveness. 
1. THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 
There are several places in the Book of Common Prayer where there 
is reference to or provision for the liturgical forgiveness of sins. 
These are in the orders for Morning and Evening Prayer and in the 
Order for Communion where there is provision for general confession 
and absolution, and in the exhortation to communion and the office 
for the Visitation of the Sick where the possibility of personal 
confession of particular sins followed by absolution in the 
indicative case is respectively assumed or provided for. Moreover in 
the rite for the ordination of priests the Book of Common Prayer is 
unique in including these words from the gospel of John in the 
formula of ordination: "whose sins thou dost forgive they are 
forgiven and whose sins thou dost retain they are retained. " These 
formularies lie at the heart of the meaning of liturgical forgiveness 
within Anglicanism. 
1. i. Exhortation to Communion 
All three prayer books of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
carried exhortations to communion which commended any who were 
not of a quiet conscience to attain the help, attention and absolution 
either of the parish priest or of `some other discreet and learned 
Minister of God's word'. In many ways it is the prayer book of 1549 
which is the most powerful and significant text. The first 
consideration is of those ways in which it marks a change from pre- 
reformation understandings. There are three points here: first that 
there was an obligation to come to confession before receiving 
communion; second that permission is now given to confess to any 
priest, not just the priest of the parish; and third that no mention is 
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made of penance. The matter is confession and absolution. 9 A 
further point touches an irenic note, for in a long section which was 
deleted from subsequent versions the hearers are admonished not to 
fall into dissension about the use of personal confession and 
absolution but to respect the consciences and practices of others. 
The 1552 revision deleted some significant words, such as 'sin' 
from the phrase 'sin and grief', and 'auricular and secret confession' 
but as that document made clear it was not written in an attempt to 
replace or change the doctrines of the first book. The 1662 book 
was a further redaction of the same text the detail of which implied 
a shift in emphasis with regard to the purpose of the encounter 
between person and priest which was meant to prepare them for 
communion. In previous editions the immediate product of the 
opening of grief (or sin and grief) to the priest was: "to receive 
such ghostly council, advice and comfort, as his conscience may be 
relieved" whereas in the 1662 edition it is put that he might 
receive, "the benefit of absolution". Thus 1662 reverses the order, 
and implicitly the priority, of advice and absolution. As Carter 
suggests, these changes are not merely literary but are theological. 
Moreover in 1552 a second exhortation encouraging the people to be 
more regular attenders at communion was added prior to that 
suggesting confession for those of troubled conscience. 1662 
reversed the order of these exhortations. The combined effect of 
these changes was to give confession and absolution a higher 
priority than before. 
1. ii. The Office for the Visitation of the Sick 
A similar pattern of development can be seen in the office for the 
Visitation of the Sick. Whereas the 1549 version took a gentler 
approach than the Latin office on which it was based, the 1662 
version was more positive and urgent about confession and 
absolution while maintaining that it was neither necessary nor 
compulsory. The books of Edward VI are very similar in that they 
both have the same rubric: "Here shall the sick person make a 
special confession, if he feel his conscience troubled with any 
9Carter, T. T. The Doctrine of Confession (London: Joseph Masters and Son) 1885 
p105 
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weighty matter". This is strengthened in 1662 to read: "Here shall 
the sick person be moved to make a special confession of his sins, if 
he feel... " It is clear that the writer of the rubric had a higher 
sense of the importance of the confession than the average visitee. 
One interesting feature of the 1549 version is that the rubric which 
applies to the absolution explicitly states that, "this same form of 
absolution shall be used in all private confessions. " This was 
deleted in subsequent editions and this absence has been used by 
some as a reason to question the validity of private confession 
within Anglicanism. 
This absolution itself, which was unrevised in 1552 and 1662, is 
worth noting in full: 
Our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath left power to his Church to 
absolve all sinners which truly repent and believe in him, of 
his great mercy forgive thee thine offences; and by his 
authority committed to me, I absolve thee from all thy sins, in 
the Name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. 
Amen. 
Whatever questions there may be about the mode and method of 
confession and absolution within the Anglican Church this one prayer 
is evidence enough that personal confession followed by indicative 
absolution, ego absolvo te, are part of the Anglican tradition of 
liturgical forgiveness. 
1. iii. Ordination Rite 
Writing for those to be ordained priests in the 1970s Archbishop 
Michael Ramsey wrote: "We are charged to preach a gospel of divine 
forgiveness and to be ready to hear the confessions of individuals 
and to give them the `benefit of absolution'. "10 He adds that the 
inclusion of the words `whose sins thou dost forgive they are 
forgiven and whose sins thou dost retain they are retained' in the 
formula of ordination "was no doubt intended to emphasise the 
ministry of reconciliation". 11 As he notes, this emphasis remains 
10Ramsey, M The Christian Priest Today (London: SPCK) 1972 p43 
11 Ramsey, M. The Christian Priest Today p44 
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regardless of what contemporary scholarship suggests the force of 
the passage in John to be. 
The strange thing about this is that it is peculiarly Anglican to 
include these words which were introduced to the ordinal in the 
medieval period in the western church. Carter suggests that the 
words have a two-fold meaning, the first is a generic understanding 
of ministry and the second is, "restrictive, as specially denoting 
those offices which were ordained for the remission of sins, as 
their characteristic subject". 12 Having recorded the way in which 
these words have been associated not only with that remission 
which is in baptism but also with that associated with penance, he 
goes on to assert that since this was a clear relationship in 
scholastic writing it follows that the English reformers were not 
minded to do away with the practice of confession and absolution. 
"To retain these words in their original position in the ordinal, and 
at the same time to hope to disconnect them from the ministry of 
forgiveness of sins, would have been vain. "13 
2. PRIVATE CONFESSION IN RICHARD HOOKER 
In the sixth volume of his Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Richard 
Hooker addresses questions of the nature and practice of penitence. 
Hooker is known to have made his confession on his death-bed and 
writes in support of the practice of confession and absolution 
within the Church of England based on a particular pastoral 
theological understanding. He conducts a historical argument and 
survey from which he draws the following conclusions: "we every 
where find the use of confession, especially public, allowed of and 
commended by the Fathers; but that extreme and rigorous necessity 
of auricular and private confession, which is at this day so mightily 
upheld by the Church of Rome we find not. "14 
12Carter, T. T. The Doctrine of Confession p143 
13Carter, T. T. The Doctrine of Confession p146 
14Keble, J. Ed. The Works of Mr Richard Hooker Vol. III (Oxford: Clarendon) 1888 
p47 
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This is perhaps his most substantial emphasis, it is certainly 
continuous with the understanding of the Church of England 
formularies of his age which, as we have seen, were slightly 
strengthened in the subsequent revisions of the seventeenth century. 
But he also lists particular points at which the Church of Rome holds 
views which are neither ancient nor traditional but, as he puts it, 
`have youth in their countenance'. These include the understanding 
that 'sacramental penitency' is the only remedy for post-baptismal 
sin and that confession is an essential aspect of that sacrament. 
But his main theological argument is that while absolution is a 
possible and proper form of ministry it does not follow that "God 
himself cannot now forgive sins without the priest. "15 Hooker is not 
at all impressed by scholastic arguments about the theological 
significance of confession in the process of penance, namely that it, 
and only it, might mediate the grace whereby insufficient attrition 
becomes sufficient contrition. But he is still less impressed by 
what he calls the Romish view of absolution which makes all 
penitence vain unless required and conducted by a priest. In one 
passage he outlines the differences between the Roman and the 
Anglican view of repentance: 
"They imply in the name of repentance much more than we do. 
We stand chiefly upon the true inward conversion of the heart; 
they more upon works of external show. We teach, above all 
things, that repentance which is one and the same from the 
beginning to the world's end; they a sacramental penance of 
their own devising and shaping. We labour to instruct men in 
such sort, that every soul which is wounded with sin may learn 
the way how to cure itself; they, clean contrary, would make 
all sores seem incurable, unless the priest have a hand in 
them. "16 
Hooker, however, is positive about absolution. Indeed he can go so 
far as to write that, "Sin is not helped but by the assurance of 
pardon. "17 And this is the key to his understanding that the benefit 
of absolution is not in the making but in the assurance of 
forgiveness. "I see no cause but that by the rules of our faith and 
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15ibid. 
16Keble, J. Ed. The Works of Mr Richard Hooker Vol. III p73/4 
17Keble, J. Ed. The Works of Mr Richard Hooker Vol. III p73 
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religion we may rest ourselves very well assured of touching God's 
most merciful pardon and grace; who, especially for the 
strengthening of weak, timorous, and fearful minds, hath so far 
endued his church with power to absolve sinners. "18 
Hooker's argument is that priests are empowered to exercise the 
power of the keys but that it is a pastoral rather than a judicial 
authority. It is not in order, as it were, to enable God to forgive so 
much as to allow the sinner to be forgiven. This is why it is 
important but not necessary. "To the use and benefit of this help for 
our better satisfaction in such cases is so natural, that it can be 
forbidden to no man. But yet not so necessary that all men should be 
in need of it. "19 Subjectivity and inwardness are naturally, 
therefore, of primary importance in the matter of forgiveness. As 
he asserts, quite consistently with the prayer book: 
`That which God doth chiefly respect in men's penitency is 
their hearts. The heart is that which maketh repentance 
sincere, sincerity that which findeth favour in God's sight, and 
the favour of God that which supplieth by gracious acceptation 
whatsoever may be defective in the faithful, hearty, and true 
offences of his servants. "20 
3. CONFESSION AND THE OXFORD MOVEMENT 
The Book of Common Prayer and the writings of Richard Hooker are 
not the only Anglican authorities advocating private confession and 
absolution. In the seventeenth century writers such as Jeremy 
Taylor, Lancelot Andrewes and others were clearly in favour of the 
possibility of some form of voluntary use in the pursuit of a quiet 
conscience and the development of holiness. 21 The nineteenth 
century saw two revivals, and while that initiated by Simeon in 
Cambridge did not involve the restoration of this form of liturgical 
experience, the Oxford Movement was to become, in the eighteen 
18Keble, J. Ed. The Works of Mr Richard Hooker Vol. III p77 
19Keble, J. Ed. The Works of Mr Richard Hooker Vol. III p106 
20ibid. 
21 See Carter, T. T. The Doctrine of Confession, McNeil, J. T. A History of the Cure of 
Souls, and Rowell, G 'The Anglican Tradition from the Reformation to the Oxford 
Movement' in Eds. Dudley, M. and Rowell, G. Confession and Absolution 1990 
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forties, the occasion for the restoration of the practice of 
confession and absolution within the Church of England. The central 
character in this was E. B. Pusey. 
3.1. Confession and Seriousness E. B. Pusey 
Keith Denison argues that Pusey's interest in confession stemmed 
from his desire to encourage and enable people to perfection and 
holiness of living, a desire evident in his first sermon, and from his 
sense of the gravity of post baptismal sin. 22 As a Tractarian, Pusey 
disseminated his concerns about this problem and the anxiety which 
this precipitated which stirred the desire of individuals, as Denison 
puts it, to make a general confession before a priest. Pusey thus 
began hearing confessions and granting absolution, presumably with 
the formula from the Visitation Office noted above. He himself 
made his confession to Keble shortly after preaching his second 
University Sermon on the subject in December 1846.23 
Dennison tells the story of the revival of confession as if its motive 
force were not the leadership of Pusey but rather, something endemic 
in the spirit of the ideas which he publicised. This is congruent 
with Pusey's account of his intentions as recorded in Liddon's 
biography where it is made clear that he was not urging particular 
individuals to make their confession. This, by and large, and Denison 
notes some exceptions, is a credible and acceptable narrative but 
one which does not make Pusey a less central character than had he 
been overtly pressing people to shrift. It is plain that the character. 
and the preaching of Pusey were of considerable importance in 
regenerating the practice, even if there was a sense in which it was 
a revival led by penitents rather than confessors. 
The change in spirituality to a seriously penitential one which 
included confession was obviously not an easy development for the 
Church to accommodate either on the part of those who were with it 
or those who were against it. From the point of those who were 
22Denison, K. 'Dr Pusey as a Confessor and Spiritual Director' in Ed. Butler, P. 
Pusey Rediscovered (London: SPCK) 1983 p213 
23See Liddon, H. B. Life of E. B. Pusey D. D. (London: Longmans) 1898 Vol. III pp95- 
100 
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involved the problem became one of maintaining the value of 
confession by educating the confessors. From the point of view of 
those who were not involved in the development the problem became 
one of coming to terms with what could not seem other than a 
distinctly Romish practice in the Church of England. One of the 
ironies of this chapter in Church history is that Pusey's projected 
answer to one problem was, of course, precisely the thing to 
aggravate the other. Pusey decided very early on that the best 
response would be to bring out a translation of abbe Gaume's Manuel 
de Confesseurs. The irony is deep because Pusey was extremely 
careful to distinguish between the Roman and the English 
understandings of confession and edited the manual in such a way as 
to remove, for instance, all references to indulgences and other 
factors which were not in accord with the understanding which he 
derived from the Prayer Book and the various Anglican Divines to 
whom we have already referred. 
In Pusey's view the accusation that contemporary practice was 
Roman in that it involved habitual confession was errant in that it 
was the penitents who returned and not the confessors who 
summoned them. He also made the point that: "It is well known that 
one who has once tasted 'the benefits of absolution' for heavier sins, 
and found good for his soul in the special counsel of God's ministers, 
longs mostly to continue to `open his grief'. "24 The background to 
this and similar remarks was Pusey's desire to keep people within 
the Church of England. To this end Pusey was prepared to go as far 
as possible in adopting aspects of theory and practice from the 
Roman Church and providing them with a rationale based on the 
Prayer Book. Denison, at least, expresses approval for this and some 
sympathy for Pusey as one struggling to lead souls to heaven and yet 
subject to inhibiting censure and criticism on several sides. "It 
seemed that Pusey could not win. On the one hand, his critics 
accused him of `minuteness of detail'25; and on the other hand they 
24Pusey, E. 'Entire Absolution of the Penitent' University Sermons 1843 - 1855 
1891 
25This is a reference to Bishop Wilberforce's comments on withdrawing Pusey's 
licence to officiate. 
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attacked him for not interfering in the private devotions of his 
penitents. "26 
3. i. Confession and Identity: Anglo-Catholicism 
This facilitation of moral and spiritual seriousness by borrowed 
Roman practices instigated a complex process by which the use of 
confession became a hall-mark not of the Church of England but of a 
particular wing of that Church. It was in this that confession lost 
some of its connection with the forgiveness of sins and gathered 
associations with being a matter of personal identity as, to use the 
jargon, 'a real catholic'. For the immediate product of the Oxford 
movement was not an awakening of the whole Church of England to 
the benefit of absolution but the establishment within that Church 
of a party which took from Cranmer and Hooker not so much a 
distinct understanding of the spiritual value of confession and 
absolution as a means of forgiveness as a license to practice 
confession along the lines laid down by the Fourth Lateran Council 
and affirmed by the Council of Trent. 
This aspect of confession in Anglo-Catholicism is identified by 
W. S. F. Pickering in his sociological study of the movement. His point 
is that going to confession was, for the Anglo-Catholic 
missionaries, the equivalent of an emotional conversion experience 
in the evangelical missions. 
26Denison, K. 'Dr Pusey as Confessor and Spiritual Director' p217 
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"Within Anglo-Catholicism itself the making of confession 
was often seen as the seal upon one's embracing the ideas of 
the movement. If anyone made a confession she or he was 
indeed an Anglo-Catholic! The problem which faced High 
Churchmen and Anglo-Catholics alike was, of course, the fact 
that followers had not grown up in a church where it was the 
custom to go to confession. It was no part of their religio- 
cultural world. Anglican penitents had to be led into a new 
country - to something that was lonely, private, and strange. 
They had to be encouraged to perform an unusual act and to be 
convinced of its merit in a milieu where it was not practised 
at all. "27 
As Pickering goes on to say there were plenty of, to use his term, 
Anglo-Papalists who went much further in urging people to 
confession than the discrete suggestion that it was a possibility for 
the particularly burdened conscience. 28 But by the same token the 
majority of Anglo-Catholics took what he calls a pragmatic 
approach reflecting the epigram `some should, all may, none must'. 
But even if Pickering is right, and his analysis, it will be recalled, is 
a sociological and not a theological one, it should be stressed that 
the goal for Pusey and others was to reintegrate personal confession 
into the liturgical ministry of forgiveness within the Church of 
England as a whole. To return to Pusey: "Consciences are burdened. 
There is a provision on the part of God, in His Church, to relieve 
them. They wish to be, and to know that they are, in a state of 
grace. God has provided a means, however deeply any have fallen, to 
replace them in it. "29 
But the matter of ministering to burdened consciences is not simple. 
Burdened consciences have an ethical and theological context, and in 
the case of the Oxford Movement this was informed by Pusey's 
understanding of the gravity of post-baptismal sin. The 
understanding of confession in the Anglican reformation implied a 
good deal of subjectivism and freedom on the part of the individual. 
It was predicated on the assumption that confession would be 
27Pickering, W. S. F. Anglo-Catholicism p78 
28Pickering, W. S. F. Anglo-Catholicism p79 
29Pusey, E. 'Entire Absolution of the Penitent' Preface piii in University Sermons 
1843 - 1855 
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irregular and in response to some crisis of health or conscience or 
both. What Pusey helped to establish had its roots not in the more or 
less untutored griefs of a guilty conscience but quite sophisticated 
theological ideas. While not being a Romaniser in any sense Pusey's 
theology did begin in Roman rather than in Anglican presuppositions. 
It was not just that Gaume was a worthy manual of advice to 
confessors but that if you construed the need for confession after 
the model and example of Pusey then you were doing so in a Roman 
rather than in a Hookerian or Taylorian way. This theology, and the 
use of this advice, had in it a logic which would lead to the practice 
and preaching of repeated or habitual confession. 
Habitual confession is the product not of receiving the benefits of 
absolution as envisaged by the Book of Common Prayer but of the 
theology which stresses the urgency of overcoming post-baptismal 
sin and which removes not only the priority of the untheologised 
subjectivity of the individual but also the Reformation emphasis on 
the over-riding significance of the faith of the individual as the 
cause of forgiveness. Anglo-Catholicism was informed not only by 
the inestimable benefit of the rediscovery of a long-since neglected 
aspect of Anglican liturgical ministry, but also by Pusey's personal 
spirituality which demanded deep penitence and which included 
habitual confession. 
4. PROTESTANT REAPPROPRIATION 
Two writers have had considerable influence on the development of 
the Anglican practice and use of confession in the twentieth century. 
Neither wrote in English and neither were Anglicans. However 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer's The Cost of Discipleship and Life Together and 
Max Thurian's Confession have had considerable influence on the 
Anglican practice of and attitudes towards confession. This point is 
not made to denigrate the scholarly works of people like Kirk, 
Mortimer or Telfer, nor the more pastoral but not inconsiderable 
books by Ross or Smith. The point is that until the latter part of 
this century English Anglicans tended to collude in the fantasy that 
confession was part of a neo-Ritualist Romance tolerated as an 
eccentric and esoteric and rather semi-detached area of the Church. 
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The translation of Bonhoeffer and Thurian into English in the 1950s, 
however, marked the beginning of the end of this fantasy. Two, of 
the books owe their provenance to Adolf Hitler. Living Together was 
written from and for the seminary of the German `Confessing Church' 
at Finkenwalde. Thurian's Confession was written when the author 
was a member of the Community of Reconciliation at Taize in 
France. Both, then, are products not only of a Christian response to 
evil but also of a communal response to evil. For just as 
Finkenwalde was a sanctuary and place of preparation for those who 
would oppose Nazism within Germany, so the community at Taize 
was a place where refugees from the war would find refuge and 
hospitality. 
4. i. The Power of Absolution M Thurian 
The idea of Protestant or ecumenical community being a spiritual 
resource for the Church of England may never have been possible 
were it not for the experience of the war. But post-war Europe and 
post-imperial Britain framed a reasonably overt and obvious 
spiritual agenda on which questions of reconciliation and 
forgiveness and community had an important place. In addition there 
was a less coherent point: that continental Protestants could safely 
be assumed not to be closet Roman Catholics. This was especially 
important in the reception of Thurian's work even if it was a rather 
ironic one given his subsequent joining of that Communion. But the 
fact that his rather disjointed book begins with Calvin enjoining 
confession in his Institutes and ends with the exhortations to 
confession from Luther's Great and Little Catechisms was, as it was 
intended to be, a challenge to the assumption that confession was a 
mark of the Roman Catholic Church. 
Thurian goes on to present the case for confession based on James 5 
and absolution based on Matthew 16 and to show that this is an 
aspect of the ministry of the Church. He does this without the 
references to Roman Catholic teaching which characterise much 
English writing on the subject, and without reference to the Book of 
Common Prayer. He argues that Calvin's rejection of auricular 
confession was merely a rejection of the distortions, not of the need 
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to confess and the power of absolution. 30 And he summarises the 
Protestant view as one which stresses not penance but forgiveness: 
"The act of `penance' consists rather in the absolution than in 
the contrition, confession and satisfaction, rather in the 
promise of God and the faith of the penitent than in works of 
reparation. Such works are the signs of mercy freely granted, 
and never a condition of forgiveness. Absolution is 
sacramental for Lutherans; it is linked with the particular 
teaching of the Gospel for Calvinists. Contrition is always 
imperfect and is only a more or less `hypocritical' sign of our 
sinful nature, although necessary. Confession is useful but 
must remain free. There is no satisfaction possible (by prayer, 
fasting and almsgiving), Christ alone having made satisfaction, 
once for all; nevertheless it is necessary to make amends for 
one's sins to those whom one has wronged. The usual minister 
of confession is the pastor. The effect of `penitence' is the 
remission of sins and renewed obedience. "31 
Thurian's combination of scholarship, psychological awareness and 
practical suggestion (the book includes a form of confession and 
suggestions for self-examination) made it a powerful contribution 
to post-war pastoral theology. The chapter on confession and 
psycho-analysis made helpful distinctions between the practices 
and argued that while it might be possible to psychoanalyse the 
sanctity out of the saints a little madness was a good thing in 
Christians. This is a tremendously sensitive area and Thurian was 
correct to venture into it. His meaning was that the goals of 
psychoanalysis and of holy living were different. Certainly the 
various schools of psychotherapy have values and among these will 
be some which are inconsistent with the priorities of the Gospel. 
But it was unfortunate that this secondary point obscured the much 
more significant issue that confession and psychoanalysis are 
compatible in as much as one was dealing with the subject as 
wounded victim and the other construed the individual as 
responsible agent. 32 
30 Thurian, M. Confession p38 
31Thurian, M. Confession p39 
32Many individuals are, of course, both wounded victim and responsible agent. 
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The task of absolution is to address the sinner as responsible and 
therefore guilty, and this is the subject of Thurian's most 
significant contribution to Protestant theology. He argues against 
the Calvinsistic stress on the preaching of forgiveness on the 
grounds of an incarnational ecclesiology. 
"The power to forgive, like that of healing, since it is the 
privilege of the Son of man, is also `given unto men' in so far 
as they are united with Christ in the Church. The Church, the 
Body of Christ, which today means the humanity of Jesus at 
work in this world, retains this power of absolution. It is not 
a question only of preaching forgiveness, but of actually 
granting it. The Church has not only a duty to preach divine 
mercy in order to arouse faith and the assurance of 
forgiveness, but also the power effectively to remit sins by 
the efficacious sign of absolution. "33 
The language reveals that this is for Thurian a sacramental matter, 
but the sacrament is not of penance, still less of confession, but of 
absolution. 
"It is not a question of the ministry of preaching only, but of a 
word and an act which operate what they signify. Christ did 
not say that their sins would be remitted who by faith 
appropriated to themselves the promise of forgiveness when it 
was preached to them. He said: `Whose soever sins ye remit, 
they are remitted unto them'. We have here an example of a 
sacramental act. "34 
He acknowledges that it is possible to be forgiven by faith in 
response to the preached word of God: "I can hear a sermon on the 
infinite mercy of God, and effectually experience forgiveness, if I 
receive the words of the preacher in true faith and in the spirit of 
prayer. "35 But this is a weak form of forgiveness. The point about 
absolution is that it is an invincible forgiveness. "In a sacrament 
God in a sense compels the faith of the believer, however weak it be, 
33Thurian, M. Confession p50 
34Thurian, M. Confession p51/52 
35Thurian, M. Confession p53 
Liturgical Forgiveness in Anglicanism 207 
and accomplishes for him and in him the work signified by the 
sacrament, far beyond all he can ask or think. "36 
Thurian, then, presents a high sacramental doctrine in Reformation 
clothes. His understanding is of a piece with that in Luther's 
Greater Catechism which he uses as a conclusion to his book. 
Christians are free to decide for themselves whether or not to go to 
confession. But like Luther before him Thurian sought to urge people 
to be penitents and to receive the grace of absolution. `To sum up, 
we do not want any compulsion, but whoever does not heed our 
preaching and does not obey our exhortation, ought not to share in 
the benefits of the Gospel, and we do not wish to have anything in 
common with such a man. "37 The words are Luther's but the 
sentiment is precisely that of Thurian. It is not fair to say that this 
call was heeded and responded to in the way that either hoped. What 
happened, however, was that the call was heard and the point that 
the sacrament of absolution can be part of Reformed Christianity 
has been registered. There was within it, as we have seen, more 
stress on the importance of confession, and the assumption that this 
should be habitual in the life of the Christian than most self- 
consciously non-Roman Anglican writers would allow themselves, 
but this is not the central point of impact. The main effect of the 
book was to advertise confession as a means not of penance but of 
absolution, that is the assurance of forgiveness. 
4. ii. Confession and Community D Bonhoeffer 
The Cost of Discipleship was a book which reasserted the 
importance of individual seriousness and effort in the practice of 
the Christian religion. In it Bonhoeffer preaches a gospel not of 
religionless Christianity but of costly grace. It is in the context of 
this that he makes remarks which sound increasingly unprotestant. 
"Cheap grace is the preaching of forgiveness without requiring 
repentance, baptism without church discipline, Communion without 
confession, absolution without personal confession. "38 The 
confession of sin is crucial because it is the only way of rendering 
36Thurian, M. Confession p53 
37Thurian, M. Confession p146 
38Bonhoeffer, D. The Cost of Discipleship p36 
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the individual open and truthful. It is a form of asceticism which 
inculcates the virtues necessary for fellowship and discipleship. 
"Complete truthfulness is only possible where sin has been 
uncovered, and forgiven by Jesus. Only those who are in a 
state of truthfulness through the confession of their sin to 
Jesus are not ashamed to tell the truth wherever it must be 
told. The truthfulness which Jesus demands from his 
followers is the self-abnegation which does not hide sin. 
Nothing is then hidden, everything is brought forth into the 
light of day. "39 
That there is no doubt that Bonhoeffer had some form of auricular 
confession in mind rather than the private penitential response to 
hearing the word of penance and forgiveness preached is clarified by 
the following passage which comes in the penultimate chapter of his 
book. The passage comes from a section where Bonhoeffer is 
discussing the forgiveness of sins and the need for the Church to be 
a disciplining community, binding as well as loosing, not in the 
interests of perfectionism, but "to establish... a community 
consisting of men who really live under the forgiving mercy of 
God. "40 Sacramental confession and absolution is seen as integral 
to this discipline. 
"In addition to examination of the faith, there is also the 
sacramental confession, wherein the Christian seeks and finds 
assurance that his sins are forgiven. Confession is the God- 
given remedy for self-deception and self-indulgence. When we 
confess our sins before a brother-Christian, we are mortifying 
the pride of the flesh and delivering it up to shame and death 
through Christ. Then through the word of absolution we rise as 
new men, utterly dependent on the mercy of God. Confession is 
thus a genuine part of the life of the saints, and one of the 
gifts of grace. But if it is wrongly used, punishment is bound 
to ensue. In confession, the Christian is conformed to the 
death of Christ. `When I admonish men to come to confession, I 
am simply urging them to be Christians. (Luther, Great 
Catechism)". 41 
39Bonhoeffer, D. The Cost of Discipleship p125 
40Bonhoeffer, D. The Cost of Discipleship p260 
41 Bonhoeffer, D. The Cost of Discipleship p260/1 
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Bonhoeffer became convinced of the value of oral confession through 
a variety of experiences. As Bethge records, he was moved by the 
spectacle of penitents of all ages making their confessions at Santa 
Maria Maggiore in Rome on the Monday of Holy week 1924. He 
recorded in his diary: 
"Children as well as adults confess with a real ardour which it 
is very moving to see. To many of these people confession is 
not an externally imposed 'must', but has become an inner 
need... Also it is not mere pedagogy, but to primitive people it 
is the only way of talking to God, while to the religiously more 
far-seeing it is the realisation of the idea of the Church 
fulfilling itself in confession and absolution. "42 
And in his seminary at Finkenwalde he moved his ordinands in the 
direction of mutual confession, suggesting that they preach an 
annual sermon on the value of confession stressing that it, "enabled 
a person to unload his conscience on to a brother in the place of God. 
For absolution by a brother in the name of God carried more 
conviction than absolution after general confession, fraught as this 
was with the danger of self-deception and self-forgiveness. "43 
These thoughts are followed up in a practical way in Bonhoeffer's 
little book on life in community. The final chapter `Confession and 
Communion' begins with the exhortation in the epistle of James 
regarding mutual confession. His emphasis is on the social aspects 
of the practice of confession. It is therefore of a piece with the aim 
of the book which is to explore the spirituality of communal living. 
He argues that there is in unconfessed sin an isolation and 
loneliness to which confession and forgiveness is the only answer. 
42Bethge, E. Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Fount/Collins: London) 1977 p39 
43Bethge, E. Dietrich Bonhoeffer p384 
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"In confession the break-through to community takes place. 
Sin demands to have a man by himself. It withdraws him from 
the community. The more isolated a person is, the more 
destructive will be the power of sin over him, and the more 
deeply he becomes involved in it, the more disastrous is his 
isolation. Sin wants him to remain unknown. It shuns the 
light. In the darkness of the unexpressed it poisons the whole 
being of a person. "44 
But the confession of which he speaks is not to the whole community 
or congregation. Rather it is to a brother. Bonhoeffer's 
understanding of the individual in community is already social: "I 
meet the whole congregation in the one brother to whom I confess 
my sins and who forgives my sins. In the fellowship I find with this 
one brother I have already found fellowship with the whole 
congregation. "45 This confession is a humiliation, it breaks pride 
which is the root of sin. "In the confession of concrete sins the old 
man dies a painful, shameful death before the eyes of the brother. "46 
In this way, that is to say through the painful shame and humiliation 
of the confession, the sinner is at one with Christ on the cross. He 
also links confession with baptism and resurrection to new life: 
"What happened to us in baptism is bestowed upon us anew in 
confession. We are delivered out of darkness into the kingdom of 
Jesus Christ. That is joyful news. Confession is the renewal of the 
joy of baptism. "47 
Against the tradition that forgiveness can be mediated through faith 
and personal prayer Bonhoeffer suggests that all too often this 
confession to God is merely confession to the self followed by self- 
forgiveness. Confession to God is not easier than confession to a 
brother, he declares, it is harder because at least the brother knows 
something about the inwardness of sin. But self-confession leading 
to self-forgiveness is vain; it can give no certainty. "Our brother 
breaks the circle of self-deception. A man who confesses his sins in 
the presence of a brother knows that he is no longer alone with 
himself; he experiences the presence of God in the reality of the 
44Bonhoeffer, D. Life Together p87/8 
45Bonhoeffer, D. Life Together p88 
46Bonhoeffer, D. Life Together p89 
47Bonhoeffer, D. Life Together p90 
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other person". 48 For Bonhoeffer the power of absolution lies in its 
origin in the voice of another. "As the open confession of my sins to 
a brother insures me against self-deception, so, too, the assurance 
of forgiveness becomes fully certain to me only when it is spoken by 
a brother in the name of God. Mutual brotherly confession is given to 
us in order that we may be sure of divine forgiveness. "49 
Both Bonhoeffer and Thurian urge confession to a brother in order 
that absolution may be pronounced and the confessant be assured of 
forgiveness. Bonhoeffer locates this within the dual dynamic of 
costly discipleship for the individual in the context of communal 
life where the Eucharist is celebrated in a spirit of joyful 
reconciliation. Thurian has a more developmental view, seeing 
confession as part of the personal sanctification of the Christian 
involving a growth in grace and virtue of the individual in the 
presence of the real community of the Church. Both stress the 
importance of the social and communicative dynamics of the process 
and both stress that the absolver is a brother. The implicit doctrine 
of the priesthood in their writing is that of all believers and the 
power of the keys is deemed to be dispersed rather than given to the 
caste whose succession is continuous with the Apostle to whom 
those keys were personally handed. But if they are quite different to 
Roman Catholic and traditional Anglican teachers in this way they 
are closer to Rome in that they stress the importance of confession 
to the point of making it an obligation. Neither goes as far as that 
and Thurian is at pains to dissociate himself from the tired 
repetitive compulsory confession which is a consequence, in his 
view, of the decree of 1215. 
48Bonhoeffer, D. Life Together p91 
49Bonhoeffer, D. Life Together p91 
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"This juridical decree has unfortunately led the faithful to 
practise only the necessary spiritual minimum (Easter 
Confession and Communion), with dire results as regards the 
practice both of confession and communion. When the Church is 
reduced to fixing a necessary minimum, it is perhaps a sign 
that she has lost faith in the attraction of the treasures of 
grace. "50 
Bonhoeffer is equally careful to warn against the making of a pious 
work of confession. 
"Confession as a pious work is an invention of the devil. It is 
only God's offer of grace, help and forgiveness that could make 
us dare to enter the abyss of confession. We can confess 
solely for the sake of the promise of absolution. Confession as 
a routine duty is spiritual death; confession in reliance upon 
the promise is life. The forgiveness of sins is the sole ground 
and goal of confession. "51 
These two authors have been widely read in the Anglican Church, and 
the English publication of Life Together and Confession in the decade 
before the second Vatican Council mark the beginning of a new phase 
in the Anglican Church with regard to the practice of personal 
confession and absolution. They opened the door both for greater 
flexibility within those parts of the Church where confession was 
already established and suggested to those parts where confession 
was regarded with suspicion that there may be more in the tradition 
of non-obligatory private confession than ultra-montane 
sacerdotalism. 
5. THE CONTEMPORARY SITUATION 
5. i. Liturgical Provision 
5. i. a. The Church of England 
In 1980 the Church of England produced the Alternative Service Book 
(ASB). This was the culmination of a process which was marked by 
the establishment of the Liturgical Commission in 1955 and the 
50Thurian, M. Confession p64 
51 Bonhoeffer, D. Life Together p94 
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measure passed in 1965 which allowed experimentation with new 
forms of liturgical worship and the subsequent revision or 
replacement of many services. This process has naturally attracted 
a great deal of attention, much of which has focused on the question 
of the theological and cultural significance of various changes of 
language. One dimension of this process which has not been properly 
analysed is the extent to which there are profound differences in the 
way in which ASB handles the question of the liturgical forgiveness 
of sins. 
In the first section of this chapter the significance of the office of 
the Visitation of the Sick, the exhortation to communion and the 
words of ordination for the practice of private confession were 
noted. It is of no small significance that the ASB neither includes 
nor revises any of this material. At one level this is of no moment 
since the Book of Common Prayer (BCP) remains, officially, the 
primary source, and equally officially, the ASB is not reckoned to 
instigate any theological change. However the absence of modern 
language versions of these texts is not without theoretical or 
practical importance. 
The fate of this material is not at all different to that of penitential 
material more generally. The Commination, which was reckoned to 
be a somewhat pale analogue of early communal penitential 
practices, was not revised. The invitations to confession at Morning 
and Evening Prayer were truncated, and that in the communion rite 
similarly limited. Whereas the BCP had different prayers of 
confession and absolution in the Office and at the Eucharist ASB had 
but one standard form of confession and absolution for all occasions; 
the absolution being of the declaratory form. 
These changes have received remarkably little attention given that 
they are so radical and touch on such a sensitive area of theology 
and practice. In advance of the publication of the ASB John Gunstone 
wrote an apologia for the decidedly less penitential nature of Series 
3 Communion service. The problem with the prayer book, he argued, 
was that its Communion service was `heavily penitential in 
atmosphere'. "The general confession in particular had been 
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criticised for being overlong and too grovelling. In Series 2, 
therefore, the Church of England provided a briefer form; but this, in 
its turn, was criticised for being too short and for lacking any 
expression of contrition. "52 
One of the aims of the liturgical revision was to render liturgies 
which were more transparent and which relied less on exhortations 
or explanatory rubrics. This, coupled with the tendency to introduce 
as much direct quotation from the Bible as could be accommodated, 
led to a removal of some of those very aspects of the BCP which 
were a contribution to a distinctly Anglican understanding of 
penance and forgiveness. The clearest example of this is to be found 
in the way in which the congregation is invited to join in the general 
confession in the Communion service. In Rite A of the ASB there is a 
Summary of the Law which is a vestige of the Ten Commandments as 
found in the BCP followed by the following words: 
God so loved the world that he gave his only Son Jesus Christ 
to save us from our sins, to be our advocate in heaven and to 
bring us to eternal life. 
Let us confess our sins, in penitence and faith, firmly resolved 
to keep God's commandments and to live in love and peace with 
all men. 
The invitation in the BCP is as follows: 
Ye that do truly and earnestly repent you of your sins, and are 
in love and charity with your neighbour, and intend to lead a 
new life, following the commandments of God, and walking 
from henceforth in his holy ways; Draw near with faith, and 
take this Holy Sacrament to your comfort; and make your 
humble confession to Almighty God, meekly kneeling upon your 
knees. 53 
52Gunstone, J. The Act of Penitence' in Jasper, R. C. D. The Eucharist Today (London: 
SPCK) 1974 p80 
53 An adapted form of this, which has some of the words in parentheses indicating 
that they may be omitted, is one of the several introductions to confession offered in 
the ASB in Rite B. 
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While the ASB is more overtly scriptural and eschatological the BCP 
is more ethical and human. It assumes that there will be real 
problems, personal and relational, and that these are an occasion for 
true and earnest repentance and for a humble approach to the throne 
of grace. The ASB assumes that penitence and faith are states 
which it is possible to be in and that the being in them is in some 
way independent of the making of the general confession. The two 
invitations differ, as well, with regard to the question of the 
significance of relationships. In the BCP relational repair is the 
sine qua non of the process whereas the ASB assumes that 
relationships of love and peace will be a product of a resolution 
which is implicitly being affirmed by the process of confession, 
absolution and communion. 
Close reading reveals many layers of theological difference between 
the prayers of confession in the ASB and the BCP. 54 The absolution 
in the ASB, while apparently a simple abbreviation of the BCP form, 
does in fact express a different understanding of forgiveness or at 
least its significance. The editing removes the reformation 
emphasis that forgiveness is based not only on repentance but also 
on faith. The line `who forgives all who truly repent' is the most 
problematic of the new form. Its rhetorical quality depends on a 
notional difference between repentance and true repentance. This is 
difficult because the rhetoric is neither strong enough, nor is it in 
the appropriate place, to deepen a sense of repentance. Placed in the 
absolution it gives the impression of being a condition or a 
limitation on forgiveness. In the BCP the equivalent sentence may 
not be concise but it is acceptable because it conforms the prayer to 
the familiar collect form: `who of his great mercy hath promised 
forgiveness to all them that with hearty repentance and true faith 
turn unto him' is manifestly a description of the hesed of God in a 
way in which `who forgives all those who truly repent' is not. The 
redundant word `truly' can not but draw attention to itself and as it 
does so it subverts the power of the prayer. Moreover, in the context 
of the lengthy and syntactically complex confession of the BCP, it is 
clear that the forthcoming absolution applies to those who have 
54lmportant points on this subject are made by Catherine Pickstock on the basis of 
linguistic analyses. See her The Confession' to appear in Theology. 
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joined in that confession. The less demanding prose of the ASB, 
however, does not facilitate the experience of contrition to the 
same degree, and consequently heightens any nascent anxiety. 
The Alternative Service Book of the Church of England, then, does not 
furnish material which is valuable in the liturgical forgiveness of 
sins. This analysis has necessarily concentrated on the material for 
general confession and absolution because that is all there is. The 
gap with regard to a private form of confession and absolution has 
not, however, gone unnoticed. 
Two publications have sought to redress this problem in the course 
of the 1980s. The Liturgical Commission produced services and 
prayers for Lent, Holy Week and Easter which included three services 
of penance. The first two were orders for common prayer based on a 
series of readings and canticles, followed by a litany leading up to 
corporate confession and absolution and concluding with further 
prayers. The third was merely a prayer of absolution `which may be 
used for the quieting of individual conscience'. In 1988 David Silk55 
in an overt attempt to strengthen the penitential aspect of 
alternative, that is contemporary, liturgies published a compilation 
of various materials. As well as several services of penitence and 
many penitential prayers Silk drew particular attention to the place 
which the Kyrie Eleison has in penitence. 
Silk stresses that the Kyrie has a range of reference and a tradition 
of use which is much broader than penitence, and by implication 
much wider than prayer for forgiveness. He sees it as "[a general] 
acknowledgement of the human condition and its dependence on the 
divine mercy. "56 He therefore contends that it is not an alternative 
to the Gloria suitable for Lent but something distinct. His material 
suggests two uses however. One, and the material of contemporary 
Roman Catholic provenance is in this category, interleaves the 
kyries themselves with indirect prayers for, or expressions of faith 
in, the forgiveness of God, and these are met by a brief and precatory 
absolution: "May Almighty God have mercy on us, forgive us our sins, 
55Silk, D. In Penitence and Faith (London: Mowbray) 1988 
56Silk, D. In Penitence and Faith p10 
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and bring us to everlasting life. Amen"57 The other forms, all of 
which come from Portsmouth Cathedral, tend to weave passages of 
scripture which are either penitential or seasonal around the 
kyries. 58 
Silk also includes a form for the reconciliation of a penitent. Such a 
liturgy has yet to appear in a properly authorised Church of England 
publication, the stumbling block being General Synod's refusal to 
agree to an indicative form of absolution. Silk overcomes this by 
suggesting two alternative forms, the second is that from the office 
for the Visitation of the Sick of the Book of Common Prayer and the 
first is the absolution found in Lent, Holy Week and Easter. 
5. i. b. The Episcopal Church of the United States of 
America. 
The American equivalent of the ASB59 is not an alternative to but an 
update of the Book of Common Prayer. It is therefore a different 
kind of document to the ASB as it replaces previous editions. It 
contains both traditional and contemporary forms of service, 
collects and so on but whatever it fails to include is no longer a part 
of the liturgy of the church. As in the ASB the words from the 
gospel of John in the ordinal are no longer a part of the rite. It 
retains, however, a form of exhortation in the Eucharist which 
includes an emphasis not only on the importance of the worthy 
reception of the sacrament but also a reflection of the BCP's 
emphasis on the setting in good order of relationships and the 
suggestion that the counsel and absolution of a priest might meet 
the needs of a scrupulous or doubtful conscience. By quoting the 
relevant section in full it becomes clear that this exhortation 
balances the various elements which make up for the need for 
57Silk, D. In Penitence and Faith p1 Off 
58Silk, D. In Penitence and Faith p1 5ff For example: 
Praise the Lord 0 my soul, and forget not all his benefits: 
Lord have mercy. Lord have mercy. 
Who forgives all your sin and heals all your infirmities. 
Christ have mercy. Christ have mercy 
Who saves your life from destruction, and crowns you with mercy and loving 
kindness: 
Lord have mercy. Lord have mercy. 
59The Book of Common Prayer according to the Use of The Episcopal Church (The 
Seabury Press)1979 (BCPECUSA) 
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personal liturgical forgiveness in the way which is both ethical and 
subjective which we observed to be characteristic of the Anglican 
approach in the first sections of this chapter. 
Acknowledge your sins before Almighty God, with full purpose 
of amendment of life, being ready to make restitution for all 
injuries and wrongs done by you to others; and also being ready 
to forgive those who have offended you, in order that you 
yourselves may be forgiven. And then, being reconciled to one 
another, come to the banquet of that most heavenly food. 
And if, in your preparation, you need help and counsel, then go 
and open yourself to a discreet and understanding priest, and 
confess your sins, that you may receive the benefit of 
absolution, and spiritual counsel and advice; to the removal of 
scruple and doubt, the assurance of pardon, and the 
strengthening of your faith. "60 
The Book of Common Prayer of the Episcopal Church of the United 
States of America does emphasise the need for penitence on the way 
to the altar and to this end includes two rites of penitence which 
may be used as preparation for the Eucharist or as separate services. 
On the other hand there is a rubric in the Eucharistic Rite proper 
which indicates that the confession may on occasion be omitted. 
The book also contains an order for the Ministration of the Sick 
which allows for the possibility of confession and absolution. The 
introductory rubric is that, 'the priest may suggest the making of a 
special confession, if the sick person's conscience is troubled'. 61 
This is more neutral than some of the early Anglican formularies. 
The case here is that a conscience should show evidence of being 
troubled before confession is suggested. 
Two forms of Reconciliation of a Penitent which may be used by the 
healthy as well as the sick are included. The introduction to the 
. rites makes 
it clear that they may be used by any who desire it and 
that only bishops and priests might pronounce the absolution. 
Deacons or lay people may hear confessions provided that they make 
it clear in advance that the absolution will be a prayer for, rather 
60BCPECUSA p317 
61BCPECUSA p454 
Liturgical Forgiveness in Anglicanism 219 
than an assurance of, forgiveness. 62 The introduction also states 
that the priest will give advice, and absolution - in that order, and 
may then assign a small devotional task as `a sign of penitence and 
thanksgiving'. 
Twenty years ago it seemed that the Anglican Churches in England 
and the United States were poles apart with regard to the question 
of liturgical forgiveness. The anxiety about the overly penitential 
tone of the BCP coupled with fears about indicative absolution and 
the desire to replace Cranmerian prose with twentieth century 
midrash led to the production of a book which seriously 
underestimated the part which liturgy can play in the forgiveness of 
sins. Like the writing of Thurian and Bonhoeffer, however, the Book 
of Common Prayer of the Episcopal Church of the United States of 
America served as encouragement and stimulation to those who 
perceived, or who were beginning to perceive, this deficiency. As 
we have seen, it enshrines the Anglican position with regard to 
liturgical forgiveness very cogently at the same time as providing 
forms for personal and corporate penance and forgiveness. In the 
Church of England the ASB is not the last word in this area, and the 
two subsequent publications which we have considered have been 
particularly significant in regenerating the possibility of liturgical 
forgiveness. 
5. ii. Current Practice 
The most remarkable thing about the contemporary situation 
regarding confession and absolution in the Anglican Church is not 
only the amount of reflection on the practice but also its generally 
sanguine tone. Even those Anglican writers who report declining 
numbers of penitents find good reasons for this and also take a 
positive view with regard to the change in style of confessions 
which are typically made. For instance, in reporting on 
contemporary Anglican practice in Societas Liturgicas David Holeton 
makes the following assertion. 
62BCPECUSA p446 
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`The frequency with which priests are being called upon to 
hear confessions is increasing and the spectrum of individuals 
seeking this form of reconciliation is broadening. The idea of 
individual reconciliation would seem to be less foreign to the 
average Anglican than it was two decades ago and an 
increasing number of clergy, from a variety of theological 
traditions within Anglicanism, feel free to suggest to 
parishioners that penance might be appropriate for them. "63 
Sadly Holeton provides no documentary evidence to support these 
contentions. This is particularly unfortunate because of the 
contrast which this suggests between the fates of confession within 
the Roman and Anglican communions. But he is not alone in reporting 
such a trend. John Gilling, parish priest of St Mary's Bourne Street, 
has written in similar vein with regard to his observations on the 
sacrament of reconciliation over the last two decades. "It is often 
said that confession is dying out in present day [Anglo] Catholicism. 
I can only speak from my experience as a parish priest... [That] the 
use of the sacrament of reconciliation has grown and not diminished 
in the last fifteen years.... "64 
Whether or not it is possible to confirm these observations with 
empirical evidence is a moot point. Certainly there are those who 
would have it otherwise. Introducing a very significant volume of 
essays entitled Confession and Absolution65, Perry Butler reports 
on a survey of clerical and lay attitudes with regard to aspects of 
confession. 66 Limited as the value of these data are they are at 
least as useful as those provided by Holeton and Gilling. Butler's 
older friends remark that the number of penitents appears to have 
declined over the years: "Large queues in central London churches at 
the major festivals seem a thing of the past. "67 On the other hand, 
he remarks that it seems to be the case that a wider variety of 
63Holeton, D. 'Penance in the Churches of the Anglican Communion' in Studia 
Liturgica 18 1988 p98 
64Gilling, J. 'Reconciliation' in Eds. Greenhalgh, J. and Russell, E. Signs of Faith, 
Hope and Love (London: St Mary's Bourne Street) 1987 p88 
65Butler, P. 'Confession Today' in Eds. Dudley, M. and Rowell, G. Confession and 
Absolution 
66This was not a published survey, rather it was one which Butler conducted 
himself. 
67Butler, P. 'Confession Today' p2 
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priests are hearing confessions now in a wider variety of situations. 
Consequently the number of people in a queue at St Alban's, Holborn 
on Maundy Thursday is not a reliable indicator of the more general 
picture. Indeed this point about the variety of forms and the 
movement from the old style confession to something less ordered, 
less pious, less perfunctory and more in pursuit of counsel is a trend 
that several Anglican confessors remark upon. "Confessions today 
are often longer and looser than in the past and are sometimes more 
akin to the pastoral interview. "68 Moreover the impression gleaned 
from his priest friends was that people, "seemed to find it harder to 
confess specific sins in a concrete way and often tended to 
articulate a vaguer (though no less real) sense of 'sinfulness' in 
their lives and relationships. "69 And in a later section he makes the 
related comment that, "many confessions today, especially of the 
particularly articulate, tend to consist more of the `I am' than the 'I 
have'. "70 
While based on anecdotal evidence this is a far from trivial point. 
It suggests that a shift has gone on in the meaning of the idea of 
confession and absolution. It is clear what is going on when a 
penitent enumerates a list of guilty sins and asks, in contrition, 
for divine forgiveness. They are asking to have their conscience 
cleared, their account settled, their guilt removed. When the 
confession is in terms of 'I am', or perhaps 'I have become' the 
matter is not one of specific guilt so much as something more 
general. One possible meaning of this is that whereas the 
experience and reality of guilt lies behind the first form of 
confession it is the experience and reality of shame which lies 
behind the second. In the following chapter the nature and 
meaning of guilt and shame will be explored in such a way as to 
facilitate a consideration of this possibility that there is in 
contemporary confession not only a disclosure of shame, but also 
a desire for the relief or healing of shame; and if so, whether or 
not this relief or healing of shame can be called forgiveness. 
68Butler, P. 'Confession Today' p3 
69Butler, P. 'Confession Today' p3 
70Butler, P. 'Confession Today' p7 
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter the specifically Anglican approach to liturgical 
forgiveness has been examined. It has become clear that while 
auricular confession has not had the same place in ecclesiastical 
discipline in this communion as it has had in Roman Catholicism 
it has a high place in the ministry of healing. Its place as 
something to relieve the burden of the guilty conscience has been 
established in the liturgical books of the Anglican Church as well 
as in the writings of the normative theologians and in particular 
those of Richard Hooker. 
Several strands of theology and practice run together in liturgical 
forgiveness. Primary among them is the element of moral 
seriousness which we discerned in the approach of Pusey, and 
this is coupled with the pastoral desire to meet the needs of the 
penitent: "consciences are burdened" he wrote, and for that 
reason it is appropriate for the Church to allow for their 
unburdening. On the other hand, as the example of Pusey nicely 
illustrates, Anglicans who desire to enrich the liturgical or 
sacramental life of the Church often look to Rome for leadership. 
But it must not be forgotten that Pusey's translation of Gaume's 
manual was an edited translation for Anglican use, nor must such 
looking be taken as evidence that confession and absolution are 
not theologically and psychologically different in the two 
contexts. 
One issue on which the Anglican approach to confession differs 
from the Roman Catholic is that of the place of habitual 
confession. The twentieth century has certainly seen exceptions 
to this but there is a sense in Anglicanism that the conscience 
should be left to bring itself to confession rather than be 
disciplined into it. `None must' is an important aspect of the 
Anglican approach although there have been many writers and 
preachers who have urged that 'more should' and those who do 
`should more often'. 71 
71 Pusey, for instance writes that "But no amount of voluntary confession involves 
the restoration of compulsory; the one is the prompting of conscience within, the 
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But these are exceptions, exceptions of which W. S. F. Pickering 
makes rather too much in his analysis of Anglo-Catholicism. 72 
More important than this is the way in which the practice of 
confession has a recurrent presence in the Anglican practices of 
liturgical forgiveness. Needless to say these practices and the 
accompanying theology have changed and developed over time. 
Anglicans have been inspired by theologians outside Anglicanism 
as our study of Bonhoeffer and Thurian have suggested. 
Anglican liturgical and pastoral practice is developmental and 
eclectic. It is not driven by theological or even theoretical 
considerations in the same way as it is in the Roman Catholic 
Church. This means that it is more responsive to influences 
which come from outside the Church. Anglican liturgy has become 
less penitential not only because new Prayer Books have been 
authorised but also as more and more of the penitential aspects 
of the liturgy were routinely deleted. This process applies in the 
sphere of liturgical forgiveness as well as anywhere else. 
General confession and absolution in the course of public worship 
remain central in the Anglican experience of forgiveness, but the 
mediation of the forgiving grace of God through personal 
confession has place beside it not only as part of the tradition, 
but also as a developing and dynamic part of Church life: what 
Bonhoeffer would call discipleship and life together. 
other the provision of discipline without. " Pusey, E. 'Entire Absolution of the 
Penitent' Preface pxv in University Sermons 1843 - 1855 
72Pickering, W. S. F. Anglo-Catholicism 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
GUILT AND SHAME 
1. THE COMPLEXITY OF GUILT 
There can be no doubt that guilt is one of the most important 
concepts in our culture. It is closely connected to the ideals of 
responsibility and freedom; it has been a major factor in the 
spirituality of the western Church; it is a corner-stone in 
jurisprudence, and a central problem for psychoanalytic thought. 
A central predicate in psychoanalytic thought is that the affect guilt 
may be caused in a variety of ways of which the responsible 
infringement of laws is but a minor example. Its imperative has 
been the alleviation of neurotic guilt caused, according to Freudian 
theory, by fear of punishment by the introjected parent as super-ego. 
Our concern, however, is not with the detail of psychoanalytic 
theory but with its significance for a general understanding of guilt. 
The psychological approach (and this is just as true of behaviourism 
which has focused on the way in which fear is conditioned by 
experience as it is for psychoanalysis) has encouraged a distancing 
between the feelings and the moral self, and in particular an 
alienation between the sense of guilt and that of responsibility. 1 It 
is psychological theories which lie behind the inclination to `blame 
the parents' and while it is right to draw attention to the aetiology 
of guilt feelings in the innocent, it is ethically negligent to fail to 
analyse the emotional responses which occur as people reflect on 
actions which are blameworthy. Psychology has done us a service in 
suggesting that guilt, or tenderness of conscience, is not a perfectly 
calibrated ethical thermometer, but it has done us a disservice in 
suggesting that the relationship between guilt and fault is not 
important. 
1This was the point made by Bieritz in the article considered in the introduction. 
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It is therefore strangely necessary to say that sometimes people 
who feel guilty are guilty. But while the feeling is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for guilt to be `real' it is 
certainly necessary for forgiveness. (It is not, of course necessary 
to feel guilt in order to be punished and that the innocent can be 
punished but not forgiven indicates an important difference between 
the concepts. ) But because guilt may be either neurotic or real it 
does not follow that its confession will necessarily lead to either 
punishment or forgiveness. A friend or counsellor who hears a 
confession of guilt feelings may well enter into a critique of the 
confession, suggesting more or less directly that the feelings are 
not entirely appropriate thereby attempting, as one writer put it, to 
weaken the super-ego. 
A similar pattern may also emerge when the confession is made in a 
religious context. But in this case any denial of the validity of guilt 
feelings will be meant and experienced differently. This is because 
the Christian tradition of human guilt and sin predates the twentieth 
century suspicion about the psychological or moral health of guilt 
feelings. There is, especially in Christianity with its doctrine of 
original sin, its rites of penance, its penitential seasons, its general 
confessions and absolution, its baptismal washing and Eucharistic 
sacrifice `for the forgiveness of sins', something approaching a 
sacralisation of guilt itself. By exhorting individuals to examine 
their consciences and to repent, Christian spirituality can encourage 
them to view guilt as the most important emotion. In other words, 
there is a very considerable clash of style between what we might 
call neo-Freudian and neo-Augustinian estimation of the nature and 
significance of guilt. Moreover such is the complexity of the 
contemporary world that any confession of guilt is likely to 
incorporate, one way or another, both of these approaches. 
The significance of this analysis is that it shows just how complex 
the apparently simple matter of expressing guilt is. In the late 
twentieth century it is invariably and inevitably difficult to know 
how to respond to the confession of guilt. The rhetoric of guilt has 
become just as tense and confused as the emotion itself. This 
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congruence is very positive, but it is one of the fundamental 
problems with which any theology of forgiveness must deal. 
Having considered the complexity of real and neurotic, objective and 
subjective guilt it is important to look more closely at objective, 
real guilt. Even this is not straightforward, however. There is an 
important distinction to be made, for instance, between legal and 
moral guilt. Legal guilt is a technical concept enshrined within a 
process which defines it. The judgement is made in an authorised 
and public way and the accused has to come to terms with it as they 
choose. Moral guilt is different in as much as ethics is distinct 
from law. Thus any individual may be morally guilty but legally 
innocent or for that matter morally innocent and legally guilty. The 
details are not important. Of significance is that while in the 
contemporary world law is publicly defined to the extent to which 
circumstances demand clarification, morality, even religious 
morality often is not. 
Thus there are important differences between legal and moral guilt 
which are in part to do with the privacy which attends to moral 
reasoning and the subjectivity which attends to theological ethics. 
Part of this derives from the emphasis which morality, as opposed 
to law, has on obligations and duties rather than prohibitions. The 
simplest form of guilt is that which derives from having 'done those 
things which we ought not to have done'. To break a 'thou shalt not' 
commandment is to be in the happiest state of real guilt. There is 
no need for anxiety. Rather the predominant emotion is fear in the 
face of impending punishment or retribution. This means that the 
only hope lies in making reparations. The situation of a'thou shalt' 
commandment can be much more difficult. To be under an obligation 
'to love the Lord thy God' or `to love thy neighbour as thyself' is to 
be in a quite different situation. Judging success or failure is a 
tendentious matter, and yet it is a commandment and as such brings 
the spectre of judgement onto the horizon. It is this prospect of 
judgement which is a cause for anxiety. The spiritual nature of the 
basic and positive Judeo-Christian law means that living within its 
orbit is a perpetual source of a guilt which is neither neurotic in the 
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objective. This Judeo-Christian emotion, which derives from the 
central idea that God requires a response of love which it seems 
both important to meet and impossible to attain, cannot without 
misleading simplification be simply called guilt. It is more complex 
than guilt and has about it much which is more commonly thought of 
as shame. 
2. GUILT AND SHAME IN GENESIS 
Questions of identity and shame are fundamental in Christian 
theology. Indeed they are so basic that to call them original is to 
imply the opposite of novelty; so old and original are they that they 
can be seen to lie behind the fall narrative in Genesis. 
"And Adam said, I heard the sound of thee in the garden, and 
was afraid, because I was naked; and I hid myself. And God 
said, Who told you that you were naked? Have you eaten of the 
tree of which I commanded you not to eat? " (Genesis 3: 10 & 
11) 
Judeo-Christian history has always had to choose how to interpret 
this action in its theologising about the meaning of redemption. If 
the action of disobedient eating is of the greatest significance then 
the question is one of guilt. If however the problem is not the action 
but the inability to live with the cognitive and emotional 
consequences of seeing and knowing then the matter is one of shame. 
Loss of innocence can refer either to the acquisition of guilt or of 
knowledge, and part of the genius of Genesis is to confound these 
categories. But theologies of redemption invariably focus on the 
problem of guilt. The fall narrative has been read as a story about 
sin as guilty disobedience and this has made redemption into a story 
about the removal of the guilt and the costly recovery of obedient 
order. Whoever wrote Genesis did so in such a way that, in the text, 
God's concern was with guilt. In the text, God's response prioritises 
the respective guilts of the different actors. For the serpent the 
guilt is for action, and for Adam the guilt is for listening to the 
woman; whereas for the woman it is not clear whether her guilt is 
for listening or speaking or both. But the shame story, for so long 
hidden behind aprons of fig, is one which is not only equally 
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important but also crucial to the plot of a complete redemption 
narrative. 
The fall narrative is also a story about shame as Adam's answer 
suggests. As von Rad puts it: "they do not react to the loss of their 
innocence with a spiritual consciousness of guilt; rather they are 
afraid of their nakedness. "2 The man and woman hide from God 
because their newly revealed nakedness is a source of fear in the 
presence of God. But even in the absence of God it is a source of 
embarrassment, their response to learning that they are naked is to 
cover it up. When the woman and the man ate of the fruit of the tree 
their eyes were open to their respective nakedness and their minds 
to the idea that this was problematic. Genesis does not explain 
what the problem with nakedness is, it merely states that they saw 
themselves and each other. The question of why nakedness is a 
problem is a question about shame. Von Rad asserts that: "Shame 
always seeks to conceal, it is afraid of `nakedness'... "3 but he fails 
to ask why this is. 
For Augustine the pathos of the fall is in the loss of grace caused by 
the half-openness of their eyes which prevented them from 
recognising, "what a blessing they were given in the garment of 
grace, in as much as their members did not know how to rebel 
against their will. "4 He goes on to explain how the post-lapsarian 
body is differently responsive to the body graceful so that, "there 
appeared in the movements of their body a certain novelty, which 
made nakedness shameful. It made them self-conscious and 
embarrassed. "5 There is confession in his concern about this 
`novelty' which he reckons to be 'insubordination of their flesh'. 
Augustine writes that, "modesty, from a sense of shame, covered 
what was excited to disobedience by lust, in defiance of a will 
which had been condemned for the guilt of disobedience"6. He is 
clearly pleased and relieved when he comes to the observation that, 
"from then onwards the practice of concealing the pudenda has 
2von Rad, G. Genesis (London: SCM) 1961 p91 
3von Rad, G. Genesis p91 
4Augustine City of God (London: Penguin) 1972 p578 
5Augustine City of God p578 
6Augustine City of God p579 
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become a deep rooted habit in all peoples". 7 He reads in the account 
a justification of keeping the shameful private. But privacy can only 
hide shame, it can not do away with it: while hiding may be a way of 
coping, it is not a way of redeeming. 
Augustine's account suggests confusion about responsibility and 
identity. He does not seem to concede, for instance, that the 
genitals are innocent, believing them to be `insubordinate', with a 
life and inclination which is not subject to reason or control. He 
finds an analogy between God and humanity and the person and their 
genitals. But genitals, however lively and embarrassing, cannot lose 
their innocence or gain a responsible, independent identity. They 
cannot, like the people in the story, become knowing. Augustine 
believes that the narrative of the fall is saying that God's 
experience of people is like Augustine's experience of his genitalia. 
Unlike human beings however, human genitalia do not act, they are 
not agents. Genitals, like animals, can be neither guilty nor 
innocent, they can be unpredictable but not insubordinate. Human 
beings can be responsible and therefore guilty and flawed and 
therefore ashamed. But the act of making aprons changes nothing. 
A more helpful approach to the way in which the fall narrative in 
Genesis is a story of shame is provided by Jean Paul Sartre's 
account of shame. In Being and Nothingness Sartre proposed that 
shame was the product of realising that one was subject to the 
objectifying look of the other. "[Shame is] the recognition of the 
fact that I am indeed that object which the other is looking at and 
judging. "8 Sartre's view is that shame has little to do with 
morality but a great deal to do with the way in which subjectivity is 
relativized. 
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"Pure shame is not a feeling of being this or that guilty object 
but in general of being an object; that is of recognising myself 
in this degraded, fixed, and dependent being which I am for the 
other. Shame is the feeling of an original fall, not because of 
the fact that I have committed this or that particular fault but 
simply that I have fallen into the world in the midst of things 
and that I need the mediation of the Other to be what I am. "9 
On this view, nakedness is only problematic because it is that which 
reveals identity as difference. If there were no difference there 
would be no `Other' and nakedness would not be problematic. It 
provides a different hermeneutic for reading Genesis 3 than the 
Augustinian one which implies that the genitals are shameful 
because insubordinate and guilty. The Sartrean starting point lies in 
the observation that observed difference is a source of shame. 
In the fall narrative God's response to guilt is to force different 
roles onto Adam and the as yet unnamed woman. In as much as this 
produces work and that the guilty conscience seems to like to work 
there is some health in it, (if that is, guilt-motivated work is 
healthy). But the addition of role differences to the already shame- 
inducing anatomical differences between men and women makes 
matters worse in terms of the dynamics of shame. The more 
different man and woman are, the greater the scope for mutual 
shame and the greater the need for privacy and separation. 
Attention to difference generates a dynamic of alienation so that 
over time genital privacy must be more and more carefully guarded 
and identities more and more firmly predicated on that which is 
hidden. As a consequence men and women are named differently and 
the context in which they share genital intimacy becomes a binding 
and exclusive relationship. 
Shame and identity are linked in a way in which guilt and identity 
are not. Guilt is much more closely linked with responsibility which 
is only an aspect of identity. We are guilty for actions which are 
bad and which we responsibly perform. The response of the victims 
of our actions or the representatives of the collectivity whose 
morals we offend can be variously punitive or lenient, retributive or 
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forgiving. Thus although some might go to confession while others 
go to jail the effect in both cases is to disassociate the guilty actor 
from his guilt so that life may continue. The only questions which 
may be put to either prison or penance is whether they work as ways 
of removing guilt. 
The narrative of shame, however, generates different questions. 
Shame is not a consequence of responsible wrongdoing but the 
appreciation that there is something wrong with the self. Whether 
this anxiety is neurotic or real is not especially important at this 
stage. Whether the shame be that of the wasted anorexic who thinks 
herself fat or that of the young German visiting Auschwitz the 
fundamental dynamics are the same. The problem is not with what 
you have done or thought or decided but with who you are. Certainly 
guilt will be in the background: the neurotic guilt of the anorexic 
who has had a sandwich for lunch and the real guilt of the German's 
forbears, but shame is more fundamental. It will remain after guilt 
has been dissipated and according to Melanie Klein is found in 
infants before the onset of guilt. Gabrielle Taylor describes shame 
as a disformation of the self in contrast to guilt which is identified 
as the beginnings of the growth of an alien self. Whatever the 
details of the meaning of this the general point that shame and guilt 
are differently connected to the self is paramount. To think 
metaphorically, the psychic alienation of guilt means that it is held 
at arm's length whereas shame is a condition of the heart. 
Alternatively, while guilt may be thought of as dark spots on an 
otherwise pure white soul, shame must be thought of as the 
discolouration of the whole. That is why covering up and hiding 
away are the classic responses, or attempts to cope, not with guilt 
but with shame. 
But covering up and hiding away are not quite the same thing. Before 
each other Adam and the woman merely hide their genitalia, their 
difference. It is only in the presence of God that they hide 
altogether. This limitation of inter-human shame to the genitals is 
significant and is the beginning of a transformation of shame into 
guilt by the taking of responsibility for a limited, if symbolically 
significant, aspect of the self. Ashamed in each other's company the 
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enlightened couple do not hide from each other but cover the signs of 
their difference. When they hear the LORD however their aprons are 
more relevant than the nakedness which they cover. As the fig 
leaves cover the innocent genitals they also reveal the shame of the 
couple who suddenly realise their new exposure. Similarly their 
nervous hiding reveals shame anxiety manifest as fear of God. The 
couple are guilty with regard to what they have done but ashamed 
with regard to what they have seen and know. It is therefore 
important to reflect more deeply on the nature of shame. 
3. THE STUDY OF SHAME 
Guilt has received far more attention than shame in twentieth 
century thought. As Leon Wurmser could write as recently as 1981: 
"While guilt, anxiety, elation and depression have received abundant 
attention, I am not aware of much systematic enquiry into shame, 
with its manifold aspects and related attitudes and feelings. "10 
Wurmser is introducing a psychoanalytic study of shame, but similar 
remarks could be made in ethics, psychology and theology. Looking 
up shame in either Alastair Campbell's Dictionary of Pastoral Care>> 
or Rahner and Vorgrimler's Concise Theological Dictionary12 is a 
fruitless task. In The New Dictionary of Christian Ethics James 
Childress makes the point that: "In the Jewish and Christian 
traditions, which emphasise the commands of a personal God, guilt 
tends to be primary". 13 Moreover anyone consulting Psychological 
Abstracts under the heading shame will find not a list of entries but 
the note to "see guilt". 14 
A reading of quite diverse late twentieth century moral reflections 
will however reveal that the concept of shame is if anything of 
greater importance than that of guilt. A sociologist who has 
1 OWurmser, L. The Mask of Shame (London: John Hopkins) 1981 p16 
11 Campbell, A. Dictionary of Pastoral Care (London: SPCK) 1987 
12Rahner, K. and Vorgrimler, H. Concise Theological Dictionary (London: Burns and 
Oates) 1965 
13Childress, J. & Macquarrie, J. A New Dictionary of Christian Ethics (London: 
SCM) 1988 p584 
14This point is made in Tangey, J. P. 'Moral Effect: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly' 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 61. No4 1991 p599 
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recently drawn attention to the significance of shame is Anthony 
Giddens in his reflections of the problems of the self in the 
contemporary era, what he calls Late-Modernity. 
"[Although] the mechanics of guilt have been very widely 
explored in the literature of psychoanalytic theory... in respect 
of problems of self-identity, shame, which has been less 
extensively discussed, is more important. The obverse of guilt 
is reparation; guilt concerns things done or not done... its 
prime emphasis tends to be on the discrete elements of 
behaviour and the modes of retribution that they suggest or 
entail. "15 
Giddens' point is not that questions of self-identity are new but that 
discourse about them is a particularly significant dimension of the 
second half of the twentieth century. An example of this is to be 
found in Primo Levi's analysis of the conscience of Auschwitz 
survivors. In The Drowned and the Saved he offers an analysis of 
shame which begins in his observation of the Russian soldiers' 
response to the Lager which they were liberating: 
"They did not greet us or smile; they seemed oppressed, not 
only by pity but also by confused restraint which sealed their 
mouths, and kept their eyes fastened on the funereal scene. It 
was the same shame that we knew so well, which submerged 
us after the selections, and every time we had to witness or 
undergo an outrage... [The shame] which a just man 
experiences when confronted by a crime committed by another, 
and he feels remorse because of its existence, because of its 
having been irrevocably introduced into the world of existing 
things, and because his will has proved non-existent or feeble 
and was incapable of putting up a good defence. "16 
Levi understands this, roughly, to be `a feeling of guilt'; but it is not 
comparable to the guilt of the perpetrators of the crimes. None the 
less there is, he affirms, something guilty, culpable, something 
negative with which the self alone cannot deal, about having been 
impotently present at, or a witness to, certain kinds of crime. 
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Survivor guilt, or shame, is more than this, however. There is 
something irredeemable about `having failed in terms of human 
solidarity' those whom one has survived. "Few survivors feel guilty 
about having deliberately damaged, robbed, or beaten a companion: 
those who did so... block out the memory; but by contrast almost 
everybody feels guilty of having omitted to offer help. "17 But such 
shame was not only known after liberation. Levi sees it as present 
in the many relatively unexplained and sudden deaths, deaths he 
attributes not to neurosis or the unnecessary worries of a tender 
conscience but to an "atavistic anguish, whose echo one hears in the 
second verse of Genesis". 18 
Shame may also be related to death in another way. Many survivors 
of Auschwitz and the other camps, including Levi himself, 
committed suicide. Analysis of individual cases is notoriously 
problematic but without pretending to make a scientific statement 
it is justifiable to mention shame and suicide in the same breath. 
While there are certain crimes for which the death penalty is upheld 
in some countries, thereby establishing a relation between guilt and 
death this is clearly a legal link. The link with shame, as Levi's 
account and the analysis of anorexia which will follow suggest, is 
much deeper than this. People may be executed because they are, 
rightly or wrongly, judged guilty of certain crimes, but they do not 
die of guilt. To die of shame however, has always seemed a 
possibility. 
31 The Psychology of Shame 
A relatively pioneering study into the nature and significance of 
shame was made in 1958 by Helen Lynd whose On Shame and the 
Search for Identity offers several arguments and insights the 
significance of which has only recently become fully apparent. 19 
Lynd makes the point that shame has been misunderstood when 
thought about as the moral emotion of relatively primitive societies 
and argues that what she calls the guilt axis is insufficient for the 
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interpretation of personality. 20 She goes on to stress, and this is a 
point to which we will return, that shame is not only a kind of self- 
consciousness but also that there is in analysing the experience of 
shame, the potential of revealing a good deal about the self. Indeed 
that there is something intrinsically revelatory about shame in that 
it is often precipitated by 'unexpected exposure'. What she has in 
mind here is not so much the simple exposure of the naked body, 
which can be of course a source of shame, but more the exposure of a 
more or less successfully hidden part of the self. Shame is 
therefore an unwelcome and surprising emotion, one which is about 
that which it is difficult to accept and which is therefore itself 
difficult to acknowledge. 
Lynd draws attention to the prevalence which shame has over guilt 
in both testaments of the Bible and in the writing of Shakespeare. 21 
This suggests that shame is an emotion of some depth and not, as 
some of the anthropologists of culture would suggest, a feature of 
merely heteronomous societies where the individual has no authority 
to be involved with the generation of ethics or where self- 
judgement would be impossible. Indeed it is one of the features of 
shame that a broad range of self-judgements can trigger it. Shame 
is elicited by incongruities, conceits and vanities in a whole range 
of areas. Weakness can be shameful, as can clumsiness as well as 
the revelation of true or deep motives which contradict an 
impression of being motivated in say, a more altruistic way. We are 
ashamed when we realise that we have been making decisions on 
what prove to be false assumptions or erroneous beliefs. "Doubt 
replacing basic trust in the way of life of one's social group or in 
one's place in it can undermine the sense of one's own identity. Thus 
shame, an experience of violation of trust in oneself and in the 
world, may go deeper than guilt for a simple act. "22 
Another feature of shame is that it involves the whole self. Many 
authors mention this. Anthony Giddens, for instance finds shame to 
20Her analysis of guilt and shame in terms of different explanatory axes is 
something which Giddens quotes and pursues in his exploration of self-concept in his 
Modernity and Self-Identity. 
21 Lynd, H. On Shame and the Search for Identity p25 
22Lynd, H. On Shame and the Search for Identity p47 
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be a particularly relevant emotion in his analysis of the 
contemporary predicaments of the self. As he puts it: "shame is 
essentially anxiety about the adequacy of the narrative by means of 
which the individual sustains a coherent biography"23 Lynd shows 
that this connects with the way in which shame is an unpleasant 
surprise. 
"One does not, as in guilt, choose to engage in a specific act, a 
sin. Guilt frequently involves a sort of haggling anxiety, a 
weighing up of pros and cons prolonged over a period of time. 
The shameful situation frequently takes one by surprise. But 
one is overtaken by shame because one's whole life has been a 
preparation for putting one in this situation. One finds oneself 
in a situation in which hopes and purposes are invested in 
which anxiety about one's own adequacy may also be felt... it is 
because of this whole-life involvement that one can speak of 
an over-all ashamedness. "24 (emphasis mine) 
It is this totality of shame which makes it so difficult to overcome. 
As Lynd puts it, there are mechanisms for dealing with guilt, be they 
confession, repentance, punishment or whatever, and the whole self 
can as it were set about the redemption of the part of the self which 
is guilty. But shame, "is not an isolated act that can be detached 
from the self ; the thing which is exposed is what I am". 25 
As we have noted shame has a complex relation to responsibility. 
One aspect of this is that shame can be experienced for non-culpable 
weakness or blameless, if naive, trust. Another aspect of this is 
that we can experience shame on behalf of others or through our 
relationship with them. Lynd draws attention to the shame which 
parents might experience through their children and children through 
their parents. But the circle of shame, she argues, is much wider 
than this and extends to the whole meaning of the universe or the 
nature of God. Such shame as this is deeply problematic because the 
individual is not responsible and yet is identified with that which is 
shamefully revealed. This draws attention to the associations of 
shame with powerlessness and vulnerability. 
23Giddens, A. Modernity and Self Identity p65 
24Lynd, H. On Shame and the Search for Identity p49/50 
25Lynd, H. On Shame and the Search for Identity p50 
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This is a central point in Bernard Williams' exposition of the 
meaning of shame. Williams argues against the Kantian view that 
guilt is the more sophisticated and honourable emotion: "In contrast 
to guilt, there is no need with shame that the viewer [or imagined 
interlocutor] should be angry or otherwise hostile. All that is 
necessary is that he should perceive that very situation or 
characteristic that the subject feels to be an inadequacy, failing or 
loss of power. "26 It follows that shame is in some ways quite 
narcissistic. It is the self which is the subject of attention, not, as 
it might be with guilt, the victim. But the significance of shame 
lies in its connection with precisely the self-consciousness which 
makes it possible to be a morally knowing subject. But this moral or 
self-knowingness is not straightforward. Lynd draws attention to 
the Biblical associations between shame, confounding and confusion 
and stresses that shame is difficult if not impossible to 
communicate. Shame often reveals personal inadequacy and this is 
difficult to communicate for two reasons. First because it will very 
likely be assumed that the peers with whom one communicates do 
not share the experience of having this personal weakness or failure 
revealed to them; that they are not in shame in this way. Secondly it 
is because shame is so broad and unlimitable. As has been pointed 
out already, one is not ashamed so much of a particular action or 
failure as of the self which was revealed when the action was made. 
As Lynd points out there is the potential for tragedy in this because 
incommunicable shame brings us close to precisely the kind of 
isolation and loneliness which modern analysts, both Marxist and 
existentialist, have suspected their culture of producing. As Gerhart 
Piers has argued, "The unconscious, irrational threat implied in 
shame anxiety is abandonment, and not mutilation (castration) as in 
guilt. "27 . Moreover, argues 
Lynd, shame is associated not with 
hatred or retribution, but with contempt. As Piers has it, the law of 
the talion applies to guilt but not to shame. 28 
26Williams, B. Shame and Necessity (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press) 
1993 p221 
27Piers, G. and Singer, M. B. Shame and Guilt: A Psychoanalytic and Cultural Study 
(New York: W. W. Norton and Co. ) 1971 Edition p24 
28ibid. 
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For some writers the narcissistic aspects of shame render it an 
unattractive emotion. June Tangney calls it `an ugly feeling' in her 
report of a psychometric study on the correlations between guilt- 
proneness, shame-proneness and empathic responsiveness as 
aspects of personality. 29 The picture which emerges from this is 
there are significant correlations between guilt-proneness and 
shame-proneness. But while guilt-proneness is positively 
correlated with other-oriented empathic responsiveness, shame- 
proneness has a negative correlation. 
It is for this reason that Tangney speaks of finding a new dimension 
to the ugliness of shame and claims to have rehabilitated guilt. But 
her point is over-stated. Certainly there is something narcissistic 
or at least highly self-interested about being prone to shame. But 
shame is not only experienced by those who are particularly prone to 
it. Certainly the person who is habitually ashamed must be in a 
sense highly interested in themselves, or alternatively, that person 
would find it hard to be interested in the lot of others because so 
much energy was being consumed by shame. But this is a reflection 
not on the experience of shame in normal individuals but on the 
empathy of people who are typically inclined to shame. Tangney is 
not entitled to conclude that shame is ugly, indeed her study does 
not look in any particular depth at the phenomenology of normal 
shame. Her only legitimate conclusion is the somewhat predictable 
one that an emotionality focused on the self is not an emotionality 
focused either on the needy or the victimised other: that to be prone 
to shame is to be narcissistic. 
In a review of both theoretical and empirical psychological work on 
the subject of the moral emotions Helen Lewis surveys recent 
psychological writing on guilt and shame and acknowledges that the 
situation is truly confused. 30 Guilt and shame can and do occur 
together and subjects do not necessarily distinguish reliably 
between these emotions. Some clear differences can be identified 
at the psychological level, however: 
29Tangey, J. P. 'Moral Effect: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly' p600 
30Lewis, 'H. B. Some Thoughts on the Moral Emotions of Shame and Guilt' in Eds 
Crillo et al Emotions in Ideal Human Development (London: Lawrence Erlbaum) 
1989 
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"Shame... is likely to be evoked not only by moral transgression 
but also by the experience of failure... Shame is directly about 
the whole self. It is the vicarious experience of the other's 
scorn of the self... Shame can be evoked by being looked at... 
Shame is contagious... When in a state of shame the self feels 
helpless, as if paralysed... Because it is only about the self, 
shame is simultaneously felt as an inappropriate, subjective 
reaction, which in turn evokes more shame. "31 
Guilt, on the other hand: 
"is about things done or not done in the world... guilt has an 
objective quality... It involves less disorganisation of the 
self, more rational ideation, more of a feeling of an intact self 
that is responsible both for the transgression and for making 
amends... In guilt the self is compelled to do something in 
order to undo the wrong... there is some element of moral 
elevation for the self in being in the state of guilt and in 
effecting the required reparations. "32 
Lewis' conclusions are good summaries of recent psychological work 
in this area. But it is not only psychologists who have taken an 
interest in shame and guilt, and our attention now turns to consider 
the philosophical analysis of Gabrielle Taylor. 
3. ii. The Philosophy of Guilt and Shame Gabrielle 
Taylor 
Gabrielle Taylor's concern in her monograph on the emotions of self- 
appraisal is to relate not only the emotions mentioned but also 
humiliation and remorse within the framework of the meaning of 
personal integrity and a reflection on the ideas of self-esteem and 
self-respect. 33 Her argument is less important for our purposes 
than her phenomenology of shame and guilt. Her approach differs 
from that of the psychologists in that she is neither concerned with 
empirical data nor with psychotherapy. Nor does she consider the 
self-assessment of the neurotically guilty, especially as this has 
31 Lewis, H. B. 'Some Thoughts on the Moral Emotions of Shame and Guilt' p40 
32Lewis, H. B. 'Some Thoughts on the Moral Emotions of Shame and Guilt' p41 
33Taylor, G. Pride, Shame and Guilt (Oxford: Clarendon Press)1985 All the 
references to Taylor in this chapter refer to this book 
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been so important in psychology of all kinds. Her real interest is in 
the logic of self-assessment rather than the emotionality of the 
subject. The focus of concern and value is in the precise and lucid 
handling of concepts of self-understanding and appraisal. 
3. ii. a. Shame 
There are, she argues, two elements in the simple cases of shame: 
`There is firstly the self-directed adverse judgement of the person 
feeling shame... the identificatory belief. Second there is the notion 
of the audience. "34 Therefore, "it requires a sophisticated type of 
self-consciousness... one which relies on the concept of another. "35 
But it is the self-consciousness, not the audience, which is crucial 
for shame. 
Shame is contrasted with embarrassment. 36 In embarrassment the 
audience plays an important role, making it difficult for the subject 
to know how to extricate himself from a particular situation. The 
audience requires a response and the subject, because embarrassed, 
does not know how to provide one. In shame the subject is shocked 
in a moment of exposure whereas in embarrassment the subject is 
locked in a moment or more of incompetence or impotence. 37 
Embarrassment may be dissolved by a change in circumstances, but 
shame is not so situation specific. Those who know shame do so 
because they have perceived themselves. Those who have been 
embarrassed have been caught not by personal failing but awkward 
circumstances, and so do not have their self-understanding radically 
challenged. This is not to say, of course that the two are completely 
independent. Shame and embarrassment can occur simultaneously, 
and one might believe that one should have been able to respond. But 
this does not invalidate the distinction. 
Taylor resists the idea that shame is only sometimes a moral 
emotion, the view of Rawls and others, predicated on the 
understanding that it is only sometimes to do with the failing by 
34Taylor, G. p64 
35Taylor, G. p67 
36Taylor, G. pp68-76 
37Taylor, G. p74 
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specifically moral standards. Her view, which anticipates her 
conclusions concerning the nature of integrity as to do with 
wholeness as much as with conscientiousness, is that: 
"there is no reason to deny that shame in all its occurrences is 
a moral emotion, provided that morality is not thought of just 
in terms of adhering to or breaking certain moral rules, but is 
taken to include personal morality, a person's own view of how 
he ought to live and what he ought to be. "38 
The distinction between self-respect and self-esteem is important 
here, and a crucial difference between Taylor and Rawls. For Rawls 
there is no distinction whereas for Taylor they do differ and shame 
is primarily related to self-respect. Indeed shame and self-respect 
are fundamentally related. 
"[If] someone has self-respect then under certain specifiable 
conditions he will be feeling shame. A person has no self- 
respect if he regards no circumstances as shame producing. 
Loss of self-respect and loss of the capacity for feeling shame 
go hand in hand. The close connection between these two 
makes clear why shame is often thought to be so valuable. "39 
One might think of the despairing rhetorical remark'have you no 
shame? ' which echoes the words of the prophet Zephaniah, "The 
unjust knows no shame" (Zephaniah 3: 5) and clearly means, 'has no 
self-respect'. 
It is precisely because a person thinks of himself or herself as being 
of value that they experience both shame and self-respect. Self- 
esteem may drop, and the self's confidence and membership of a 
group with shared values may be threatened but, "shame is the 
emotion of self-protection"40. In shame the person holds on both to 
the person he once was and also to the values of the society or 
culture which he has transgressed or of which he has fallen short. 
By experiencing shame the potential outcast affirms his own status 
as a member: 
38Taylor, G. p77 
39Taylor, G. p80 
40Taylor, G. p81 
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"Shame can be seen as a moral emotion, then, not because 
sometimes or even often it is felt when the person believes 
himself to have done something morally wrong, but rather 
because the capacity for feeling shame is so closely related to 
the possession of self-respect and thereby to the agent's 
values. "41 
3. ii. b. Guilt 
Taylor's concern is with what she calls real guilt, that which comes 
from breaking some kind of law. Indeed she considers guilt to be a 
'legal concept'. The concept of authority is important here, in a way 
which is analogous to the role of audience in shame. Taylor tends 
towards a rational understanding but she concedes that guilt is an 
emotion and therefore cannot be reduced to being the consequence of 
thought-out responses to situations. She notes, for instance that 
one may continue to feel guilt about transgressing a law after one 
has discarded the conditions which made the law valid or 
appropriate; one may feel guilty, for instance about not attending 
church on Sunday having discarded the religion with which one grew 
up. Whether this time-lag is merely due to the relative half-life of 
an emotion as compared to a decision is a matter which she does not 
discuss. She seems to suppose a bi-partite conscience with a 
rational and an irrational part, the first making decisions and the 
second carrying emotional vestiges. But this is psychologically 
simplistic. Human decision making and emotionality is much more 
complex and much more profoundly connected than her interpretation 
at this point suggests. 
But the authority, the context of which makes for guilt, need not be 
external or moral or have the status of a law. One might feel guilty 
for wasting one's time or abilities. Thus guilt is not necessarily a 
result of doing something which is of harm to others as some have 
argued and others assumed. "What is important for guilt is just that 
some form of action or abstention should present itself as 
obligatory to the agent". 42 In this way guilt is like shame. 
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To be guilty is to be liable to punishment. In this way it is different 
to shame. Also, breaking a law is what Taylor calls 'localised'. 
"Given that he has at one time broken the law it does not follow that 
he has also broken others, or that he will go on breaking the law. "43 
Thus feelings of guilt can be contrasted with those of shame: guilt 
is to do with what one has or has not done, whereas shame has to do 
with who one is. These two differences interact so that while it is 
possible to make up for what one has done wrong, that for which one 
feels guilt, by experiencing punishment, no such option is available 
for those who feel shame: "there is nothing to be done, and it is 
best to withdraw and not to be seen. This is the typical reaction 
when feeling shame. Neither punishment nor forgiveness can here 
perform a function. "44 
3. ii. c. The Self in Shame and Guilt 
According to Taylor the self is regarded very differently in guilt and 
shame: "In shame I see myself all of a piece, what I have just done, 
I now see, fits only too well what I really am. But when feeling 
guilty I think of myself as having brought about a forbidden state of 
affairs and thereby in this respect disfigured a self which otherwise 
remains the same" 45 Taylor also discusses the relationship 
between guilt and remorse. Guilt is an emotion of self-assessment, 
`I am guilty'; whereas remorse is a moral emotion, `I feel remorse'. 
Guilt concentrates on the agent and remorse on the deed. 
Taylor discusses forgiveness in the context of the relation between 
guilt and remorse. The guilty can seek forgiveness, which she 
defines as the restoration of relationship with one wronged, but if 
there is no remorse, no 'change of heart' on the agent's part, then the 
would-be forgiver does not forgive the offender but condones him. 
To be forgiven the agent must `be sincere in wishing the deed 
undone', and this must involve feeling remorse. Remorse is also 
important in 'self-forgiveness'. If the agent is to live with himself 
in the future of a true offence he must have a sense of remorse. So 
Scheler's view is not completely unhelpful: there must be a genuine 
43Taylor, G. p89 
44Taylor, G p90 
45Taylor, G. p92 
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and primary concern for the damage done to the other for 
forgiveness of self by self and by the other to proceed. 
But according to Taylor there are exceptions. There are 
circumstances in which forgiveness may occur without remorse and 
yet not be condonation. However, there can be no self-forgiveness 
which does not include remorse. 
According to Taylor shame and guilt are both 'essentially connected' 
with integrity, though connected in different ways. While in shame 
the connection is through self-respect, in guilt it is through the 
disformation of the self. "Guilt is different to shame in that it is 
not felt at the recognition of the failure of the worthy self, but is 
felt rather at the recognition of the emergence of a worse self. "46 
The relation of shame to failure is crucial: 
"Shame is always felt about some failure [to have or to live up 
to certain values] and so the self always appears weak and 
ineffectual. For this reason there is in cases of shame a loss 
of confidence in either his (the agent's) values or in his 
capacity to live up to them which is not found in cases of 
guilt. "47 
4. SHAME AS ENERGY: AN INTERPRETATION OF ANOREXIA 
NERVOSA 
The condition anorexia nervosa is as Anthony Giddens has argued, "a 
pathology of reflexive self-control, operating around an axis of self- 
identity and bodily appearance, in which shame anxiety plays a 
preponderant role. "48 No thorough analysis of the role of shame in 
anorexia has been made nor has any attempt been made to enquire 
more deeply into the nature of shame by a consideration of the 
phenomenology of anorexia. Both of these tasks are attempted in 
this section which is an examination of the dynamics of shame 
which, as we have already seen, are profoundly different to those of 
guilt. 
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A cultural reading of the significance of anorexia, which involves 
both psychological and sociological insights is provided in Susie 
Orbach's book Hunger Strike. 49 Orbach's argument is that anorexia is 
a culturally located pathology which has its origins in the way in 
which women's bodies are `commodotised' and women's desires and 
natural appetites denied. It is in this way that she sees it as `a 
metaphor for our times': "The starvation amdist plenty, the denial 
set against desire, the striving for invisibility versus the wish to be 
seen - these key features of anorexia - are a metaphor for our 
age. "5o 
Orbach suggests that the typical development of anorexia involves a 
narrative which begins with an individual who is self-conscious and 
ashamed but without identifiable reason or responsibility. In 
response to this the incipient anorexic characteristically begins to 
pay progressively more and more attention to lifestyle in general 
and diet and bodily regime in particular. This continues until the 
process of control becomes, as it were, a subject in its own right. 
Until, that is, her way of living becomes a parasitic self-system 
which is nourished and nurtured at the expense of the true, bodily 
self. Rather than identify with the body the person gets a sense of 
himself or herself through the control which they exercise over 
their body so that in the end, and this is why anorexia is a tragically 
fatal condition, the person is affirmed to the exact extent to which 
the body is denied. 
Orbach presents a case study which exemplifies this process. It is 
the case of Lisa who had a long history of problematic eating and a 
sense of being ill at ease with her body. She felt herself to be 
49Orbach, S. Hunger Strike (London: Faber and Faber) 1986 
50Orbach, S. Hunger Strike p24 
Orbach's reading of anorexia is not entirely adequate as a complete account of the 
condition. The most striking reason being that she offers a feminist analysis of what 
she perceives as an exclusively women's problem. This is to deny the significance of 
anorexia as it affects men, and while there are fewer male anorexics the fact that 
they have a lower survival rate than women makes them disproportionately 
significant. In using Orbach's analysis I shall not be adopting the detail of the 
argument as it concerns the relation between women and food and body image but 
engaging at a slightly less problematic more abstract level. 
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chaotic inside and 'in a mess'. "51 Lisa's life stabilised when she 
married an accountant with an orderly if unexciting personality but 
when she was twenty six that marriage broke up and she 'drifted 
towards anorexia'. 
"Although she initiated the break up, the effects of it left her 
devastated. She felt guilt and insecurity at the same time. 
She began to believe that she was the rejected one and she felt 
herself flailing about. She was nervous about being single and 
in the position of looking for a partner. She couldn't bear to 
feel so exposed and vulnerable. 
As she began to scrutinise what was wrong with her, she 
decided it was her body, and that she would be more acceptable 
and appear less needy if she could resemble the untouchable 
ladies stalking the pages of Vogue. She got slimmer and 
slimmer and, having a large frame, she looked longer and 
longer and increasingly remote and untouchable. She developed 
disdain for food and those who ate, including the part of her 
that expressed such a basic need. Food and eating, previously 
experienced as soothing and potentially pleasurable, turned 
into dangerous and contemptible activities. Because she was 
really very hungry and used to relating to food in a positive 
way, she had to work hard to repress her impulses towards 
food. To this end, she developed a series of rituals, such as 
only eating one egg a day divided into four sections, each of 
which had to be eaten with a minimum space of four hours 
between them.. . [other rituals mentioned here]. "52 
For Orbach, anorexia has to do with overcoming a sense of alienation 
from the world. "Anorexia is an attempted solution to being in a 
world from which at the most profound level one feels excluded, and 
into which one feels deeply unentitled to enter. "53 But while Orbach 
does go on to analyse this sense in terms of a missing self-esteem 
or sense of entitlement she does not take the obvious step of 
considering anorexia as a shame pathology. Once this step is taken 
however it becomes clear that there is a significant contrast 
between the problem of shame which lies behind anorexia and that of 
guilt with regard to eating which is nearer the surface. 
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Eating is central to the anorectic process because it changes both 
the internal state and the external form of the body. This shift of 
attention from the body in general to the act of eating in particular 
is a shift from the deep problem of shame to a more superficial 
problem of guilt. The anorexic's regimes of diet and exercise and 
interest in food are fuelled by shame. The anorexic will not, 
however, report the original problem of shame but draw attention to 
the guilt experienced as a result of transgressing or being tempted 
to transgress an aspect of the self-imposed asceticism. 
Shame, the emotion of being unacceptable, is itself unacceptable. 
As a consequence the self-conscious subject experiencing shame- 
anxiety characteristically seeks to transform unacceptable shame 
into the acceptable emotion of guilt. In the case of the anorexic this 
may be part of the attempt to gain control over the body and thereby 
to generate both a sense of responsibility and therefore personhood. 
But the generation of guilt is also (on Taylor's view) the 
development a bad alien-self alongside the proper self. This self 
will carry the guilt associated with eating and exists so long as the 
true self can be comforted by the way in which the proximate but 
alien guilty self relativises the shame of the real self. 
It is the fuelling of guilt by shame which makes anorexia tragic. The 
self, perplexed and anxious about being itself, is lost as soon as it 
attempts to deal with this anxiety by a process of control. This is 
the way in which anorexia is different to objective dieting. In the 
latter case the individual would be seeking a body image which, if 
achieved, would be a source of pride. It can therefore lead to a 
process of control which, when followed, gives positive feelings 
while the transgression of which is a source of real but manageable 
guilt. In anorexia a shame anxiety which attaches to the whole self 
is transferred to a punitive guilt which attaches to aspects of daily 
life. The object of the regime is thus punishment and self harm, the 
motivation self-hatred and the result of transgression is an 
increase in the rigour of the regime. 
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The case against coping with shame by transmuting it into guilt is 
thus very strong. The example of anorexia is sociologically 
important because of its special relation to the modern condition of 
the self's responsibility for its own construction being placed in the 
context of what Giddens calls 'a dazzling plurality of options for the 
self', but it is theologically important because the control of self 
through pathological regimes of exercise and eating is a particularly 
complex form of the idea of justification by works which has its 
roots in the sub-narratives of Eden. 
It is reasonable to see that the dissipation of real guilt through the 
making of reparations, or apologising or whatever can be positive, 
that it can involve `an element of moral elevation'. Gabrielle Taylor 
also makes the point that guilt can be consistent with, even a source 
of, pride. But this is not possible in the case of guilt which is 
focused shame. The actions which this motivates are always going 
to be interpreted in the worst possible light by the cynical self. 
Thus the cruel dynamics of perfectionism are set in place. Work 
leading to failure leading to the demand for more work leading to 
further failure... But this, tragic as it is, is only a personal or social 
tragedy. The graver matter is the cultural and religious travesty 
which lies behind it; that which forces shame to be ashamed of 
itself and which thereby makes it an engine of guilt. This is the 
most vicious circle within which a religion or culture can capture 
itself and is precisely the kind of situation which a gospel of 
forgiveness must be able to break. 
5. SHAME AND THE CONFESSION OF SIN D. BONHOEFFER 
I have been arguing that shame is an extremely important emotion of 
self assessment with the intent of introducing the question of 
whether or not the Christian rhetoric and rituals of forgiveness are 
able to meet the reality of the shameful person. Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
paid considerable attention to shame in his Ethics seeing it as the 
primary moral and ontological category. 54 He understands the fall to 
have been a change in the focus of human attention. A human being's 
life is, in knowledge of good and evil, a life of disunion with God. 
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Whereas before his attention was on God, now it is on the self so 
that divine contemplation is replaced by self-consciousness and 
self-knowledge. The good and evil which human beings know is not 
the good and evil which God knows but the good and evil which is 
known from the point of estrangement with God. It is therefore 
`against God'. 
Shame is the self-consciousness of fallen person: "Shame is man's 
ineffaceable recollection of his estrangement from the origin; it is 
grief for this estrangement, and the powerless longing to return to 
unity with the origin. "55 There is more ontology than psychology in 
this, but the logic of the position is clear. "Man is ashamed because 
he has lost something which is essential to his original character, 
to himself as a whole; he is ashamed of his nakedness". 56 This is 
consistent with Taylor's understanding of shame as consciousness 
of disformation. The emphasis is on self-consciousness gained 
through awareness of the perception of another who has a different 
vantage point. For Bonhoeffer the significant thing is that man 
realises that his point of view is no longer that of God's; for 
Gabrielle Taylor the point would be that the deity is perceived as 
audience. 
Shame is important for Bonhoeffer. It is, for instance, to be 
distinguished from remorse: "Man feels remorse when he has been 
at fault; and he feels shame because he lacks something. Shame is 
more original than remorse". 57 He interprets the attempt to cover 
the nakedness with aprons as, "confirmation of the disunion that has 
occurred"58. The fact that disunion is disunion means that a damage 
has been done which cannot be repaired. 
To be covered is not to be hypocritical, however. Bonhoeffer's view 
is that privacy and modesty are theologically required and 
spiritually valuable. "Covering is necessary because it keeps awake 
shame, and with it the memory of disunion with the origin, and also 
55Bonhoeffer, D. Ethics p6 
56ibid. 
57ibid. 
58Bonhoeffer, D. Ethics p7 
249 
Guilt and Shame 
because man, disunited as he is, must now withdraw himself and 
live in concealment. "59 Bonhoeffer reflects on the privacy sought in 
sexual union and prayer and considers this evidence of the shame 
perceived not so much in the attempt to overcome disunion as in the 
fact of the disunion. 
"Shame implies both a positive and a negative attitude to man's 
disunion, and that is why man lives between covering and 
discovering, between self-concealment and self-revelation, between 
solitude and fellowship. "60 Bonhoeffer's interpretation of the 
complicated dialectic between solitude and fellowship is revealed in 
an editor's footnote which refers to his disapproval of the way in 
which people express and share their fear after an air-raid. 61 He 
believes that ontological shame requires of us a reticence in self- 
disclosure of this kind. It is as if he feels that there must be a 
confession of disunity in the whole of social life. `The secrecy of 
shame remains outspread over the creative power of man which 
comes to him in the self-sought union of the disunited. It is the 
memory of the disunion from the Creator, and the robbery from the 
Creator which is here disclosed. "62 
Bonhoeffer's theology of shame thus becomes a theological critique 
of emotional intimacy as well as a theological justification of 
privacy. But at this point he goes far beyond the implications of his 
position into an assertion of a particular understanding of 
appropriate emotional distance. Bonhoeffer has raised a difficult 
question: does human shame have any implications for the way in 
which people should construct and maintain inter-personal 
distance? And, what is it appropriate for people to reveal to each 
other in various circumstances? This is also a question about self- 
knowledge and self-consciousness. Bonhoeffer's suggestion, if it is 
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62Bonhoeffer, D. Ethics p8 
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A different point concerns the significance of the emotion of shame 
in a cultural context where the self is not thought of as being a 
given which it is possible to explore and know, but as a construction. 
When self-identity is understood to be a construction then the self 
is responsible in a special way. When the self is not convinced that 
it has exercised this responsibility well it becomes subject to 
shame and its pathological legacies. 63 These are, as Helen Lewis has 
clarified, quite different from the products of guilt. "Shame and 
self-directed hostility very often occur together (whereas guilt is 
associated with hostility directed outward)"64. Moreover she points 
out the difference in the susceptibility to shame and guilt and their 
respective pathologies in men and women. While shame is related to 
depression, and this makes sense through the idea of the 
disorganised, demoralised and self-conscious self, guilt is related 
to the more schizoid conditions. The respective routes which men 
and women characteristically take to madness are through the 
failure of the sexes to cope with different contradictions. For 
women, who are more likely to become depressives: 
"the affectionateness that is their heritage and that they are 
taught to cultivate is turned to dross by a massive devaluation 
and sentimentalising of feeling in a warring, male dominated 
culture. This contradiction can transform shame into 
depression. For men, the contradiction between their natural 
affectionateness and the aggressions they are taught to value 
- the contradiction between being tender and the requirement 
that they be tough - transforms guilt into an insoluble 
dilemma of forbidden action that is somehow compellingly 
required. "65 
This suggests a feminist critique of Bonhoeffer. If women are prone 
to shame and depression then this is certainly a problem associated 
with their sense of themselves. But while it might seem that the 
answer to this is to be found in the Bonhoefferian suggestion of 
privacy, modesty and social distance this is just an appearance. The 
reality is that the suggestion is not an answer but a denial of the 
63Giddens makes the point that shame is of particular significance in late-modernity 
as the burden of this responsibility is particularly relevant. Giddens, A. Modernity 
and Self-Identity 
64Lewis, H. B. 'Some Thoughts on the Moral Emotions of Shame and Guilt' p41 
65Lewis, H. B. 'Some Thoughts on the Moral Emotions of Shame and Guilt' p47/48 
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problem. Self-consciousness leading to shame and depression needs 
to be redeemed. There is nothing to be gained by men, whose 
characteristic fault is pride, suggesting that such self- 
consciousness is misplaced. The challenge to the theology of 
forgiveness is to open up a healing trajectory for the person who is 
anxious on account not of what they have done but because of who 
they are, not on account of blemishes on their soul but on account of 
what they see in the mirror. It seems profoundly unlikely that this 
path will be opened up by censuring intimacy or discourse about the 
self. It is more likely to come about through attentive affirmation 
and a transformation of the negative feelings associated with the 
sense of self. 
For Bonhoeffer, however, shame is to be overcome only through an 
experience of judgement which is a restoration of original unity. 
"Shame is overcome only in the enduring act of final shaming, 
namely the becoming manifest of knowledge before God... 
Shame is overcome only in the shaming through the forgiveness 
of sin, that is to say through the restoration of fellowship 
with God and men. This is accomplished in confession before 
God and before other men. "66 
Forgiveness for Bonhoeffer is a `clothing' not with aprons but with, 
"Christ's blood and righteousness. "67 
Bonhoeffer's convictions about oral confession are surprising not so 
much because of Bonhoeffer's Lutheran background, as we have seen 
Martin Luther favoured the practice, but because of his views about 
conscience. While Roman Catholic theory has a high doctrine of 
conscience and sees conscience as integral to the practice and 
pedagogy of confession, Bonhoeffer, as we have seen, takes a low 
view of it as a self-regarding form of knowledge. In conscience it is 
man's disunity with himself which is significant. Conscience is 
negative, it permits all that it does not prohibit. It therefore 
perpetuates the lie that there can be good in disunity with God. 
"Conscience pretends to be the voice of God and the standard for the 
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relation to other men. "68 Conscience sets a high store on the quality 
of its understanding of the relation of good and evil. "Bearing 
within himself the knowledge of good and evil, man has become 
judge over God and men, just as he is judge over himself. "69 The 
power of conscience is destructive: "drawing all things into the 
process of disunion". 70 Conscience is the vanity of a shameful 
species: "Knowledge now means the establishment of the 
relationship to oneself; it means the recognition in all things of 
oneself and of oneself in all things. "71 
This brief description has disclosed an apparent inconsistency in 
Bonhoeffer's theology and ethics. First, while he stresses shame in 
his ethics when he comes to talking about the mediation of 
forgiveness it is confession and absolution which is his favoured 
model. The paradox is that this is the model based on the idea of sin 
as guilt, and responsibility as something which is held for discrete 
actions. The second apparent inconsistency is that while he values 
confession as a way of dealing with guilt he disavows the 
significance of conscience which is necessary to confession because 
it is a form of self-knowledge, which, according to his views on 
shame, is a sign of irredeemable disunion. 
But these inconsistencies are only apparent because there is in 
Bonhoeffer's approach to these matters an implicit development. To 
begin with he sees confession not as a matter of dealing with the 
guilty conscience by itemising all faults on the basis of a well 
formed and carefully examined conscience. Rather he sees it as an 
act of shaming which puts an end to shame. This is a helpful insight 
which is, interestingly, consistent with Rahner's oft-repeated 
remark that the history of penance is misunderstood if thought to 
fall into the two eras of public and private penance. The crucial 
division is into two eras, but what distinguishes them is whether or 
not confession and absolution can be repeated. Rahner's point is that 
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confession is always in some sense public - and it is for reasons 
associated with this that we can say that it is always shameful. 
But the implications of thinking of confession and absolution, the 
sacrament of penance in terms of dealing with shame rather than 
guilt are very considerable and will form the beginnings of our 
conclusion in which we will bring together the fruits of the 
arguments in the various aspects of forgiveness considered in the 
different chapters. 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has been an examination of the nature and the 
theological significance of shame and guilt. It has often been argued 
and assumed that Christianity is a `guilt religion', in which the 
moral issue for the human subject has been to live with the 
consequences of having transgressed objective commandments. Such 
a view however ignores the significance of the moral and emotional 
reality of shame. 
The differences between shame and guilt have been explored in 
psychological and philosophical analyses. Among the many points 
made those which suggest different relations to the self are most 
relevant to this study. Shame and self-respect co-exist in a 
mutually reinforcing system which supports an ethic of 
responsibility and integrity. Guilt, contrary to the assumption of 
many anthropologists, can reveal an ethical system which is more 
heteronomous and in which the potential for independence or even 
individualism is reduced. 
Shame is a peculiarly difficult and complex emotion, however, in 
that it has a strange relationship with itself so that there are ways 
in which shame, the emotion of being discovered, disclosed or 
observed is something which it is difficult to acknowledge. The fact 
that only shame can be ashamed of itself points to the important 
relationship between shame and the coherence and integrity of the 
self. 
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The relationship between shame and guilt can be seen to be 
pathological when it is observed that unacknowledged shame can 
fuel guilt. This was observed in the phenomenology of anorexia 
nervosa but can be a feature of any system which allows for guilt 
and its remission, punishment or forgiveness but where shame is not 
acknowledged. 
Finally there was a consideration of Bonhoeffer's thought about the 
ethical significance of shame which suggested that it might indeed 
have an important role in forgiveness. He considered confession as a 
healing encounter with shame rather than as an act of guilt 
acknowledgement. 
Just as many have assumed that Christianity is a 'guilt religion' so 
too have many supposed that Christian forgiveness has primarily to 
do with the removal of guilt. The final chapter of this work shows 
that when shame is given due weight in human ethics, emotionality 
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This attempt to gain a synoptic overview of the Christian idea of 
forgiveness has involved the scrutiny of some very diverse sources. 
In this way the current work is quite different from recent 
philosophical writing on forgiveness, such as Haber's Forgiveness, 
which was discussed in chapter three, which approaches the subject 
in a much more idealised and limited way. Haber's driving question 
concerns the ethics of interpersonal forgiveness. His interest is in 
the morality of an injured person who offers forgiveness. 
This work is dealing with issues which are at once more 
anthropological and more theological than Haber's. The dominant 
question here concerns whether the Christian idea of forgiveness 
makes theological sense. The question has been approached by 
considering the way in which the word forgiveness features in the 
gospels and in contemporary theology and ethics. But the work has 
also involved studies of atonement theology as well as of liturgies 
of forgiveness. 
That differences are found between the way in which forgiveness 
language is used in these areas should cause no surprise. The 
interesting question concerns whether or not there are sufficiently 
meaningful connections between the way in which forgiveness 
language is used in the different areas as to render it meaningful to 
talk of the coherence of forgiveness. This is important for Christian 
theology partly because the word forgiveness is found in such 
different environments and contexts. The centrality which the idea 
is estimated to have in Christian theology and ethics adds to the 
importance of the subject, as does the premium which is placed on 
connecting the forgiveness of God of an individual with the 
forgiveness of others by that individual in the teaching of the 
synoptic gospels. 
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The purpose of this conclusion is to draw together various of the 
observations made and conclusions drawn in the foregoing chapters. 
In order to do this I will discuss the meaning of forgiveness with 
regard to others, time, God and self. 
1. FORGIVENESS AND OTHERS 
In the first chapter I argued that Matthew and Luke understood the 
connection between being forgiven and forgiving others in different 
ways. The Matthean understanding is that it is necessary to forgive 
others in order to be forgiven by God. The Lucan understanding is 
that the experience of forgiveness is the inspiration of further acts 
of forgiveness. Such differences are neither contradictory nor 
paradoxical but complementary. Both suggest that forgiveness is 
not an end in itself but necessarily has its origins and its effects 
outside the moment or episode in which it occurs. This observation 
suggests that forgiveness is not so much connected with the rest of 
life as characteristically embedded within it. 
In the third chapter I reviewed the ethical tradition of writing on 
forgiveness and noted some of its more important distinctions, 
particularly those between pardon, condonation, excuse and 
forgiveness. The distinction between pardon and forgiveness was a 
most helpful analytical tool when it came to interpreting the famous 
story told by Simon Wiesenthal in The Sunflower. The point was not 
so much that Wiesenthal had not found it in his heart to forgive but 
that he had been asked to pardon Karl and correctly failed to find 
himself authorised to do so. 
The analysis of forgiveness and similar concepts does not, however, 
remove the need for a category of exchange which is properly called 
forgiveness. Two questions about this are important in 
philosophical ethics, and they are important enough for there to be a 
range of answers. The first question concerns the nature of 
forgiveness and the second is the relation between forgiveness and 
justice. 
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For Bishop Butler forgiveness was the forswearing of resentment, 
and this is by far the most important definition in this area. 
Various ethicists discuss the grounds of such forswearing and take 
up different views on the value and nature of repentance, apology 
and what is called old time's sake, but which might better be 
thought of as the relation between the offence and the relationship 
in which it occurs. 
Another approach to forgiveness is the neo-Augustinian notion of 
hating the sin while loving the sinner. Forgiveness is the attempt to 
maintain a positive relationship with an offender, or at least the 
attempt to maintain a sense of that person's objective and 
inalienable value, while recognising that because they have offended 
or transgressed the law at the expense of another they must be 
punished. This is the terminus of an ethics based on retributive or 
punitive justice. In this context resentment is not forsworn but 
attached to one limited aspect of the offender's biography. 
This approach is helpful in as much as it draws attention to the fact 
that the person is of greater significance than being merely the 
agent of offence or injury. Its weakness is that it does little more 
than allow for the contextualising of the offence in the greater 
narrative of the offender's personhood. In some cases this may well 
effect a forgiveness-like response from the offended, but it equally 
may not. Indeed it is this absence of forgiveness which seems to 
make it attractive to those who, like Jean Hampton, seek to preserve 
the claims of justice in the face of forgiveness. But the 
contextualising of the offence in the autobiography of the offender 
is in many cases a strategy for excuse. In order for genuine 
forgiveness to occur the offence must be recontextualised not in the 
life-story of either offended or offender but in the relationship 
between the two. 
It is partly for this reason that forgiveness can be a legitimate 
response to apology or to an intimation of repentance, however 
subtle, on the part of the offender. The value of such intimations 
and words lies not, pace Swinburne and many others who speak of 
the need for some sacrifice or costliness, in some token of 
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sincerity, but in the freedom with which the apology or repentance 
is offered. This, is evident from our reading of the tragedy of Paula 
in Death and the Maiden. Her situation is unresolvable, her suffering 
unredeemable, unless her torturer confesses and repents. But 
although she has ultimate physical power over him, she has a gun at 
his head, this reversal of power is not able to precipitate the 
reversal of her pain and suffering. She knows that she cannot 
forgive, which would be as much a release for her as for him, unless 
he repents. For her to pardon or excuse would be to condone and to 
become, as it were, a complicit partner in her own torture. 
2. FORGIVENESS AND TIME 
The distinction between pro-active and reconciliatory forgiveness 
made in chapter five is helpful in clarifying a confusion which 
occurs with regard to the New Testament. Jesus is very often 
portrayed as a pro-active forgiver, whereas much of the writing of 
Paul, and indeed of subsequent atonement theology, is concerned 
with reconciliatory forgiveness. 
The problems with pro-active forgiveness are those of any form of 
pardon: authority and justice. Of these it is only that of authority 
which is raised in the gospels. This question is clearly central to 
the evangelical message which concerns the nature of Jesus Christ. 
'Who can forgive sins but God alone? ' is the primary leading question 
in the gospels. Of more interest at this stage of our enquiry, 
however, is the absence of the question of justice. This is partly 
explained by the fullness of the narrative context in which episodes 
of pro-active forgiveness occur. As we have seen, in the teaching 
and action of Jesus forgiveness is not necessarily a response to 
repentance. This point has been made in two recent books by E. P. 
Sanders. ' Sanders' point is that, contrary to more common 
interpretation, Jesus was not intending to love the sinners, such as 
Zacchaeus, into repentance, rather that his demand was that they 
accept and follow him. His forgiveness was pro-active, his. seeking 
1 Sanders, E. P. Jesus and Judaism (London: SCM) 1985; It is noteworthy that such is 
the resistance to this conclusion in some of his readers that he takes great pains to 
explain it most clearly in a sequel to his original study: Sanders, E. P. The Historical 
Figure of Jesus (London, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press) 1993 
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after them offensive. Certainly it was the case that Zacchaeus 
repented, but this was the significance of the event more for Luke 
and the early Church. For Jesus the significance was that Zacchaeus 
accepted his pro-active forgiveness. 
This question of forgiveness and time can be criticised in the 
language of either justice or grace, law or love. From the point of 
view of justice the problem of pro-active forgiveness is that it 
leaves the offence untouched, there is no repentance. This view 
might be questioned however as pro-active forgiveness clearly does 
have an issue, and in the case of Jesus it is in the development of a 
new relationship and relationships in the community of disciples. If 
Sanders is right and this is what is most central to Jesus' audacious 
concern then the main questions are no longer the relationship of the 
offender to the offended through the offence, but of the offender to 
the offended through the eschatological community. 
Despite Sanders' view about Jesus' own lack of concern about the 
repentance of those whom he forgives and are accepted as his 
disciples we can see that the existence of such a community is of 
great theological and ethical significance. The community of Jesus 
becomes a theologico-ethical sponge which soaks up past wrongs 
and which re-orients individuals and relationships towards a future 
of positive relating and what Vernon White called recreative justice. 
Alister McFadyen reached a similar conclusion about forgiveness in 
the gospels in his study of the individual in social relationships. 2 
McFadyen observes that: 
2McFadyen, A. The Call to Personhood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
1990 
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"Jesus found broken, closed and communicatively distorted 
people in distorted and closed relational networks. The Gospel 
set people free by placing them firmly in an alternative 
communication context from which a new identity could be 
sedimented, even though their social situation might remain 
materially unchanged. In relating to people as though they 
were forgiven, as though they were free from the burden of 
their sins, Jesus intended them as. forgiven and justified 
sinners before others and God in a new way. He pulled the 
future emancipation into the present and thereby established 
new possibilities of identity with and for them. "3 
For McFadyen, then, pro-active forgiveness is anticipatory rather 
than unconditional. In this way he implies that the forgiveness 
might be withdrawn should there not be reformation and repentance 
from within the redeeming and reconciling community. The notion of 
pro-active forgiveness being suggested here is not conditional in 
this way, however, it is genuine forgiveness which is not interested 
in the future of the forgiven as a penitent but as a member of the 
reconciling community, and therefore as a forgiver. In terms of the 
conclusion from our previous section it is the eschatological 
community which recontextualises the relationship of offended and 
offender and which can therefore provide healing for the one and 
forgiveness for the other. 
This theology of forgiveness is consistent with post-Vatican II 
thinking which sees the Church as the community of reconciliation 
and the Anglican tradition which emphasises healing and 
subjectivity with regard to confession and absolution. Moreover, 
while the process of reconciliation certainly takes time it does not 
follow that the moment of forgiveness or reintegration into the 
community should be delayed. For this reason the two contemporary 
approaches to the revitalisation of penance in the Roman Catholic 
Church, that based on general or public absolution or that 
characterised by a re-opening of the Order of Penitents, are 
contradictory. This argument about forgiveness is very clearly in 
favour of the gracious and immediate response of general absolution. 
This is not, of course, pro-active forgiveness; it is a response, but it 
3ibid. p118 
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is a prompt action which can open the door to the deep and healing 
processes which can occur in the context of the reconciling 
community. 
3. FORGIVENESS AND GOD 
In chapter two twentieth century British atonement theology was 
seen to make considerable use of the concept of forgiveness. This 
was the case in the writing of R. C. Moberly who sought to understand 
atonement in categories which were more personal than legal as 
well as in William Temple and Charles Williams who went on to 
forge some of the connections between atonement and the remainder 
of theology and of ethical living. It was only H. R. Mackintosh in our 
brief survey who did not progress very deeply with the ethical and 
theological significance of divine forgiveness, and who was more 
interested in explicating the New Testament theology of 
justification than developing a genuine theology of forgiveness. 
Arthur Lyttleton saw forgiveness as a mystery which transcended 
the normal laws of justice. Temple and Williams went on to explore 
this mystery to see what the ethical and theological meanings were. 
Both showed that there must indeed be ethical connections so that 
forgiveness did not die on the lips of the forgiver but inspired the 
forgiven to live for the other in a way which redeemed, so to speak, 
the generosity which had forgiven them. But both also saw that 
there must be theological connections. 
A recently published study of forgiveness argues that every act of 
forgiveness is a testimony against radical individualism. 4 This is 
part of the reason that we found Haber's approach so unsatisfactory; 
his Kantian presuppositions do not allow for the human and 
relational space and reality in which forgiveness occurs. But 
Temple and Williams do not assume a radical or Kantian 
individualism in their respective theologies of forgiveness and 
atonement. Their thought is of a social and theological order which 
is broken by sin and restored by forgiveness. But this restoration is 
4Shriver, D. W. An Ethic for Enemies (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1995 
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no reconstruction of what was, rather it is the elevation of the 
human to the level of the unified or co-inherent life of God. 
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It is this theological and social context which makes their thinking 
so important for this thesis, and so consistent with its main 
argument regarding forgiveness. The means whereby forgiveness 
occurs or the place of sacrifice or expiation or whatever within the 
process are less important. Williams follows the epistle to the 
Hebrews in seeing that without the shedding of blood there is no 
forgiveness. But this is not a mechanistic argument about the 
necessary conditions for forgiveness. Rather it is a way of 
articulating the extent to which forgiveness is a matter of 
fundamental life and health for the theological community of the 
created order and its relations with the loving and just God who 
created it for eternal love and happiness. It is an argument about 
the connections between forgiveness and life made in symbolic 
language, not a quasi-economic reckoning of the cost of sacrifice. 
The question of absolution is also one which needs to be considered 
under this heading. We have observed that the Roman Catholic and 
the Anglican traditions with regard to confession and absolution 
locate them in rather different pastoral-liturgical space, the one 
being quite objective and juridical, the other more concerned with 
subjectivity and healing. Another difference between the two 
traditions concerns the way in which they have been theologised, 
with the difference between objective and subjective again being 
important. But the most important difference is that confession and 
absolution has never been a compulsory aspect of Anglican 
ecclesiastical life. The personal and autonomous desire to open the 
heart and to receive absolution has been seen to be central to the 
Anglican practice here, the contrary position being likened in one 
manual to sending a policeman to find the prodigal son. 5 
It is for these reasons that absolution is construed differently in 
the two traditions, the one viewing it more in terms of assurance, 
the other more as an act of power over sin. The medieval church 
5J. F. Briscoe 'The Confessional in Practice' in Ed Hubert Box The Theory and 
Practice of Penance (London: SPCK) 1935 p74 
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knew a great deal of controversy over the nature and significance of 
contrition and attrition, and it was in the light of this discussion 
that the teaching and practice with regard to confession and 
absolution was seen to make more or less sense. Part of this 
discussion concerned the locus, as it were, of forgiveness: was it in 
the contrition, the confession, the absolution or the penance? Such 
questions are perhaps sufficient evidence that things are not well 
understood. Equally the distinction between precatory, declaratory 
and indicative absolution reveals very little about the nature of 
forgiveness. Indeed the reason that these matters have not been 
discussed at length is because such a discussion would take us far 
from our subject to the realms of ecciesiology and the nature of 
priesthood. Discussions about absolution do not hang on the issues 
which influence forgiveness but on the often polemical discussion of 
what priests are for and what they and other ministers can and 
cannot do. This is an area which is much confused, with, for 
instance, the argument for indicative absolution with all its 
apparent objectivity and power being typically made for allegedly 
pastoral reasons in Anglicanism. In the Roman tradition, it is now 
customary for the pre-venient forgiveness of God to be emphasised 
to such an extent that the absolution is effectively a declaration and 
the matter of confession more to do with furthering the process of 
reconciliation with the Church than achieving the forgiveness which 
can get that process started. The argument regarding forgiveness 
being made here favours a form of absolution which makes it clear 
that the pardon has been given. This means that on the grounds of 
the theology of forgiveness either a declaratory or an indicative 
formula is appropriate. Distinguishing between the two is 
something which depends more on questions concerning the nature of 
priesthood than on the nature of forgiveness. 
The power and value of absolution lies in the decisive termination of 
the alienation which was instigated by a sinful episode. Writers 
vary in the vividness with which they describe this dissolving of sin 
but agree that it renders the sin something to be forgotten but at the 
same time assert that it does not deal with the consequences of sin. 
This is a sound point. Contrite confession that one has mortally 
harmed another does not bring that other back to health. Nor does it, 
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of course, restore relations with that other person or even suggest 
that there is any obligation or even reason why that other should 
forgive or there be any reconciliation. 6 
In terms of the distinctions made in the third chapter absolution is 
not properly thought of as an act of forgiveness. It is an act of 
pardon in which the one who speaks is not drawn into relationship 
based on the mutual, and to a degree emotional, recognition of the 
offence. Rather the one who speaks transcends the offence. The 
absolution is not pronounced on behalf of the Church but is declared 
on behalf of the God of mercy and compassion. It does nöt mean that 
all is well but it proclaims that God is quick to mercy and 
forgiveness. It is unfortunate that some forms of absolution 
introduce complicating factors: the American Prayer Book allows 
for the questioning of the penitent on the matter of whether or not 
they themselves forgive those who sin against them, and the 
Alternative Service Book has it that God, 'forgives all those who 
truly repent'. When absolution is seen as pardon the problem with 
these intrusions becomes clear. In the context of an act of genuine 
interpersonal forgiveness such matters would be settled in the 
subtle dialogue of verbal and non-verbal communication. The 
situation of pardon, which is by definition the exercise of an 
authority, is likely to be much more formal. Pardon, and therefore 
absolution, cannot be equivocal or conditional or relative. It either 
is or is not pronounced, declared. Liturgical and pastoral 
considerations should be controlled by this primary theological 
insight. This is a situation which demands clarity and 
straightforwardness. The central pastoral necessity is to make a 
break with a bad past, possibly with bad habits, in the interests of a 
new more healthy and more ethical future. There is no ethical, 
theological or psychological place to keep any hostages to fortune. 
There is no currency in which any price could be paid, for that would 
be to change the matter from pardon to exchange. Absolution should 
6Shriver argues that the development of private confession and absolution had a 
negative effect on public and civic life, effectively removing forgiveness from the 
public and political arena. The Church and Christian and post-Christian society are 
still only slowly managing to liberate the idea of forgiveness from the 'sacramental 
captivity' to do its civilising work in human social relations. Shriver, D. W. An Ethic 
for Enemies p49ff 
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be declaratory (and the indicative form is a specific form of 
declaratory) and decisive. It is not the dialogical development of 
relationship but the monological dissolving of the chains of the past 
which would otherwise prevent the development of reconciliatory 
processes. 
Ethically, absolution is a risk. But this is a risk which is now 
familiar to us in the Christian tradition with regard to forgiveness. 
It is the same risk as Jesus took with Zacchaeus. The idea is that 
entry into the eschatological community will provide the forgiven 
sinner with the conditions and the encouragement which lead to the 
living of a better life. It may. It may not. But it is a characteristic 
of the merciful that they are inclined to be quick to admit and slow 
to remove from this fellowship of redemption and potential 
redemption. 
One question which has not yet been aired in this concluding chapter 
concerns what it is that needs to be pardoned in absolution. The 
short answer is, of course, `sin'; but that is an inadequate 
statement of the matter. It will be recalled that one of the 
differences between the relevant rubric in the office for the 
Visitation of the Sick in the two prayer books of Edward VI was that 
while in the first the visitee was urged to open his 'sin and grief' in 
the second he was urged to open his 'grief'. It will further be 
recalled that the 'benefit' of absolution was asserted to be the 
quieting of conscience. Thus the basic problem to which forgiveness 
is the answer indicates that 'grief' and `unquiet conscience' are the 
humanly sensible products, the symptoms as it were, of sin. The 
Anglican tradition recognises that absolution must meet the need of 
the sinner, it must connect with what was then called grief but 
which we may now call guilt and shame. For a consideration of this 
we must pass on to the final section, that of forgiveness and the 
self. 
4. FORGIVENESS AND THE SELF 
In the seventh chapter I argued that contrary to the widely accepted 
view that Christianity was, along with Judaism, a guilt-religion the 
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moral emotion of shame was of great, possibly even greater, 
significance. It is shame which is connected to both pride and self- 
respect but which is so difficult to live with that it is also 
connected in deep and important ways to death. Shame is often 
ashamed of itself and for this reason is often in a very unhealthy 
partnership with guilt, and we observed the way in which guilt 
fuelled by shame generated the tragic and helpless dynamics of 
anorexia nervosa. 
Shame is also a crucially important emotion when it comes to 
interpreting the dynamics of forgiveness, not least in the sacrament 
of penance. The dominant understanding of the history of penance is 
based on the eras of public and private penance, alternatives in 
which shame varies despite guilt being constant. But as Karl Rahner 
has emphasised there is no escaping the public dimension of 
penance, and as Thomas Tentler has shown shame had an important if 
paradoxical place in the Medieval theologies of confession. "The 
penitent is not supposed to be driven to confession by shame, 
nevertheless he is to be ashamed when he gets there. "7 Moreover, 
while there is meant to be shame in a good confession such a 
confession should also be `strong' so that "nothing is omitted out of 
fear of getting too harsh a penance, or out of shame"8. However, 
"Medieval thinkers lived easily with that kind of paradox, and 
the shame of the confessional enjoyed just such a position. In 
one sense it was considered a menace. In another it was held 
in the highest esteem. But it is important to stress that even 
when shame is esteemed it never becomes the central element 
is discipline. Shame before God is more frequently extolled 
than shame before the priest. And shame before the priest is 
itself restricted to the secrecy and privacy of the 
confessional. Shame may reinforce guilt; but shame never 
displaces guilt. "9 
In this interpretation Tentler confounds shame with embarrassment. 
Shame can be a personal rather than a social response, it does not 
7Tentler, T. Sin and Confession on the Eve of the Reformation (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press) 1977 p108 
9Tentler, T. Sin and Confession on the Eve of the Reformation p130 
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need a physical onlooker as Bernard Williams argues. Indeed, the 
self can abhor itself. But, as Dietrich Bonhoeffer realised, there is 
the possibility, in the revelation of shame of the healing of that 
shame. This observation returns us to the Rogerian notion of 
acceptance which, as we saw in the introduction, Paul Tillich among 
many others, estimated to be an appropriate twentieth century 
alternative to the pre-modern notion of forgiveness. 
The argument of this thesis is that forgiveness remains a distinct 
and valid reality and is not to be replaced by acceptance any more 
than by pardon or excuse. The difference however is that while 
excuse mitigates against forgiveness, and pardon is a comparable 
alternative in different circumstances, acceptance is a necessary 
aspect of forgiveness. For the shame and guilt of the other must be 
accepted if there is to be forgiveness. Unless shame and guilt are 
identified and acknowledged there can be no forgiveness. 
In some ways Rogers and Tillich are on solid evangelical ground, in 
as much as the response of Jesus to sinners seems to have been 
more of acceptance than forgiveness. But this is not the only 
response of Jesus, in particular he also forgave those who were 
sick, or as we would prefer to say as there was no evidence of 
previous personal relation, he pardoned or absolved them. 
It follows from our argument about anorexia that it is not guilt so 
much as shame which lies behind the sickness and distress of those 
whom Jesus healed and forgave. Their shame, so difficult to 
articulate and face, was there for all to see as they suffered or 
were carried about. In seeing and mercifully responding to that 
shame Jesus removed it and liberated the person from the bonds of 
guilt, sin and sickness. 
Shame is a difficult and troubling emotion, but it has within it the 
possibility of healing. The ashamed person knows that they need to 
be forgiven, and their shame is part of their repentance. What they 
lack is the assurance of forgiveness and that is something which 
may well begin in the acceptance of their shame by another who has 
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the personal skills and talents, the charisma, to perceive the shame 
and to communicate that it has been accepted. 
The foregoing concerns the healing and curing of the ashamed and 
guilty subject by a third party. In the situation of a face to face 
encounter between the offended and the offender the situation is 
different, but shame remains crucial because it is connected with 
repentance. Had Paula perceived any shame in Roberto her situation 
and her options would have been quite different. Bruno's problem 
was his isolation and loneliness. This meant that there was no way 
of alleviating his shame. For it is an aspect of the condition of 
isolation that there is no other to accept the shame-filled person. 
Being ashamed and yet not having the possibility of it being released 
Bruno rightly questioned the existence of forgiveness. Like Edward 
Damson in The Gift of the Gorgon he suspected that forgiveness was 
to do with the avoidance of sharp moral issues and situations, 
avoidance of the claims of justice. But as we have seen, forgiveness 
is to do with the relation between events in the past and living in 
the present and for the future. Forgiveness is not antinomian but is 
the recognition that events have consequences some of which 
disrupt and harm and even dislocate the self. Forgiveness is based 
on a recognition of this situation of the self and offers it a new 
location in an ethical and eschatological relationship or community. 
Does this mean that the sinful episode, the destructive habit, the 
cause of guilt and shame is forgotten? Many writers emphasise that 
forgiving and forgetting are not corollaries. Their point is that it is 
only by remembering rather than repressing that guilt and shame can 
be revealed, forgiveness occur and reconciliation progress. 
However, it is consistent with the argument of this work that 
forgetting will be a response both to forgiving and being forgiven. 
This point can be made as an implication of the case made in chapter 
four where it was argued that the act of forgiveness reorders the 
significance of various events in the subjects narrative of self or 
autobiography. The cause of shame may, of course, be repressed, in 
which case a psychoanalytic process may be necessary to reveal it. 
But once it is recognised and perceived as a proper object for 
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repentance (provided that there is some real moral responsibility to 
be answered and that the appropriate response is not excuse) then 
that item will assume a disproportionate place in the self-narrative. 
And this in turn causes the anxiety which is shame. This is equally 
true for those who have offended and those who have been subject to 
another's offence or violation. Both need to be set free from the 
shaming and unhealthy influence of this event in the past. 
Forgiveness involves the re-signification of injurious events and 
intentions. It is based on their acknowledgement and identification, 
but also based on their disproportionate importance to the subject, 
indeed that subject's bondage to that event or those events. It is by 
forgiveness that events, episodes and encounters are re-placed in 
the memory in a way which allows that they might be recalled 
alongside other interesting experiences. This is not forgetting, but 
it is likely to reduce the emotional impact and the conscious 
predominance of the relevant reminiscences. It certainly is a 
necessary step in the direction of a personal, social and civil life 
which is oriented towards the future rather than towards the past. 
Jesus' practice of forgiveness was audacious and positive and led to 
the integration of sinners into the eschatological community of 
disciples. It has been argued that the church's practice of 
sacramental and liturgical forgiveness should have a similar energy 
and commitment and that the emphasis on judging contrition, 
seriousness or completeness is ill-placed; what matters for the 
sinner is the integration into the reconciling community. The pardon 
of absolution should therefore be directed at facilitating this 
potentially saving step. 
Forgiveness is a subtle and complex matter, not so much because it 
has a difficult relation with justice, which has been the basis of 
much ethical writing, but because the social and psychological 
dynamics of relating to episodes which induce shame and guilt are 
so fraught. Forgiveness is not particularly concerned with justice, 
nor is it simply an alternative to retribution or punishment. The 
proper location of forgiveness is in the relationship between 
individuals who are alienated by the actions of themselves or 
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another. It is mediated by a generous response which would not 
cover the event entirely but would place it alongside other more 
positive experiences. 
There is an eschatological dimension to all forgiveness. It is 
anticipatory in that it often involves the purposeful putting to one 
side of the injurious event or events in the interests of creating the 
space in which reconciliation might develop through the sharing of 
non-injurious or even positive experiences. This does not mean that 
forgiveness is conditional. It means that it is a risk, and as such 
demands courage from the forgiver. 
Forgiveness posits a new beginning for the sake of both the past and 
the future. It is fundamentally connected to faith because of the 
courage which it requires. Forgiveness therefore makes theological 
and eschatological sense; it also makes psychological sense in that 
it affirms guilt and shame and opens the door to healing. The 
Christian understanding of forgiveness which I have argued is 
located in the theological tradition which sees persons as 
ineluctably social and which would see creation and redemption as 
movements in a salvific spiral which tends towards co-inherence. It 
is a complex matter not because it is confused but because it 
pervades so many different areas of intellectual enquiry. It is an 
important and central matter within Christian tradition and 
civilisation because when properly exercised it can create healing 
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